The second most common epithet after "poorly trained" that has been applied to the hapless men of C Force is that they were "poorly equipped", particularly with regard to transport. As with most such sweeping generalities this is far from totally accurate, but the lack of transport was tragically all too real. In dealing with the question of equipping the force it is necessary to divide the matter into three component sections - Technical Ordnance Stores (dealing with such items as weapons, ammunition, and wireless), General Ordnance Stores (such items as blankets, boots, and uniforms), and Mechanization Services of National Defence all come into play. In providing the first two types of equipment the job was done quickly and efficiently, despite many problems due to shortages. In the case of the third type, the vehicles never reached the ship. The circumstances leading up to this situation were exhaustively investigated by the Commission, and its censure of the handling of this matter was the only wrist-slapping it indulged in. Even then, the Commissioner doubted that any harm had been done to the troops as the 20 priority vehicles despatched in advance would probably not all have gone on the ship and, even if there had been sufficient space, he could not positively find that they would have been much help. On both these points the findings of the Commission were directly contrary to the testimony and evidence given. Perhaps more than any other point raised at the Inquiry, the decision on this issue gives the impression that the whole thing was a whitewash. When considering questions such as the probability of a Japanese attack, the exact state of training of a battalion, or the effect of reinforcements on a unit, there are bound to be some grey areas. But when three immensely experienced men who were present at loading testified that the vehicles could have been loaded, and the Commissioner preferred to believe a man who was not there and who stood to gain by saying the opposite, it is difficult for anyone who has read all the testimony to believe in Duff's impartiality. The Commission also saw as exhibits reports from Hong Kong stressing the critical nature of the transport situation during the battle. Ignoring these, the Commissioner wrote in his report, "There is no evidence, however, that the troops suffered from the lack of them..." 80-1 In this matter, as in others, the Commissioner showed himself remarkably selective when it came to weighing the evidence.
General and Technical Ordnance Stores can both be dealt with briefly. The evidence submitted at the hearing established that everything went smoothly and there were no complaints about the supply of these stores.
Out of a voluminous list of General Ordnance Stores needed for C Force, only four things could not be supplied, because they were not available: strings for bugles, disinfectant for dishes, an oil cabinet, and heel plates for shoes (nails were supplied instead). All clothing supplied to C Force was brand new and of the latest pattern. Major Robert McColm, who had been in charge of General Ordnance Stores at the time, felt that this force was the most well-equipped of any that left Canada. McColm had assembled the stores required from 12 different depots in Canada, mostly in small quantities. He stated that if any stores had not arrived either he or the Special Ordnance Officer in Vancouver, Colonel Henderson, would have completed stores from the Vancouver Depot or else would have raided battalions in the Vancouver vicinity. The only check used by McColm on the smooth functioning of the supply system he had arranged for C Force was the sending of a message to the local Ordnance Officer giving the scheduled date of arrival of any shipment. If it did not arrive in time, the Ordnance Officer was to telephone McColm immediately. This seems to have been effective. 80-2
Technical Stores, that is, weapons and ammunition, were supplied equally efficiently. Colonel Gordon L. Ross, the Director of Supply, Technical Stores, testified that the most notable deficiencies were in Boys anti-tank rifles, and 2-inch and 3-inch mortar ammunition. Instead of having 22 anti-tank rifles each, the battalions only had one each, and there was no mortar ammunition at all. In no way could these deficiencies be laid at the door of military ineptitude unless one traces it back to the failure to convince pre-war Canadian governments of the desirability of a well-equipped army and an indigenous armament industry. As there were, at that time, only 300 rounds for the 3-inch mortar in all of Canada, it is not altogether surprising that none could be spared for C Force. Echoing McColm, Ross also said that, on the whole, C Force was the most well-equipped group that had left Canada. 81-3 There is no reason to doubt McColm's and Ross's estimate. A British officer noted when the force disembarked that they appeared "unusually well-equipped." 81-4
The third type of equipment supplied to the force was mechanical transport (MT), and its provision did not go as smoothly. The evidence on this subject at the hearing was voluminous, and the Commissioner's criticism of Lieutenant Colonel Spearing for his lack of energy was the only censure of the report. This aspect of equipping C Force had already been the subject of an extensive departmental investigation, as a result of which the Quartermaster General (QMG), Major General Schmidlin, and Lieutenant Colonel Spearing had been retired.
The failure to fill the troopship Awatea with as much MT as she could carry was the result of a misunderstanding between the QMG's Branch and the Master General of the Ordnance (MGO) Branch, with the civilian Controller of Transport adding his bit to the confusion.
On 9 October the first Directors' meeting was held at National Defence Headquarters in order to begin preparations for the Hong Kong expedition. The British War Office had advised that a reduced scale of MT might be acceptable, but at the meeting it was decided to make the full scale available. The name of the ship, the Awatea, was made known that day, but Lieutenant Colonel Spearing, in charge of Movement Control in the QMG's Branch, did not take note of this. Captain E.D. James, Acting Director of Mechanization, MGO's Branch, undertook to make the necessary MT available. 81-5
The following day Captain James, after ascertaining the established complement of vehicles for an infantry battalion, made arrangements with the major automobile manufacturers (Ford at Windsor and General Motors at Oshawa) to have the necessary vehicles boxed for shipment and ready to load on flatcars. 81-6
James's subordinate, Lieutenant Findlay, wrote a memo the next day to Movement Control, stating that the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers would take no MT with them from their districts. 82-7 This memo was a routine one, complying with a February 1941 QMG directive requiring that Movement Control be kept informed of what MT a unit kept when it moved, but Lieutenant Colonel Spearing wrongly inferred that neither unit would take MT to Hong Kong. 82-8
On 13 October James gave Major Gwynne of Movement Control a list of the MT which was to go. The next day, having learned from the manufacturers that rail permits were still lacking for the vehicles, James phoned D.C. Connor, the Assistant Controller of Transport in Montreal, to find out what was causing the delay. When Connor told him that this was the first he had heard of the matter, James arranged for Spearing to phone Connor immediately. James had already given Connor the information on MT, and Spearing gave Connor information on the general and technical stores. 82-9 Connor then worked out the space required for MT (100-125,000 cubic feet) and the other stores (70,000 cubic feet).
On 15 October Connor gave rail permits to the motor companies. It may be noted in passing that the Office of Controller of Transport was created late 1939 to have control over the passage of goods by rail. The Controller could stop or embargo a shipment if in his opinion the rolling stock was needed more urgently elsewhere or if there was not enough shipping available to take a cargo. The prevention of rail congestion in dock areas was one of his prime responsibilities. That same day Connor's superior, the Controller of Transport T.C. Lockwood, learned from the Naval authorities that the Awatea had only a 45,000 cubic foot freight capacity. Realizing that the force's MT required approximately three times this capacity he therefore placed an embargo on the shipment late that day, thus preventing it from leaving the factory. He informed the motor companies the next day of his action, but his office did not pass the information on to National Defence Headquarters.
James found out about the embargo on 16 October direct from the motor companies. He phoned Movement Control every day thereafter to ask about moving the MT and Lieutenant Colonel Spearing kept talking about getting another ship. James claimed at the Commission that, by this time, he was getting "pretty disgusted" with the whole thing. 82-10
Following a second Director's meeting on 14 October, Spearing, Lawson, and Macklin held a brief conference. Having learned that not all the MT could go on the Awatea, they decided to list the priority vehicles and load as many on as possible. The priority vehicles were 6 Universal Carriers, 12 fifteen-hundredweight trucks, and 2 fifteen-hundredweight water tanks which occupied a total space of 11,571 cubic feet. On 18 November Macklin gave James the list of priority vehicles, which totalled four carloads, and the latter then phoned the motor companies. James left a memo for Lieutenant Findlay to inquire about the permit situation and then left Ottawa that weekend, telephoning back the next week to check on progress. The second time he called, on 21 October, he was told that the priority shipment had been allowed to proceed, and the rest of the MT would go the next day.
The shipment of priority vehicles had been released the day before when Lieutenant Colonel Spearing ascertained, by totalling up the volume of general and technical stores, that 12,000 cubic feet would still be available. Mr. Connor was still sceptical, and wired to P.B. Cooke, General Manager of the Canadian Australian Line, owners of the Awatea, to confirm this. Cooke's return telegram was rather unclear, but the shipment of MT was released nonetheless. It went out the morning of 21 October, and in normal circumstances would have reached Vancouver late 27 October. Due to congestion of rail traffic on the prairies, however, the MT did not roll into Vancouver until the afternoon of 28 October, by which time the Awatea had sailed.
Brigadier Lawson was far from happy about this. He had talked to Macklin a few times about the MT situation and it had been agreed that the ship would take all she could. In a report dated 15 November 1941, written on board the Awatea, Lawson complained: "Despite my repeated representations at NDHQ regarding the necessity for at least a proportion of our transport to accompany us, none of the MT had apparently arrived at Vancouver by 27 October, and it was therefore necessary to sail without it, though there were two holds practically empty." 83-11
There is no question that Lieutenant Colonel Spearing, on 9 October, should have ascertained the exact capacity of the Awatea and acted accordingly. As it was, he did not begin to look for another ship until 16 October. That was two days after he had talked to Macklin and Lawson, and agreed that all the MT for C Force could not possibly go on the Awatea. He seemed confused over his responsibilities, and claimed his organization had not been responsible for movement of vehicles crated for overseas since March 1940. The Controller of Transport told the Commission, however, that "Movement Control advises that Controller of Transport of any equipment which is going forward on troopships." 84-12 Whoever was responsible for the actual movement of the vehicles, Spearing was the only man in a position to know how much space, if any, could be used for MT, and he was exceptionally slow in acquiring this absolutely essential data.
For their parts, neither Lockwood nor Connor made any real effort to inform National Defence Headquarters that an embargo had been placed on the shipment. Captain James found out, almost by accident, from the motor companies. He talked to Spearing about the matter several times between 15 and 17 October, but there is no evidence that Spearing was particularly concerned as a result. Having agreed, on 14 October, that as much MT as possible should be shipped, he made no move until 20 October to inform the Controller of Transport of this decision. One telephone call would have been sufficient to get four carloads, out of a total of approximately 50, moving to the coast. Until 20 October the Controller of Transport was not aware that there was a distinction being made in the MT, and that some were set aside which it may have been possible to load. During those five days, the MT sat on the motor company sidings gathering demurrage charges. 84-13
One excuse for the "lack of energy" on Spearing's part was that he was involved with 10 other troop movements concurrently with C Force, one totalling 30,000 men. During this period he was talking to Halifax and to the Controller of Transport's Office two or three times a day, and it was therefore difficult to remember everything that passed between them. Be that as it may, the Movement Control Chief appears to have been quite confused during this entire period, and extremely slow in passing on information. This could probably not have occurred in the case of anything but crated vehicles as there was a definite routine laid down (Routine Order 318) for the shipment of goods overseas. The Order was unworkable in the case of MT because of its bulk, and when a special case such as the despatch of C Force cropped up no one seemed to know what to do or what their responsibilities were, and demonstrated no great urgency in finding out. On 18 October, for instance, Spearing knew that 12,000 cubic feet would be empty on the Awatea, he also knew that this space could be filled with priority vehicles, and he knew that the MT was crated and ready to be shipped to Vancouver whenever permission was received from the Controller of Transport. He did nothing, however, until two days later, as he thought that it was James's job to inform the Office of the Controller of Transport, despite the fact that the QMG's Branch was quite clearly responsible for any long distance movement of Army material.
At the Vancouver end, neither the Ordnance officers nor the Movement Control Officer (Major Gwynne, who had been sent out temporarily) were troubled by the non-appearance of the MT. They knew by 25 October that another ship had been found (the American freighter Don Jose) and therefore believed that everything was going well. 85-14 According to Major Gwynne, Brigadier Lawson was not too worried either, as he probably knew by 25 October that the MT would not be loaded, but made no complaint. 85-15 This impression is certainly not corroborated by Lawson's report of 15 November quoted earlier.
The Commission also looked into the question of whether the priority MT could have been loaded even if it had arrived on time. Conflicting evidence was heard, many witnesses asserting that room could have been found for 10 or so vehicles at most.
The Controller of Transport, T.C. Lockwood, testified that the problems of stowing the vehicles in the Awatea would have been very great, due to the size of the hatchway on her No. 1 hold and the fact that MT uses a great deal of space over and above its nominal requirements. 85-16 Chief Justice Duff was quite impressed with Lockwood's testimony, and he referred to Lockwood as a "man of immense experience in the shipping business before the war as well as in his present office." 85-17 Duff quoted his testimony at length in his report.
The Commissioner also heard evidence from Mr. P.B. Cooke, who stated that the MT could all have been loaded quite easily, even after the other gear was stowed, and proceeded to explain in detail just how it could have been done. 85-18 Sir Lyman simply noted in his report: "I do not accept Mr. Cooke's evidence that it was a simple matter to load these vehicles..." 85-19 Yet Cooke was the General Manager of the Line that owned the Awatea. He had loaded military vehicles and civilian cars on that very ship before. He was present the whole time the ship was loading. Most important, however, is the fact that he had no vested interest, as did Lockwood, in the outcome of the Inquiry. Lockwood's Office was the possible subject of a censure by the Commission, and it was obviously in his interest to show that the MT could probably not have been loaded. In addition, Lockwood had never seen the Awatea and had never supervised the loading of MT before. On the other hand, Cooke's testimony was corroborated by two independent witnesses, both of whom had much more knowledge in this regard than Lockwood. In signed affidavits, Henry Scarisbrooke, the Wharf Superintendant, and Adam Watson, the Marine Surveyor, gave evidence in detail to show that the MT could have easily been loaded. 86-20 The former had held his position for 20 years and was directly responsible for leasing the Awatea. He knew the ship well. The latter, a former captain and holder of the highest certificate in the British Empire, was responsible for issuing a certificate of seaworthiness to all foreign-bound ships in Vancouver after loading. That the Commissioner chose to ignore the evidence of these experts in favour of Lockwood's seems on the face of it a very curious thing.
The Commissioner then went on to speculate about any possible deleterious effect the lack of MT had on C Force. To anyone studying the battle it soon becomes clear that MT would have been very useful at Hong Kong even though it would not have altered the final outcome, and that the trucks and especially the water-carriers would have alleviated a great deal of hardship among the troops. This evidence, however, was not brought before the Commission. What was included was a cable of Lawson's to National Defence Headquarters of 24 November 1941 which said that "Transport hired as required." 86-21 Duff quoted this in the report (p. 60) to show that no injury was caused by the lack of MT, although a careful reading of the entire telegram makes it appear likely that this transport was mentioned only in the context of "breaking down, checking, and distribution of ordnance stores" from the ship to the barracks. The vehicles hired for this job certainly did not go into battle.
Situation reports demonstrate clearly that the extra MT would have been valuable in the battle. A report from the General Officer Commanding dated 22 December states: "Water and transport situation critical." 86-22 One of 23 December says: "Troops now very tired, Water and transport situation still very grave." 86-23 In the light of these reports, it is difficult to understand Duff when he reported, "In the absence of evidence, I can make no finding as to whether or not the force suffered from lack of these two [water-carrying] vehicles." It would probably be hard to overestimate the value of even two of these vehicles in the last few days of fighting, when the pipelines from the reservoirs had been destroyed by Japanese shellfire. As to the carriers, the Commissioner reported that both the Bren gun and the 3-inch mortar, the normal load of these vehicles, were designed to be carried by the troops. Evidence pointed out, however, that in the case of the mortars (and the six priority carriers were those for the Mortar Platoons) this was impractical except over very short distances, as the loads were quite heavy. Lack of the carriers or shortage of trucks would seriously hamper the use of the 3-inch mortars, and this was admitted by officers at the hearings. 87-24 To the Commissioner, however, whether detriment to the force resulted could only be a matter of "speculation". This might have been so as none of the members of C Force were in a position to appear before the Commission and testify, dearly as they might have liked to. There is a world of difference, however, between Sir Lyman's matter of "speculation" and the definition any reasonably objective person would apply - a "virtual certainty".
All 212 vehicles were eventually loaded on the second ship, Don José, which left Vancouver 4 November. It was originally scheduled to sail Shanghai - Hong Kong - Manila, which would have brought it to Hong Kong on 6 December. However the vessel's master was given instructions by the US Navy (as it was an American ship it was subject to US Navy orders) to proceed via Honolulu and Manila first. It is interesting to note that the US Navy was, even at this early date, taking extensive precautions. On the route from Honolulu to Manila, the ship was instructed not to proceed directly, but via Torres Strait and the Molucca Passage. These are well to the south of the direct route - Torres Strait is between New Guinea and Australia. The master of the Don José was told to "darken ship after passing the Hawaiian Islands” and "maintain radio silence west of 160° West". The ship, which normally sailed at 8½ knots, passed south of Port Moresby on 2 December and arrived in Manila on 12 December, several days after the outbreak of war. Since it was impossible to deliver the MT to Hong Kong it was decided to turn the vehicles over to the United States military authorities in the Philippine Islands, with the understanding that if a chance presented itself, they would be delivered to Hong Kong. The United States authorities agreed to pay for them, but it is doubtful that the money was forthcoming quickly, as the Philippines were soon under full siege themselves. At the time of the Commission's hearings the Americans were still resisting but were obviously very near the end, and the Canadian vehicles presumably ended up in the hands of the Imperial Japanese Army.*
*The total value of the MT was set at $845,562. The United States planned to buy it outright, but the American Quartermaster General officer who had the papers was soon afterward a POW himself. There is no record of the money being paid.
One case of spare parts failed to make the connection with the Don José due to the inability of the automobile company to collect the necessary parts on time. It was loaded onto the SS Fernplant on 22 November 1941, and by 10 December had reached Los Angeles. This shipment appears to have been eventually returned to Canada. The Canadian authorities were exonerated from any blame for the failure of the cargo of the Don José and the Fernplant to reach Hong Kong. It may be argued that a second ship should have been obtained earlier, but evidence submitted by two west coast representatives of the United Kingdom Ministry of War Transport stated that, even if they had started looking on 9 October for a second ship, the Don José was the first available. This may be so, but it appears that Movement Control was blameless in spite of itself; Spearing ought to have known that a troopship could not take most of the MT, and he knew by 9 October that the Awatea was proposed.
When the Minister of National Defence was advised in December that no MT had gone with the force, he instituted an inquiry into the matter. In early January he took personal charge of this investigation. During its course, the officers of the QMG and MGO Branches kept dumping the problem into each other's laps. The Quartermaster General, Major General Schmidlin, protested that "the 10,000 feet [of available space] was nominal. It wouldn't have taken more than eight or ten vehicles." Ralston said with considerable clairvoyance, "Somebody will say these vehicles might have been useful". Later on he became extremely angry: "I can't find any branch taking responsibility. The Master General of Ordnance has the stuff on the rails. The Transport Controller says the stuff is moving. Whose responsibility is it to tie it up?" 88-25 Macklin, the Director of Staff Duties, put in a gloomy word:
I said I had a feeling that people did not appreciate the necessity of making that ship as self-contained as she could be. I still have that impression - that Mr. Lockwood and everybody was (as Mr. Lockwood says) jubilant when they got the second ship. Everybody but me. I wasn't jubilant. And when I knew that ship had sailed without the transport I remarked that they had despatched J.K. Lawson without even a wheelbarrow and nobody could tell where he might end up. 88-26
Ralston came to the conclusion that Spearing was primarily at fault and the Quartermaster General's Branch was therefore partly responsible. Lieutenant General Stuart, the Chief of General Staff, "felt that this situation alone was not sufficient to take drastic action regarding the Quartermaster General but agreed that there was a cumulation of incidents respecting the Quartermaster General's attitude in matters of responsibility and decided [that it was] desirable to have the Quartermaster General take a District.” 89-27 Schmidlin was offered Military District No. 12, but preferred to retire instead (announcing that it was for ill health). Lieutenant Colonel Spearing was also retired and his superior, Colonel H.O. Lawson, the Director of Supplies and Transport, followed soon after (although he had little to do with it, he got caught up in the general shake-up in the Quartermaster General's Branch). No other action regarding personnel was taken. In all, three officers were retired for a muddle that caused untold hardship and an indeterminate number of casualties to the two battalions.