The battle for Hong Kong, while possessing some interesting features, demonstrated few tactical novelties and progressed to an inevitable conclusion.
The Japanese, as is often the situation with the victors, offer little scope for analysis. They deployed a larger force of better-trained and better-equipped troops, exploited their superior mobility, had the capacity to concentrate against weak points in the defence, and so won the battle. Yet there were, indeed, occasions when their talent for flexibility and improvisation seem to have deserted them. The initial slowness in taking advantage of the opening Colonel Doi's initiative had gained for them at the Gin Drinkers Line, and the three days when Shoji's and Doi's men flailed around in the Wong Nei Chong Gap area while Tanaka's men squatted above Repulse Bay, are not examples of supreme military efficiency. Indeed, except for the first day of the Island invasion, when the Japanese exploited their ability and willingness to move over high ground -probably one of the biggest surprises to the defenders -to gain them an overwhelming tactical advantage, the battle was little more than a slogging match until Doi's two, savage, successive blows against Mount Nicholson and Mount Cameron opened the way. After the first few hours of the Island battle, it is doubtful whether even a stronger and more skilfully handled garrison could have seriously affected the issue, but there were times when it could have dealt the Japanese some heavy blows and dislocated their plans.
When the defence is considered, it is all too easy for the armchair critic, armed with both hindsight and a view of "both sides of the hill", to condemn the conduct of operations by Major General Maltby and his brigade commanders. Maltby, faced with the execution of a difficult task with inadequate means, unquestionably did his best. To what extent the defence could have been better handled must be left to the reader.
The only possible basis for Maltby's decision to hold the Gin Drinkers Line for a period must have been an inaccurate appreciation of Japanese strength and efficiency. If he had known that he would be attacked by a beefed-up division of experienced and well-trained soldiers, he would hardly have taken the risk of losing half his garrison when the Line was breached. Even though the Japanese were thrown off balance by their rapid penetration of the Line, the fact that the defenders were successfully evacuated is to the credit of all concerned. The decision not to hold Devil's Peak to the last was an unfortunate reversal of original plans.
It is Maltby's dispositions for the defence of the Island that have been subjected to the most severe criticism. Even one of his own senior officers was to state that Maltby, though a newcomer to the Island, embodied in his defence plans strongly-held personal ideas, including one to the effect that the "Japs will not attack over the hills and mountain tops". His decision to adopt a perimeter defence for the Island was against the advice of his brigade commanders, and Wallis believed that during the battle, Maltby overestimated his own troops' ability to move over rough terrain as much as he underestimated that of the Japanese.
The lack of provision for a vigorous counter-attack should the perimeter defences be breached,is the most obvious fault of Maltby's plan, though it is possible that this lack may be partly blamed on his brigadiers. Despite the increasing indications of the threat to the north coast of the Island, no alterations were made to the defences, and at the moment of the Japanese landing, the only counter-attack force on hand was Lawson's "flying column" of three platoons. A strong case can be made that Maltby should have relied on the powerful south coast defences to delay any attempt to land there and kept the Canadians either near the centre of the Island or, if he had been willing to take the chance, on the rearward portion of the north face. In view of Japanese speed and efficiency and the defenders' lack of transport and Intelligence, whether strong and effective counter-attacks could ever have been made is doubtful, but the siting of the troops made it impossible.
Through a combination of bad positioning, ill fortune during the first day's fighting, command indecision, and faulty information, Maltby's infantry force, which was initially not markedly inferior in numbers to the invaders, was never employed in such a manner as to have any chance of decisively impeding the enemy.
The men of the 5/7 Rajput Regiment cannot be greatly condemned for their dissolution under the impact of many times their number during the invasion of the north shore. The death in this battle of so many of the senior personnel was doubly unfortunate, as it meant that the ill-trained and inexperienced men who fled south were never rallied, and only a handful played any further part in the fighting. The effective part played in the battle by the surviving Rajput company (B) showed what this unit might have been capable of under other circumstances.
The 2nd Royal Scots, as Fortress Reserve, was the only battalion that was thrown into the battle on the first day of the invasion with decision, determination, and in almost full strength. Unfortunately, they ran into a succession of bloody ambushes and then were sent into Wong Nei Chong Gap in the same fashion that the Light Brigade went into the valley of Balaclava, and with much the same result. On that day, the Royal Scots probably showed more raw courage, suffered more casualties, and achieved less than any other unit. It was reduced to a third of its former strength, and although it stayed in the fighting, it could not be called on to play a major role.
The experience of the 2/14 Punjab Regiment was almost exactly the opposite. It was rarely committed to battle in strength, and many of the Punjabs were not heavily engaged until they were used to strengthen the line in the last confused day's fighting before the capitulation. Because so many of its men continued to man pillboxes on the western portion of the north coast, or were held in reserve positions in Victoria during the first days of battle, those companies that were sent into the fight had only a fraction of their proper strength. B Company, which held the positions immediately north of Jardine's Lookout, was so weak that it is extremely fortunate Japanese plans did not call for a determined assault on it. When A Company went into the counter-attack on Caroline Hill on the first day, it was only 45 strong, and by the time of its final action, was down to 25 men. One of the most tragic episodes of the battle was the death of the Punjab's Commanding Officer at the head of this handful of men during the hopeless assault on Shouson Hill. The Punjabs seem to have fought bravely and well when they had the chance, and it is a shame that this battalion was not used in a more effective manner.
The 1st Middlesex always fought well. Unfortunately, because of its role as a static defence machine-gun battalion, it was rarely available in strength at any one point. Several days had elapsed before the first troops of this battalion were released to play a more mobile role, and even then their employment and positioning was open to criticism. An exception was Z Company, which was in action from the first day of battle and held Leighton Hill almost to the last. Operating with machine-guns from prepared defensive positions, they withstood the engineers of the Suzukawa Unit for six days. Except for Z Company, the Middlesex were never primarily responsible for holding ground and hence could not be criticized for its loss or for the failure of a counter-attack. For this reason, and because much of their fighting was done under the eyes of senior officers, they were the recipients of a great deal of subsequent praise, which was certainly not undeserved.
The Volunteer companies usually acquitted themselves well, particularly in East Brigade and on Jardine's Lookout, but were not committed to battle in sufficient concentration to permit anything more to be said.
The two Canadian battalions performed the bulk of the fighting for the Island, particularly during the first five days. This may be a sweeping statement, but it is justified by the facts. Comparisons are frequently invidious and sometimes odious, yet inasmuch as some official and private accounts of the battle have been rather derogatory concerning the Canadians, it may be as well to put their activities into perspective.
The Canadians fought "not only under the common disabilities but under additional difficulties arising from lack of transport, lack of fighting vehicles, and the early loss of their two most senior officers." 202-1 The Canadians were assigned, presumably because of their lack of training, to hold the south coast, but were then immediately ordered to about face and fight the battle almost by themselves. Indeed, with the Rajputs nearly wiped out in the first hours of the battle, the Royal Scots decimated after the first day, the greater part of the Punjabs kept out of battle, and most of the Middlesex immured in their static defences, there was no one to try to hold the Japanese except the Canadians and the handful of gallant Volunteers.
The record speaks for itself. The Royal Rifles executed more counter-attacks at company level or above than the British and Indian battalions combined, and the Winnipeg Grenadiers had the next greatest number. The Royal Rifles certainly moved further on foot during the course of the battle than any other battalion. Of particular importance is the fact that the Canadians, with the exception of the Volunteers on Jardine's Lookout and Engineers on Mount Cameron, carried out the only fighting on the heights of the ridge of mountains running the length of the Island. In a succession of savage battles the Canadians fought for the crests of Mount Parker, Mount Butler, Jardine's Lookout, Mount Nicholson, and Mount Cameron, almost single-handedly, to say nothing of such other features as Sai Wan Hill, Violet Hill, the Ridge, Stanley Mound, Sugarloaf Mountain, and Notting, Bridge, Red, and Bennet's Hills, which are minor only by comparison. The other battalions rarely faced the full strength of the Japanese infantry as did C Company of the Rifles in their fight against Tanaka's 2nd Battalion or had the awesome experience of having to withstand the onslaught of one of Doi's formidable battalions as was twice the fate of the Grenadiers. Indeed, the northern half of the West Brigade sector saw little fighting for the first five days except against the Suzukawa engineers who were not intended to take ground but rather apply pressure until the infantry came up.
There is no insinuation that the other units were anything but efficient and courageous. They simply did not have to do the same amount of fighting that the Canadians did and, if the Canadians failed more, it was because they tried to do so much more. A force with the training of C Force and burdened with the handicaps of few vehicles, unfamiliar terrain, and an unfamiliar role could be excused to a great extent if it collapsed when fighting began. The record shows that C Force did not collapse. There was a great deal of muddle and confusion (much at levels beyond the control of the battalion), the troops were often slow in moving, lack of weapon and tactical training cost them lives, but they only halted or withdrew under the most grave circumstances. It is a fact, moreover, that wherever the Japanese ran into problems, it was usually the Canadians who were responsible. When the Japanese regimental commanders, whose standards were extremely high, recorded "strong opposition", "fierce fighting", and "heavy casualties" they were almost always referring to fighting against the Canadians. It is a very conservative estimate to say that at least half the Japanese casualties were incurred in battles against Canadian troops.
One of the major handicaps to the defence which had a significant effect on the conduct of operations, was the weak intelligence system. Some of the gaps made little difference -Maltby recorded that "the efficiency of the enemy air force was probably the greatest surprise to me," but even if he had known all about it, there was nothing he could have done. On the other hand, as has been noted, if Maltby had credited the reports that the Japanese had large numbers of efficient troops available, rather than choosing to believe those reports that denied this, his plans would undoubtedly have been different.
Lack of information during the battle was seriously detrimental to the direction of the defence. This was particularly important as Maltby was later criticized for trying to run a battle from a concrete box. Major Trist of the Winnipeg Grenadiers wrote, "During the whole period of the Battle for the Island Fortress, HQ appeared to have little definite information," 204-2, and Brigadier Wallis commented, "It was very noticeable how effectively 'out of the picture' Fortress HQ appeared to be." 204-3 Possibly one of the reasons was that Fortress Headquarters refused to be put in "the picture". Accounts of the battle abound with incidents where accurate information on Japanese activities and locations was passed on to be ignored or rejected with various "we know better" comments. Wallis had something to say about this as well. "One had an unpleasant feeling that one’s reports were not trusted, that a passionate desire to minimize what was obviously a serious situation, was responsible for piecemeal attacks being ordered on strongly held difficult positions with resulting failure. " 204-4 Although the last dozen words from Wallis are a blatant case of the pot calling the kettle black, the statement is accurate.
Instead of trusting reports from units in the line, Maltby's staff officers were always out and about to determine the situation for themselves. Because they usually did not have a clue about what was happening, they often stumbled into the Japanese. Three of these officers blithely drove into Wong Nei Chong Gap on 19 December and all were promptly killed or wounded. Maltby's staff suffered high casualties during the battle, largely because of this incredible lack of caution.
A Canadian official summary prepared immediately after the war, includes a statement to the effect that the confusion revealed by Fortress Headquarters in official communiqués must have been reflected at Brigade level and below. It seemed mainly to have been engendered by a lack of operational intelligence. Reports from returned prisoners of war portrayed attacks and counter-attacks executed by pathetically inadequate forces, often with little or no covering fire, against an enemy of unknown strength in commanding positions. Information now available does nothing but indicate that this analysis was absolutely accurate.
"*It is strange that the British, knowing they would eventually be reduced to holding the Island, had not organized an intelligence system to inform them of Japanese activities on the mainland. The Japanese could not have policed Kowloon sufficiently to prevent messages being sent by flag or lamp, and, out of nearly a million Chinese, some would surely have been willing to do this. Information as to the number of troops embarked, would have been invaluable to Maltby (if he had chosen to believe it).
The lack of operational intelligence and unwillingness to accept information from units in contact with the enemy, manifested itself most strongly in a persistent refusal to believe that the Japanese were present in strength. For most of the morning of 19 December, Maltby thought the Japanese had only landed two battalions on the Island*. This led to some ridiculous orders, many of which had tragic repercussions. For example, the Commanding Officer of the Royal Scots was told that the Gap was "lightly held", which must have been partly responsible for the subsequent massacre of the battalion. The orders to Major Hodkinson and his Grenadiers that same day border on the fantastic (see earlier content). This attitude continued. When Maltby, on information received from the residents of the Repulse Bay Hotel, became dissatisfied with the activities of A Company of the Royal Rifles (presumably because they had failed to destroy Tanaka's two battalions and then clear the Gap), he sent Major Templer to the area to take over. The episode in which this unquestionably gallant officer dashed off with A Company to the south end of Wong Nei Chong Gap and, on realizing the Japanese strength, straightway retired, would be farcical if the situation had not been so serious.
The Japanese on the other hand, had a good knowledge of the fixed defences, due principally to their excellent espionage system, but partially to poor British security. For example, Colonel Doi recorded that on the night of the landing, "an enemy map showing fire positions on Hong Kong Island was captured, and it greatly facilitated our subsequent actions”. 206-5
The Japanese used psychology and propaganda in an effort to undermine their enemy's morale. They dropped leaflets and set up loudspeakers to play nostalgic music and descriptions of home, et cetera. The British had nothing but contempt for such tactics and claimed they showed "a great ignorance of British and Indian psychology." 206-6 The Japanese did get some return on their investment. Colonel Shoji noted that on 23 December, some 30 Indian troops crossed the Japanese lines with leaflets guaranteeing good treatment, followed by an additional 40 the next day.
The British did try to bolster morale by the announcement of large numbers of Chinese troops advancing to the rescue, which, when nothing happened, led to bitter disappointment. Although the Chinese did make some moves, they were ineffective. It is strange that anything at all was expected. If the Chinese had possessed the capacity, they would surely have cleared the rich Canton area of Japanese long before.
The defenders were kept constantly on edge and suffered losses by snipers. The blame was normally laid at the door of Chinese fifth columnists, and some of these were actually caught and executed. However, forward Japanese elements and reconnaissance patrols were usually a day or so ahead of the main forces and, by going across country, operated far behind the defence lines. A large percentage of the shots fired by "fifth column snipers" should have been credited to the Japanese soldiers.
The defence was also handicapped by the communications system, which became increasingly unreliable. Lines were continually being destroyed, and the Signals personnel, both British and Canadian, were constantly on the job, even going behind enemy lines to make repairs. A dispatch rider system was organized but because of snipers, two men had to go at one time.
In addition to the perfectly genuine reasons for Japanese success, a number of rumours and false assumptions were current at the time, many of which continued to exist post-war. For example, the belief persists that the Japanese were headed by 2000 "storm troops” -in reality the invasion troops belonged to an ordinary Japanese division whose previous activities had been garrison and anti-guerilla duties in South China. The activities of fifth columnists were much exaggerated -one gets the impression that the Japanese were always accompanied by their trusty Chinese guides, whereas the Japanese colonels testified that they made use of none, which, in view of the confusion and control problems they experienced, is probably true. Another rumour was that the Japanese had been sold the demolition plans for the mainland and so were able to cut the lines or have replacements ready. In fact, the rapid Japanese movement of heavy equipment was due partly to hasty demolition and mainly to the efficient Japanese engineers, who could easily deduce what demolitions would be made. A story which gained wide currency, was that German officers were the organizers and planners of the expedition, while German pilots were responsible for the accurate bombing. This was too fantastic for Headquarters to give any credence to, but many of the lower ranks believed the tale. This is not surprising -they had been told so often that the Japanese were poorly led, unimaginative, bad flyers, et cetera, that when the battle went so heavily against the defenders, some excuse was necessary.
With the exception of the courage of most of the defenders, there is little that is positive to be gleaned from the defence of Hong Kong. Recognized by informed opinion even before the Japanese attack as futile and wasteful, in the final analysis it remains so, and any claims to the contrary are demonstrably false.
For example, Maltby claimed in his post-war report that two Japanese front-line and one reserve division were tied up at Hong Kong. He must have been putting the widest possible interpretation on “tied up” , because when he wrote the report, it was known that only one division assaulted Hong Kong. Some of the other units of the 23rd Army had been deployed to protect the 38th Division's rear, but the 23rd Army had been in the South China area for years -it certainly was not sent there for the express purpose of capturing Hong Kong!
There have been claims that, because the battle for Hong Kong lasted almost eighteen days, some inconvenience was caused to the Japanese by delaying their planned deployment of the 38th Division for further conquest in Southeast Asia. All evidence, however, points to the contrary. The Japanese were astounded by the speed with which the mainland fell, therefore it can be assumed that their invasion of the Island was probably ahead of schedule, and, whatever their estimate for taking the Island, it can hardly have been much less than the seven days actually required. The Division sailed for the Netherlands East Indies in January, and these also were occupied ahead of schedule. The 38th Division did not meet its fate until more than a year after Hong Kong fell, when it was annihilated after fighting with great courage and tenacity against the Americans at Guadalcanal and the Australians in New Guinea.
The senselessness of the defence was recognized by the Dominions Office, when the battle for Hong Kong was nearly over, as a circular telegram to External Affairs states: "The capture by Japanese of Hong Kong would gain them some strategical advantages but would not materially alter the strategical situation of China Sea as a whole." 208-7 This was a somewhat sugar-coated version of what the British were admitting to themselves: resistance at Hong Kong was weakening, and the battle would have no "direct influence in the way of tying up Japanese forces...". 208-8 After the war, the British official history made the statement that the battle (and especially the reinforcement by Canadian troops) represented a "lamentable waste of manpower". Since Hong Kong had no strategic importance, such a reinforcement was an unnecessary extravagance. Besides, "the extra few days of resistance which were gained by the presence of the two reinforcing battalions sent at the eleventh hour could not, and did not, have any influence on the course of events." 208-9 To portray the battle, and any consequent upset to the Japanese plans arising from it, as being worth the loss of six, or even two battalions is therefore nonsense.
In addition to being unable to represent Hong Kong as strategically valuable, or its defence as having dislocated the Japanese dispositions or timetable, the defenders could not claim to have inflicted unduly severe losses on the invaders. By that crudest but nevertheless valuable barometer of battlefield results, the body count, the defenders lost again. Their casualties numbered 3,445 killed, missing, and seriously wounded, the first category being somewhat inflated by prisoners murdered by the Japanese. The Japanese official casualty figures are 675 killed and 2,079 wounded, for a total of 2,754. These accord well with the estimates of casualties made by the Japanese colonels. Shoji estimated his at 1000 and Tanaka his at 600. Doi's have been estimated at 800, and the Suzukawa engineers fighting as infantry plus casualties in the other arms, would account for the remainder. After the war Maltby estimated Japanese losses as 3,000 killed and 9,000 wounded, almost the strength of the entire 38th Division!
Frequently in warfare, the defence causes more casualties to the attackers than it suffers. This was not the case in Hong Kong, for once the Japanese seized the initiative, they forced the defenders to expend much of their strength in a series of unsupported counter attacks against impossible odds, which were largely responsible for the imbalance in losses. The Japanese casualty figures have never been seriously challenged. They certainly cannot be regarded as light. However, when looked upon as the price for a wealthy seaport and the elimination of more than 14,000 of the enemy who might have posed a serious threat if employed elsewhere, the Japanese had no reason to consider them excessive.