From Barry Mitchell: Some time ago I placed a notice in our newsletter about a history paper, which had been left at a computer printer at the University of Manitoba. The title of the paper is "A Price, A Pride, A Prayer: Hong Kong and the Winnipeg Grenadiers". It deals with the Defence of Hong Kong in 1941 and it summarized many newspaper articles, which were published at that time. It also included comments in various journals about sending troops to Hong Kong and the role politics might have played in that decision. It's an interesting paper and it provides a good summary of public opinion at the time of the Japanese invasion. We never did find the owner of this paper. Now, I'm involved in the HKVCA because my dad, Lieut. W. Vaughan Mitchell was killed in Hong Kong and this university paper was found by my oldest son who is named after my dad. I don't know about you, but I pause when I think of the U of M student Vaughan Mitchell finding a lonely history paper at three in the morning, about his grandfather, Lieut. W. Vaughan Mitchell who had been killed about 60 years previously. I'm told that God works in mysterious ways, but maybe this is just all coincidence. Or maybe…….?? https://www.hkvca.ca/newsltr/archives/MB/Manitoba_Dec_2002.pdf
Editor's note: Here is the transcript of that paper. If anyone knows who the original author is, please contact the webmaster. We would love to acknowledge and credit their work.
In the fall of 1941, British Chiefs of Staff decided to buttress the garrison in Great Britain's eastern colony of Hong Kong, requesting these additional troops from Canadian armed forces. It was hoped that strengthening the British position in Hong Kong would send a forceful message both to Japan and to Britain's eastern Allies, that Britain was committed to her territories in the east.1 The result of this decision was devastating. Supplementing the Allied forces in this small Pacific colony, at a moment when Japan's entry into the war was imminent, only served to intensify the suffering that was endured by troops when Japan attacked Hong Kong in full force on December 16th, 1941. Two Canadian battalions were engaged in this impossible struggle, which ended in Allied surrender on Christmas Day, the Royal Rifles of Canada, from the Quebec City area, and the Winnipeg Grenadiers. Out of the 1975 Canadian personnel that were sent to Hong Kong, 537 would never return, dying in warfare or in the horrific conditions experienced in Japanese prisoner of war camps.2
As one of the first major military engagements of Canadian forces against an Axis power, the event had great significance for those back in Canada. Many homes in Manitoba were hit directly due to the involvement of the local battalion, the Winnipeg Grenadiers. From the moment that their participation in the battles of Hong Kong was made known, members of the Grenadiers were honoured as local heroes. For the first month after the disaster, the Winnipeg Free Press printed daily the pictures and brief biographies of the men, the "gallant Canadians who fought at Hong Kong." 26 Winnipeg, and the surrounding area, was clearly proud to have its own sons involved in an international theatre of war.
However, critics of the ill-fated expedition emerged in the weeks and months to come, as facts regarding the decision to send Canadian troops were revealed. While there was little debate about the decision to accept Britain's request by the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa3extensive debates followed in the wake of the disaster. One of the early critics of the expedition was the leader of the Conservative party in Ontario, George Drew, who argued that the men sent to Hong Kong were ill-trained; a point, which in his mind, proved the need for national conscription.4In the House of Commons, parliamentarians engaged in heated discussions around these issues in the first six months of 1942, culminating with debates over the official inquiry into the affair, a Royal Commission headed by Sir Lyman Duff. This report, which came out in June, 1942, concluded that the Canadian government had committed no major sins in sending its forces to Hong Kong. Many opponents of the government disagreed with Duff's findings, however, supporting Drew's view that the situation was mishandled.
How were Manitobans engaging in these debates? The experience of Hong Kong did not appear to lessen the spirit of those touched personally by it; instead, they sought to work harder and more effectively in their war contributions. A poetic offering in the Winnipeg Free Press the day after Hong Kong fell, reflected, "Hong Kong upon our lips, Hong Kong in every beating thought...Hong Kong, a price, a pride, a prayer." Indeed, there was pride in the achievements of the local battalion, and prayers for those on eastern shores whose fate was unknown. As for the price, it was perceived as necessary by some and unnecessary by others; all, however, agreed that the maximum potential benefit should be gained from the painful experience of Hong Kong. In this context, the discussion surrounding the debacle, as evidence in the House of Commons and local newspapers, demonstrated the need for Manitobans to reconcile the reality of the disaster with the desire to give a valid contribution to the Allied war effort. Those who were critical of the event never questioned the role of the soldiers involved, but blamed top officials responsible for implementing the operation, and attempted to use the experience to bring enact changes. Moreover, making the reconciliation easier was the fact that precise casualty lists, and extent of the horrors experienced by prisoners in Japanese camps, was not immediately known.
The price that Manitobans were willing to pay for their war contribution was, of course, no measurable, uniform sum: across the province, a multitude of opinions existed. Members of the Manitoba Mennonite community, for instance, were opposed to active service because of their religious beliefs, with roughly 2,500 declaring status as conscientious objectors in the Second World War. Ethnic ties with the people of Germany also made some Mennonites slightly less than enthusiastic about the campaign against their homeland.5 However, many Manitobans did support a strong Canadian role in the Allied war effort. The throne speech in the Manitoba Legislature of December, 1942, strongly urged the Dominion to engage itself in an unambiguous "total war" effort.6 In June 1942, the Winnipeg Tribune reported that rural recruitments were extremely high, putting Manitoba "at the top of the recruiting list for Canada." 3341- 15 Jun 42 That same spring, Manitobans had voted overwhelmingly in favour of relinquishing Prime Minister King from his initial promise not to invoke conscription during the war. Many in the province, therefore, wished to make a strong contribution to Canada's effort, and were willing to endure some hardship for that cause.
The Winnipeg Free Press, touted by opponents as the "organ of the Liberal Party," 7and under the direction of J.W. Dafoe, a reputed "Liberal nationalist"8, certainly advocated unstinted cooperation with the government over military matters. When Parliament opened in Ottawa in November, 1941 for a new session, the editorial page in the Press warned, "There is not reason for any Canadian to be at all ashamed of his country's war effort to date, but every Canadian must be made to realize that we have only just begun to fight, to produce and to sacrifice."9 Elaborating on this theme when Japanese forces bombed Pearl Harbour a month later, engaging the Allies in both eastern and western hemispheres, the call for a stringent effort was yet stronger: All these new demands the Allies will face with a glad heart, each one assuming for herself that share of the load that falls to her lot to carry, and Canada, we may be sure, will be first among all the Allies to recognize her new responsibility. The months to come will be hard for us all, but they will not be so hard that they cannot be borne. 10
These were ominous foreshadowings of events soon to come. However, according to the Grenadiers' commander, Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.R. Sutcliffe, his men were more than happy to experience their first taste of warfare. While the Grenadiers were in the heat of the battle, the Free Press reported how Lieutenant-Colonel Sutcliffe, prior to the event, had indicated "the battalion's desire for active role." 11Desire for action, and commitment to the war cause, then, seemed strong from both the battalion and the paper that supported the battalion.
In fact, Manitoba was not the only province hoping that Canada would establish itself as a nation among nations during this time. In the spring of 1941, the Department of National Defence was concerned about the inactivity of Canadian troops, which were, according to the Department, suffering from a decline in morale as a result of limited action. It was with this sentiment that Colonel J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, made it clear to the British Secretary of State that Canadian forces were to be used wherever and whenever needed.12 The desire for action was also in the mind of Canadian Chief of General Staff, Harry Crerar, when he gave his approval for Canadian invovlement in Hong Kong. 13 It was evident to these individuals that there were clear gains to be achieved in having Canadian troops at the front; namely, in improving the morale of soldiers and the Canadian public.
Without a doubt, the battles in Hong Kong effectively launched Canadians into the fullness of the war experience, and equipped leaders of the war with useful rhetoric. When Colonel Ralston made his statement in the House of Commons about the Hong Kong expedition in January of 1942, he was able to proudly cite Lieutenant-Colonel Sutcliffe of the Winnipeg Grenadiers: "Canadian troops part prisoners, residue engaged, causalities heavy...troops have done magnificent work, spirit excellent." Ralston could truthfully sum up, without having to refer to the wisdom of sending troops in the first place, that "The defence of Hong Kong is in accordance with the finest traditions of Canadian armies." 4473-j21 The Free Press went farther, declaring the very day after Hong's Kong's fall that "enough of [the story of Hong Kong] can be surmised to justify, if justification must be sought, the sacrifice of thousands of the flower of our nation's youth," since the defence of Hong Kong was useful in matters of "diplomacy and grand strategy." 14 In the immediate aftermath, then, without knowing the full details of the expedition, or indeed the fate of the thousands of soldiers involved, it was a relatively simple task to bridge the distance between the loss suffered, and the benefits gained from the Hong Kong experience.
In fact, once local pride was added to national pride, the Grenadiers and their fellow-soldiers apparently won even more than they had "lost" in Hong Kong. From the outset local pride was paramount to the way in which news of the Grenadiers' activities was received by Winnipeg newspapers. The Winnipeg Tribune was proud to report that the Grenadiers, filled with "the citizens of the prairies," had "won the admiration of the entire democratic world" 15 Free Press articles were equally pleased to note the connection between hardy Manitobans and the excellent Grenadier soldiers, even after the fall of the colony: True Manitobans, who did not know meaning of defeat, the members of the first battalion of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, had won many a fight against the elements, carried through many a seemingly impossible task in their native province before they amazed the world and won a new battle honor for Canadian arms by their part in the heroic defence of Hong Kong. 16
Using the language of victory, this report indicated that the Grenadiers, and, as a result, all Manitobans, were more triumphant than defeated, despite the obvious fact that the Japanese attack was entirely successful. Local pride, therefore, was a key factor in casting a more positive light on the otherwise dismal reality of Japanese victory. Furthermore, there was evidence that the losses suffered during the defense of Hong Kong were a motivating factor for enlisting soldiers. The Winnipeg Tribune reported on December 31, 1941 that recruitments has reached a record in Winnipeg. The dispatch revealing this information indicated that "Volunteers gave as their reason for enlisting, desire to avenge conjectured losses among Winnipeg Grenadiers at Hong Kong, [and] realization after hearing Prime Minister Churchill's address before United States Congress that the war will be long and all-out effort is needed." 17 Manitobans, then, showed support of the military campaign not only through words, but through actions as well.
Nevertheless, there were certainly those who felt that a better use of resources and man-power could have been demonstrated. Even at an early date dissident voices were raised. On December 22, 1941, the Tribune printed an article from London which headlined, "Critics To Ask Why Hong Kong Garrison Small." These critics suggested that troops ought to have been evacuated from, not added to, the outpost. The article agreed, however, that Britain should have attempted to hold on to the territory, and concluded that there was simply a lack of resources and man-power to properly hold it. Moreover, it was careful to headline that "Valour Not Missing" from the soldiers in question. 18 Therefore, pride, in the possession of territory, and in the performance of troops, helped to justify the fight for Hong Kong.
In a similar manner, a dissatisfied veteran from Birtle, Manitoba expressed his concerns in the Free Press: I am no defeatist, as I have served my country in two wars. My opinion is that our men could have been put to better use in Singapore...Our troops have proved their metal [sic] on many battlefields, and will fight to the last but it is too much to ask our men to sacrifice themselves for a piece of land, which, it has been admitted cannot be held effectively against superhuman odds. 19 This man denounced the decision to send troops to Hong Kong, while remaining confident in the capabilities of the soldiers themselves. Months later, a Winnipegger voiced exactly the same concern in the Tribune, looking beyond decisions made by Canadian military officials, to Allied grand strategy, asking "why was not Hong Kong evacuated in favor of Singapore?" and concluding "This was apparently the greatest blunder of the Pacific war zone. 20 Therefore, the criticisms offered about the expedition were directed toward the decision-makers, while the sanctity of soldiers defence of Hong Kong was preserved.
That there was something questionable about the leadership involved in the Hong Kong decision was evident to politicians as well. These small voices from Manitoba were echoed in the rants of parliamentarians in Ottawa. Here, just as in Manitoba, a variety of opinions were articulated. The first in-depth discussions in the House of Commons about the issue occurred in late January, 1942. R.B. Hanson, leader of the Conservative party, and thus of the official opposition, initially supported the decision to send men to Hong Kong, declaring, "If we are to be in a total war, and to undertake a total war effort...we must expect to share, in common with the other gallant soldiers of the British empire, and of our democratic allies, the fortunes of war." b4474-21j42 Hanson implied, then, that part of what made the soldiers so gallant was the fact that they had suffered considerable losses; this was a significant element in his acceptance of the situation.
Critics of the expedition also paid homage to the men involved, but used their losses to prove that the Department of National Defence mishandled the operation. One of the most ardent critics, C.C.F. representative Tommy Douglas, from the Saskatchewan constituency of Weyburn, called for an investigation into the government's role in the affair. Douglas, who informed the House that he had lived in barracks with Saskatchewan men who were sent overseas as part of the Winnipeg Grenadier battalion, announced that "One expects to lose one's comrades in war time, but not through incompetence and negligence, and if there have been blunders we expect the government to see that the persons responsible are properly punished." 520-12f42 For Douglas, then, the fate of the men in Hong Kong rendered the experience a disaster, rather than a glorious battle honour for Canadians.
For the M.P.s from Manitoba who involved themselves in the debate, their pride in the activities of Manitoban troops in this event was clear, regardless of their partisan affiliations. J.A. Ross, a Conservative member representing the constituency of Souris, declared that "As a member coming from Manitoba, I wish to express our great admiration for those chaps who went to Hong Kong." 4476-21j42. Weeks later, Liberal representative Leslie Mutch of Winnipeg South continued in this vein, introducing a lengthy speech about Canada's contribution to the Allied effort with the following comments: "As a member from the city of Winnipeg I think it both natural and appropriate that my first words in this chamber during this session should be a tribute to those fellow townsmen of mine who fought the Canadian fight in the city of Hong Kong." 246-2feb42 Not only was Mutch proud of the fame gained by the Winnipeg battalion, he was also supportive of government action in the matter, maintaining that "anybody in Canada faced with the decision that he [Charles Power, Minister of National Defence on Air] had to make would have agreed to send two battalions to Hong Kong." ib Ross, on the other hand, used his personal experience to criticize the way in which the affair was handled: "...a young friend of mine enlisted from my own community and within three months of being attested he was on his way to Hong Kong. I think that is wrong." 4475 While the arguments of these men differed, both were prefaced with an emphasis on the performance of Manitoban soldiers in Hong Kong. Clearly it was not these soldiers who were being attacked, but the government which sent them overseas.
The experience of Hong Kong bolstered, rather than diminished, the desire of Manitobans to make a contribution to the war effort, and this tendency is evident in the issue of conscription. Anti-conscriptionists used events like Hong Kong to demonstrate the irresponsibility of the government in wasting human life. La ligue pour la defense du Canada, a Quebec-based anti-conscriptionists group, rallied people to its cause with such cries as "Souvenons-nous de Hong-Kong." 224cdawar In Manitoba, however, not only did the province support Mackenzie King's plebiscite, which asked for the approval of citizens to use conscription "if necessary," some criticized the need for a plebiscite at all. J.A. Ross from Souris expressed such a view when he declared the plebiscite to be "the negation of parliamentary responsibility," then subsequently worked to obtain a "yes" vote in his constituency. 3340-15june42 A less prominent Manitoban, C. Highfield writing from Oatseed P.O., echoed these ideas when he wrote to the Free Press, captioned under the heading "Sees No Reason to Keep Conscription Promise," declaring it to be a political manoeuvre at the expense of the war itself.21
These pro-conscription attitudes were then linked to the disaster of Hong Kong. Matt Carey from Winnipeg complained to the Free Press that "I consider it nothing but criminal negligence for our Canadian troops being compelled to fight overwhelming enemy odds [in Hong Kong] that are trained to the limit while thousands of young Canadians are strutting our streets and arenas with hockey sticks instead of rifles slung over their shoulders." 22 In the House of Commons, Ross also articulated the idea that Hong Kong proved the need for conscription, pointing out that conditions under which men were sent to Hong Kong demonstrated deficiencies in the voluntary system. 3342- 15 june 42 Therefore, Hong Kong was used on both sides of the conscription issue, to prove that it was a criminal offence on one hand, and imperative on the other. For those who supported conscription in Manitoba, the event did not reduce, but rather intensified, their zeal.
Leslie Mutch, from Winnipeg South, followed in Mackenzie King's footsteps by supporting conscription if necessary, but only when absolutely so. The greatest lesson he felt could be learned from Hong Kong was a tactical one, since the losses suffered were "due not so much to lack of man-power as to lack of an aeroplane roof over their heads and lack of communications." As a result, he suggested that rather than infusing the armed forces with more men, new recruits should be directed to the air force, where they "can make a greater contribution to the war effort of our allies and ourselves." 249-2 feb 42 Mutch therefore came to a different conclusion about the Hong Kong experience than Ross did, but ultimately had the same objective in mind: to ensure that Canadians, members of his own province included, were a crucial, contributing part of the Allied campaign.
On June 5, 1942, the official report of Sir Lyman Duff's Royal Commission, investigating the actions of the Canadian government in handling the matter, was tabled in the House of Commons. The bulk of the debates about this report occurred on July 27 and 28 of that year. Howard Green, representing Vancouver South, began discussions by introducing an amendment to the report, claiming that the report "reveals convincing proof of incapacity on the part of the responsible military authorities and demonstrates the immediate and urgent need for a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of National Defence." 4782-27 The major issues at stake were whether or not all men sent to Hong Kong had adequate training, why major pieces of equipment allotted to the battalions went sent too late to be of use to them after Japan attacked, and why Canadian military officials did not have sufficient intelligence of their own to properly assess the gravity of the Hong Kong situation, using instead the intelligence obtained from Great Britain. In the matter of training, about 440 troops had been added to the experienced battalions to bring them up to full strength; at least 120 of these had not had time to complete their required training period.23
As the debate developed, those who had personal connections to the men involved strove to ensure that the government was using its human resources effectively; that, if nothing else, Hong Kong would be a lesson of how not to administer similar operations. Not surprisingly, J.A. Ross of Souris engaged in the debates in late July with a personal fervour, declaring that the men he knew in Hong Kong and the relatives of those men, "would expect that I should say something in this discussion." Thinking of "what might happen to our forces in a much larger degree if...mistakes [of Hong Kong] are not rectified," Ross offered his suggestions as to how Canada might improve her military operations. He censured the government for relying completely on the intelligence received from Great Britain, and argued that Canada should be represented on an imperial war council. Furthermore, he used the improper training of soldiers to once again promote the need for conscription, "to avoid a repetition of Hong Kong." The selection of soldiers for this expedition was indeed a concern of those back in Manitoba, for Ross read a letter from a woman whose son had gone to Hong Kong, who wondered "how many men were taken out of the Tuxedo hospital, Winnipeg, and put on the train with the Grenadiers on the evening they left." 4844-48 jul 28 At the center of Ross' criticisms of government actions, then, were the men and families who were adversely affected by these actions. His call was not for a reduced effort due to the suffering endured, but for a more effective one.
What of the other Manitoban members of parliament? Besides Mutch and Ross, no other M.P.s from Manitoba contributed to the Hong Kong debate. Ross was the sole Conservative member from Manitoba, J.S. Woodsworth was the only member of the C.C.F., and two other M.P.s were Liberal-Progressives. Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that the remaining M.P.s, all Liberal, remained silent amidst the criticisms of of their own party, the official government. Indeed, their silence speaks volumes, and suggests that they agreed with the position of their leaders. The ultimate argument from those at the government's helm was that Canada had no real alternative to accepting Great Britain's request for battalions for Hong Kong. According to the Minister of National Defence, if Canada had refused to send men to Hong Kong, it "would have left a question mark in the minds not only of the people of Canada but of people all over the world." 4811-j28 Sir Lyman Duff's report had concluded that "In view of what other dominions had done in Abyssinia and Libya it was Canada's turn to help...such an appeal from the predominant partner in the common cause could not be rejected." 3091-5 jun 42 It was this argument, that to refuse a request from the British Empire would have considerably reduced Canada's military and national status, which justified the event in the eyes of the government, Manitobans M.P.s included.
This was the ultimate opinion of the Free Press. As information regarding the Hong Kong incident began to unfold in the first months of 1942, the paper conceded that an inquiry must be held, reporting in late January the fact that vehicles intended to accompany the troops had not arrived in time for the Japanese attack. 23jp1122 jan p13
During the debates of late July, it was also suggested that the event could be used to improve the training procedures of the armed forces. 29 jul p9 However, in the end, the Free Press concluded that the decision to send men to Hong Kong was unavoidable; that had Canadian men not been sent, opponents of the government would have criticized the lost opportunity for Canadian troops to be active. 24 Two weeks later, in its final column on the debates, the editorial page contained the following, under the heading "In retrospect": "...the other British nations which have suffered military disasters far outranking any that have overtaken Canada, have not regarded it as necessary or wise to have them investigated by non-military agencies and then made a football for political discussion," 25and delivered a scathing reproach of the principal agitators. Not only did the Press feel that government actions were justified, under the circumstances, but it also condemned the efforts of the opposition to use the event as a means of attacking the Liberals. Sharing the same viewpoint, a "1914 Veteran" complained in a letter to the paper that the "fuss over Hong Kong" made by the Conservative party was an unjustified excuse to lambaste the Liberals. 26>Such sentiments reflected the attitude that motivation for instigating the Hong Kong debates was more about partisan politics than about legitimate criticisms of the government.
The Tribune was much more suspicious of the government's actions, and used the event to discuss an apparently favourite theme of the paper. On July 28, 1942, an editorial column claimed that "It is more than three years now since The Tribune appealed to the government to supply the Canadian Army...with enough weapons and equipment for training in modem warfare." The government had failed in this regard, according to the Tribune. The paper offered another means by which the local citizens could feel better about the Hong Kong situation. A campaign to send cigarettes to prisoners in Hong Kong had begun, and the Tribune framed this project in terms of local pride. Under the headline "Something We Can Do About Hong Kong," it stated, "Our idea of the very latest definition of 'the meanest man,' is the Canadian who would not dip into his pocket for smokes for our boys in Hong Kong. But Winnipeg is not mean, and never was. 27 Not only did the campaign for smokes permit local citizens to take an active part in assisting their men overseas, but in indicating that Winnipeg was always eager to give, the words of the Tribune subtly made a parallel between the sacrifice made by men in Hong Kong and the generosity of the city: Winnipeggers would give whenever and whatever the circumstances. Local pride, therefore, continued to give some sort of legitimacy to the Hong Kong experience.
Another factor which helped ease the gap between the losses suffered and the benefits gained was the limited information on the status of troops in Hong Kong's aftermath. Those soldiers who were not killed in battle were put into Japanese prisoner of war camps, but exact numbers and conditions of these circumstances were unknown. During the months following the surrender, rumours abounded, and there was debate as to what and how much information the government should release to the Canadian public. In February, 1942, Tommy Douglas reported in the House of Commons that accounts of Japanese atrocities were being published in Ottawa newspapers, and urged the Prime Minister to make "an appeal both to the press and to the radio not to announce and repeat such heart-rending stories about these men until the government itself has been able to verify their authenticity." 598-16f42 Shortly after, the Minister of National Defence, announced an official estimate that 296 Canadians were dead or missing. 28 The Free Press acknowledged the pain that such information would bring to Manitoban families, but agreed that Ralston had acted appropriately in devolving this intelligence. While it left families and friends of Hong Kong soldiers under an intensified "strain," the lack of confirmed knowledge also allowed for a kind of noble sacrifice: "...all that is left to us is to do what we can to give support and sympathy to those thousands of Canadian homes which lie today under so sad an uncertainty. May the fountain of their patience and endurance be kept filled 29 In fact, the estimate of 296 killed or missing was a far cry from the 537 who eventually suffered that fate. In the meantime, then, while individuals waited for more precise information, the effects of the disaster were with muted over with elevated rhetoric.
Throughout the summer months, more gruesome reports filtered into the papers. A source in Lourenco Marques, Portuguese East Africa, supplied numerous accounts of casualties suffered and deplorable conditions faced by Canadian soldiers in Japanese camps. 30 However, the government declared at the end of July, 1942, that these accounts had not received official authentification. 31 But the confusion was evident since a week later, a Free Press article headlined, "Japs Hold 14 Winnipeggers, Soldier Writes." 31 This indicated the extent to which the fate of Canadian soldiers in Japan was unknown, as conflicting and unsubstantiated statements emerged. The uncertainty caused by lack of knowledge would have been a painful experience for many families; however, because the full extent of the disaster was not known in 1942, it was not as large a factor in firing the debates about the expedition as it might have been had full casualty lists been available from the outset.
Moreover, part of the horror of the event were the atrocities committed by Japanese emprisoners toward Allied soldiers, and these were not known for a considerable length of time. By the time such news came to the Canadian government and the public, as some did in the early part of 1944, much of the passion generated in criticisms of sending men to Hong Kong had dissipated. The only fierce words in these reports were directed at the Japanese, not the government that had sent men to fight. One woman, whose opinion was printed in the Tribune, knew exactly where to pin her disgust at hearing news of Japanese atrocities: "I felt the gorge rise in my throat, the steel enter my hear, and horrified bafflement encompass my brain...Let us direct the fury that we feel at the right object. That object is the super-state, the all-embracing Leviathan- eternal enemy of the human race on this earth. 33 Therefore, by the time such news arrived in Canada, the attention had sufficiently turned away from military officials responsible for sending men to Hong Kong.
Even the experience of the P.O.W camps, however, could be used to make Hong Kong a profitable enterprise. Staff-Sergeant Harry P. McNaughton served with the Winnipeg Grenadiers, and spent almost four years in the camp at Shamshuipo, Hong Kong. While emprisoned, he wrote numerous poems to portray his experience there, which were printed in a booklet, "Shadow Lights of Shamshuipo Hong Kong: A Rhyming Picture of the Yesteryears." In a preface to one of his poems that was printed on a broadsheet, entitled "Sick Bay-Shamshuipo," he wrote of the horrid conditions endured in the camp: "For several months, we buried four and five of our comrades every day...Picture if you can, Huts without doors, windows, lights, no beds. No Anti-toxin serum, not even common ordinary salts. A complete indifference to this tragic situation on the part of the Japanese.' However, despite such circumstances, McNaughton was able to maintain a hopeful outlook through humour and companionship: "Your rice was rather tasteless/Till a pal passed you some salt/For you always found a buddy/Mongst the lame, the blind the halt. 35 The majority of his poems reflect a resilient attitude to the hardships he experienced, as he drew on his religious faith and faith in mankind to find the positive side of his situation.
In fact, McNaughton's words best reflect the idea that once Hong Kong became personal, the need to reconcile reality and the desire to make a valid contribution was prevalent. Ultimately, McNaughton found that something of value had been achieved by the experience of Hong Kong and the years in camp. In the introduction to his volume of poems, he reflected:
Some of the incidents at Shamshuipo were perhaps such as we would much rather forget; yet, in the recollection of many of them, there will be a justifiable pride in doing so. Certainly we have nothing but the greatest of admiration for the manner in which most of the boys took it on the chin...Who shall know, better than ourselves, that it all has been good for us. We have been through the hard school, but our education in the matter of acquiring a new and higher sense of human values, goes without saying. 36
Just as those at home had done, McNaughton sought to emphasize the benefits of the situation, so that he could demonstrate that he and his comrades had accomplished something concrete and vital through their action, that all was not done in vain. Above all, it was the pride of, and the lessons from, the sacrifice endured that gave value to the dismal reality of defeat and emprisonment.
Moreover, also reflecting the pattern witnesses in Manitoba, local pride formed an integral element of reshaping the experience in a more positive fashion. McNaughton's poem "The Winnipeg Grenadiers," encapsulates these ideas, as he wrote that: "And then behind the wire/They suffered grief and pain/ But in spite of all the suffering,/You found them good and game./So I'm proud of having joined them/As for me I'll shed no tears/For being Armourer Sergeant/To the Winnipeg Grenadiers."37 McNaughton, therefore, took the painful experience of the P.O.W camp, the time "behind the wire," and turned it into an intense pride in the Winnipeg gang who could survive the ordeal. Hong Kong was not an event which either the Winnipeg Grenadiers or Manitobans who lived through the war would soon forget. To reconcile the effects of the disaster in its aftermath, some Manitobans justified the incident in light of the desire to have Canada assume her proper responsibility within the Allied war campaign, and to have Manitobans assume their responsibility within Canada's contribution. Those who criticized Hong Kong did so with the hope of improving the nation's war contribution, rather than weakening it, looking to the actions of Canada's military authorities to ensure that the lives of ordinary soldiers were protected. Never did these critics forget the the pride of having a Winnipeg battalion prominent in a turbulent theatre of war either. In a nostalgic look back in December, 1974, Vince Leah of the Winnipeg Tribune summarized the history of the Grenadiers, remarking, "the regiment's 57 years are proudly punctuated with valourous deeds and tragic sacrifice...from the slopes of Vimy Ridge to the disaster of Hong Kong." 38 Whether the event was accepted or debated, it was certainly remembered, on that point, at least, there could be no argument.
1 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, in Paul Dickson, "Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong Kong," Canadian Military History (1994) 3:1, p. 100. 2 Desmond Morton, Canada at War: A Military and Political History (Toronto: Butterworth's, 1981) 109. 3 Cabinet War Committee, Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, Vol. VI, 2 October 1941, p.9. 4 J.L. Granatstein, Conscription in the Second World War, 1939-1945: A Study in Political Management (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969) p.50. 5 E.K. Francis, In Search of Utopia: The Mennonites in Manitoba (Altona, Manitoba: D.W. Friesen & Sons Ltd., 1955) pp. 234-236. 6 Winnipeg Tribune, 17 December 1941. 7 Manitoba Provincial Committee, Labor-Progressive Party, in Leslie Morris, "Whose War?-A Reply to the Liberal Party's Winnipeg Free Press" 8 Ramsay Cook, The Politics of John W. Dafoe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) p. ix. 9 Winnipeg Free Press, 6 November 1941, p. 15. 10 Ibid., 8 December 1941, p. 13. 11 Ibid., 23 December 1941, p. 13. 12 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 199) pp.40-41. 13 Dickson, p.102. 14 Winnipeg Free Press, 26 December 1941, p. 17. 15 Winnipeg Tribune, 26 December 1941, p.13. 16 Winnipeg Free Press, 26 December 1941, p.6. 17 Winnipeg Tribune, 31 December 1941, p.2. 18 Winnipeg Tribune, 22 December 1941, p.3. 19 Winnipeg Free Press, 27 December 1941, p.8. 20 Winnipeg Tribune, 29 July 1942, p.7. 21 Winnipeg Free Press, 6 December 1941, p. 15. 22 Ibid., 3 January 1942, p. 18. 23 C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific, Volume I (Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War) (Ottawa: Emond Cloutier, 1955) p.455. 24 Ibid. 27 July 1942, p. 11. 25 Ibid., 13 August 1942, p.13. 26 Ibid. 8 August 1942, p.8. 27 Ibid., 1 August 1942, p.6. 28 Winnipeg Free Press., 26 February 1942, p. 13. 29 Ibid. 30 Winnipeg Tribune, 24 July 1942, p.7; Winnipeg Free Press, 24 July 1942, p.9. 31 Winnipeg Free Press, 30 July 1942, p.11. 32 Ibid., 7 August 1942, p. 1. 33 Winnipeg Tribune, 2 February 1944, p. 6. 34 Harry P. McNaughton, "Sick Bay-Shamshuipo,"Harry P. McNaughton Collection, P. A.M, broadsheet. 35 Harry P. McNaughton, "Did You Ever Stop to Figure," in "Shadow Lights of Shamshuipo Hong Kong: A Rhyming Picture of the Yesteryears," (nd) Harry P. McNaughton Collection, P.A.M, p. 24. 36 Ibid. introduction. 37 Ibid., "The Winnipeg Grenadiers," p.42. 38 Winnipeg Tribune, 7 December 1974, A.V.F. "Military-Winnipeg Grenadiers," P.A.M.