No Reason Why (Second Edition)

Young Men Full of Enthusiasm...

—the force is organized and strengthened

The Canadian government had agreed in principle to the despatch of two battalions on 23 September, and, after Ralston was consulted, the substance of this decision was communicated to the United Kingdom government. No time had then been set for the actual sailing of the force, but its selection had, to all intents and purposes, already been made. The final draft proposing the Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadiers was submitted by Crerar to the Minister the next day.

On 9 October 1941 the Dominions Office despatched a telegram to the Canadian government which informed them that the British government "now feel that in all circumstances it would be most desirable if the two Canadian battalions could be despatched at a very early date. . ." The Dominions Office suggested that future discussion of the matter be on the military level. 67-1

This was obviously the cue for the British War Office to move. That same day Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London sent a telegram to National Defence Headquarters relaying an inquiry from the War Office, who wished to know whether the force would be able to embark on the transport Awatea (capacity 2000 troops) in late October. As the next opportunity for direct sailing would not be for another two months, the War Office was very keen that the units go on the Awatea. The Department of National Defence was also informed of what the requirements were for the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The battalions were to be up to full war establishment, though possibly a reduced scale of MT [Mechanical Transport] would be acceptable. Some non-standard items such as tropical clothing and mosquito nets would also be necessary, and the War Office wanted to know which of these Canada would not be able to supply. 68-2

On receipt of these telegrams, Colonel Gibson (the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence) arranged a meeting of National Defence Branch Directors to discuss what measures would be taken regarding the despatching of the battalions, which was held at 3 pm on 9 October 1941. The final approval of the selection of the two battalions had not been given (this arrived at the end of the meeting), but arrangements were to proceed as far as possible. Lieutenant Colonel Spearing, Movement Control (Quartermaster General Branch), stated that as rolling stock was needed at that time for other important moves, the westward movements for the Royal Rifles should start about 23 October and for the Winnipeg Grenadiers about 25 October. In view of the fact that it would be very difficult to reinforce the units in the event of war, it was decided that extra men should go as first reinforcements. For the medical inspections necessary before the departure of these units it was thought that the standard required should be the same as that for garrison units. As for MT, further information was needed from CMHQ in London, but meanwhile preparations were to be made for the transportation of full scale and ship-boxed MT. Most of the weapons needed could be supplied by Canada. For administrative purposes at least a Staff Captain and possibly a Force Commander should accompany "C Force", as the units were now designated. 68-3

After this meeting similar warning orders were sent out to the two battalions-"Serial 1042 Royal Rifles will be ready to move from 0900 hrs 23 October to carry out duties in semi-tropical climate. Further instructions will be issued by QMG. Acknowledge. " 68-4

The following two days saw a flurry of messages containing requests, queries, information, and advice pass between National Defence Headquarters and CMHQ, the latter acting as the liaison for the War Office. The British advised that men down to medical category C2 could be taken 68-5 (Gibson testified that in fact no man below the much higher B1 category actually went). National Defence Headquarters informed the United Kingdom that a senior Canadian administrative officer would probably be appointed. 68-6 Enough Thompson guns to bring the unit up to established strength were obtained from the United States by a special release, and commercial Marconi sets replaced the standard No. 18 set.

On 11 October CMHQ relayed to National Defence Headquarters a request originating from the General Office Commanding Hong Kong for a Brigade Headquarters, to consist of a Brigadier, a Brigade Major, a Staff Captain, and 94 miscellaneous all ranks including 2 medical officers, 2 nursing sisters, a Signals Officer, a Workshop Officer, and a Pay Officer. It was stated that if Canada could not find these quickly "despatch two battalions should not repeat not be delayed on that account." 69-7 General Crerar and the Minister of National Defence were leaving for England that day and were no longer in Ottawa when the telegram arrived, but Brigadier Kenneth Stuart, the Acting Chief of the General Staff, immediately telephoned the airport at Montreal and reached them before they left. He suggested Colonel J.K. Lawson, the Director of Military Training, as Brigade Commander and Colonel Pat Hennessy as the Senior Administrative Officer. Crerar and Ralston concurred both in the request for the Brigade Headquarters and the suggested appointments. Stuart then obtained official approval of this decision from C.G. Power. Power later informed the Cabinet War Committee of the action, but there does not appear to have been any discussion on the subject. 69-8

Thus, the request was approved the same day it was received. Macklin replied to CMHQ informing them of the decision to accept the British request and adding that a Senior Administrative Officer (Hennessy) would be going with the Force. The Brigade Headquarters would go with the battalions and the "whole sailing will not be delayed on this account". 69-9

Three days later a second meeting of Directors was held at the instigation of the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. Everything seemed to be under control at this meeting. It had been decided earlier to take full scale MT with 12 months' reserve. The representative of the Director of Mechanization (Captain James) stated that arrangements were being made to send 212 vehicles. Although this is not recorded in the minutes, Lieutenant Colonel Spearing, Brigadier Lawson, and Gibson discussed the practicality of getting all the vehicles on one boat. Spearing agreed to check the freight capacity of the Awatea after the meeting. 69-10

On the 16th October the War Office sent back a telegram saying that they had "learned with gratification the quantities of equipment which will be taken with Canadian units to Hong Kong. Any of the few deficiencies mentioned can and will be made up at Hong Kong. " 69-11

Before C Force was sent overseas the Brigade Headquarters, consisting of 83 all ranks, was organized. Most of the other ranks were tradesmen of one sort or another and most had over 16 weeks in the Army; only 4 had less. The C Force administrative personnel were drawn from all across Central and Western Canada, and rather hastily assembled. Lieutenant Colonel Home got the impression that they were a rather inexperienced lot, particularly the Staff Captain, H.S.A. Bush. 70-12 This is borne out to some extent by an entry in Brigadier Lawson's diary for 19 November; "Tell 2 Ech [Colonel Hennessy] to keep away from Bde in order to give S.C. [Staff Captain] a chance. " 70-13

Two nursing sisters accompanied the force, despite the fact that the GOC at Hong Kong had stated that medical orderlies were what were really needed. Likewise, two extra RCAMC doctors were attached, although at a full British Command base in a colony of 1½ million, which had a University with a medical school, doctors were not exactly at a premium. The other attached officers appear to have been well trained for their jobs, particularly Captain G.M. Billings, the Brigade Signals Officer, who was made responsible for training Punjabis, Rajputs, and Royal Scots at Hong Kong.

More messages passed across both the Atlantic and Pacific before the troops sailed. On 31 October 1941 the War Office informed National Defence Headquarters, "We are very grateful to you for despatching your contingent to Hong Kong at such short notice. We fully realize the difficulties of mobilization and of distance which have had to be overcome. The moral effect of their arrival in November will be much greater than it would have been two months later." 70-14 During October, however, there had been a few problems associated with the despatch of C Force that had not been entirely overcome. These related specifically to the matter of reinforcements and mechanical transport.

Because the force was being sent to form part of a distant garrison, the units carried with them full establishment for all their stores and weapons, plus reserves. The same principle applied to the men. In addition to the normal full war establishment of an infantry battalion, 150 men and 6 officers were attached to each unit as what the military termed "first reinforcements". Under normal conditions these would remain at the Regimental Wing and be sent out as required, but Hong Kong was much too far away for that.

The normal establishment for a battalion plus attached personnel was 34 officers and 773 other ranks (807 total). With 156 reinforcements this came to 963 all ranks. When the two battalions arrived back from their garrison duties in Newfoundland and Jamaica, the Royal Rifles were slightly over strength while the Winnipeg Grenadiers were under strength by just over 100 men. The Grenadiers, in addition, had men who were in the process of transferring to the RCAF. Before sending the units to Hong Kong, all ranks in both battalions had to pass a medical inspection which also resulted in a certain reduction in strength, especially among the Grenadiers, who had just spent 16 months in the tropics. In the end 436 new men were required-136 to bring the units up to strength and another 300 for the reinforcements.

Responsibility for this task fell to Colonel Pat Hennessy, the Director of Organization (Adjutant General's Branch) who was later chosen as C Force's Senior Administrative Officer. In obtaining the new men Hennessy worked with Brigadier Riley, the District Officer Commanding, Military District No. 10, and in the case of the Royal Rifles with Lieutenant Colonel Home. Hennessy was sure that he could get the men. The criteria used were, first, to obtain the best men possible under the circumstances (the need of speed and secrecy), and secondly, transfers to the C Force regiments had to be voluntary. It was decided that reinforcements for the Grenadiers should come from Military District No. 10 (the Winnipeg area) while reinforcements for the Royal Rifles should come from Military District No. 2 (Toronto, Camp Borden, and adjacent areas).

Obviously, Hennessy was hoping to fill the ranks with "trained men", that is, men who had completed the 8-week Basic and 8-week Advanced Training courses. In fact, there had been a routine order in effect since 18 August 1941 that men were not to be sent overseas unless they had the full 16 weeks of training, without prior authority from National Defence Headquarters. At that time, of course, the order applied only to the Canadian Corps in England, but it should be safe to assume that it was meant to be a general rule (which, in fact, all routine orders are). Ironically, the order was written and distributed by the Director of Military Training, then Colonel J.K. Lawson, who as Commander of C Force was to take with him to Hong Kong more than 100 men who had not received the required training. The Adjutant General, Major General B.W. Browne, claimed at the hearings that these men were replacements, not reinforcements, and the order did not therefore apply. In addition, he claimed, prior authority had been obtained from National Defence Headquarters in the person of Colonel Hennessy. As Hennessy had given his instructions to the Military Districts over the telephone because of the pressure of time, no documentation of this existed. 72-15

In Winnipeg, meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Sutcliffe could not be certain as to the precise number of men he would need. The men currently on his battalion strength still had to pass medical inspection, and some were waiting for transfers. The situation was further confused because the last group from Jamaica had only returned on 10 October and, having been granted 14 days leave, had promptly scattered. These men all had to be contacted and told to report back immediately. Sutcliffe at first thought that 150 men would do, then he asked for (and got) 220. After the medical inspection of the battalion, however, it was found that 50 or 60 more were still required.

The first contingent for the Winnipeg Grenadiers was taken from Advanced Training Centre No. 15 at Winnipeg. The Commanding Officer there, Lieutenant Colonel R.G. Graham, asked Lieutenant Colonel Sutcliffe to visit the Centre, which he did on the 10th or 11th of October. Sutcliffe said he was badly in need of signallers and other specialists. Graham gave him 30 trained signallers, two or three 3-inch mortar personnel, 12 driver mechanics, three or four carrier drivers, plus some NCOs who were willing to revert to privates in order to go overseas immediately. In response to a request for volunteers, 150 at the Advanced Training Centre came forward. Later Graham was asked for some more men. Sutcliffe gave a talk on the regiment to the men at the Centre, after which 35 more volunteered. Four more men from the Centre were to join later. Of the 189 men who joined the Grenadiers from this Advanced Training Centre, 30 had only three months in the army; the rest had the requisite 16 weeks.

Graham also supplied 12 officers to the Winnipeg Grenadiers. He had a high opinion of all of them and said they were fully trained. These included the ones who had talked to Tommy Douglas the weekend before they left. All in all reinforcements from this Centre were good; Brigadier Riley later claimed they were the cream of the reinforcements earmarked for the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, and South Saskatchewan Regiment. Some of the NCOs were former instructors and these subsequently proved very valuable. Riley also stated, in regard to the Grenadiers, "it was quite clear that the specialists were not adequately trained....The signalling section could not be classed as trained....No training done as a battalion . . ." 73-16

The Winnipeg Grenadiers found that they still needed men, so an Advanced Machine-Gun Training Centre at Dundurn, Saskatchewan (in Military District No. 12) was asked for volunteers. Thirty men, all with over 16 weeks' training, came forward and were taken off to join their new battalion in Winnipeg by a Grenadier lieutenant.

As it appeared that both the Winnipeg and Dundurn training centres were exhausted as sources of reinforcements, recruits were sought from a Basic Training Centre (No. 100) at Portage-la-Prairie, where 17 men volunteered. About half these men had less than eight weeks' training.

Finally, about 22 October, it became apparent that the battalion was still not up to strength. Men were obtained from the Military District No. 10 District Depot in Winnipeg, which was a holding unit for men waiting assignment. About half these men had completed basic training, while the other half had gone through advanced training. Of the 38 men taken from the Depot, 23 were originally with the 18th Reconnaissance Battalion and had been left behind when this unit moved east. They had not been taken because the Second-in-Command of the 18th Reconnaissance Battalion, who was Acting Commanding Officer at the time, did not think they were suitable for his unit due to low mental capacity or inability to learn. Brigadier Riley protested against the strength of this assertion when it was later brought forward by George Drew and said that they were not struck off as inefficient-they were just thought unsuitable for a reconnaissance battalion. The Second-in-Command at the Depot considered them much better material than the 18th Reconnaissance Battalion's Second-in-Command gave them credit for and thought that they had been unfairly treated. 73-17

All together, 63 of the men who joined the Winnipeg Grenadiers in October 1941 had less than 16 weeks' training. The senior officers who testified at the Commission claimed that this was not particularly important because the officers of the battalion had been personally involved in the recruiting of these men. These senior officers also stated that the need for secrecy prevented National Defence Headquarters from combing all the Districts in Canada. It was pointed out, however, that the trained men were there-1513 men had completed the 16-week course and were in the training centres in October 1941. Of these, 388 were at Camp Borden and at Winnipeg. The reason for emphasizing this last point in testimony at the Commission was purely politics. George Drew, the chief critic of the government concerning the Hong Kong affair, was rabid for compulsory service, and was always on the lookout for anything that would prove that Canada's volunteer system was a miserable failure. This was a point that R.B. Hanson, Tory Leader, wanted written into the Commissioner's terms of reference. Hence the attempts by the officers to show that "other considerations"-secrecy, speed, and the value of having the Commanding Officer inspect the men, and not the lack of trained soldiers-were responsible for the scraping of the bottoms of certain barrels to find reinforcements.

The impression was also given at the hearings that Colonel Hennessy was constantly informed of the reinforcement situation and that he assented to all the transfers, although Riley and Sutcliffe did most of the work. In fact, Hennessy remarked on board the Awatea that Military District No. 10 had been instructed to call on other Districts as far as the coast if enough men could not be found. 74-18 When this was done, as at Dundurn in Military District No. 12, the results were good. As for the Military District No. 10 men, "only a very small percentage were sufficiently trained for overseas service," however the officers supplied by this District were "splendid material and well trained".

The Royal Rifles did not need as many reinforcements as the Winnipeg Grenadiers, because they had been slightly over strength before medical re-examinations. It was decided to get the necessary men from Military District No. 2. No explanation for this was asked for or given, but it is curious when it is recalled that Military District No. 5 was home ground for the Royal Rifles. The probable explanation lies in the fact that the Rifles were an English unit from Eastern Quebec. Problems in recruiting in their home district may have been foreseen, as by 1941 their main sources of recruits, English Gaspesians, Lac St. Jean, and Quebec City men, must have been almost exhausted. This factor was undoubtedly known and taken into consideration at National Defence Headquarters, where it was feared that as a result of a heavy battle, the unit might lose its regional character. 74-19 It seems most likely, therefore, that the reinforcements for the Royal Rifles were taken from Ontario because in the time allotted the necessary Quebec men could not have been found.

There was one attempt made to get Quebec men for the Royal Rifles. The Regiment's Second (Reserve) Battalion was paraded and Home asked for volunteers. Out of these 250 men, most of whom were conscripts for Home Service only in the "Non-Active" battalions, only one stepped forward-a Rifleman Fleming. This man subsequently deserted at Kamloops, British Columbia, before the troops embarked for Hong Kong.

The first call for volunteers was made at Camp Borden where there were two Advanced Training Centres, A-10 and A-11. At A-11 the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Denison, was asked via the Camp Commandant, Brigadier McCuaig, for men to transfer to a unit for overseas duty. He was also told that Hennessy would accept men with one month or more in an Advanced Centre, in other words, men with 12 weeks' training or better. There were 89 volunteers from this camp, who were taken to the District Depot in Toronto to be looked over by two Royal Rifles officers. Two were rejected. Of those accepted, 38 had 16 weeks or more training, 3 had 15 weeks, 1 had 12 weeks, 43 had 11 weeks, and 2 had ten weeks. The Commanding Officer of Camp Borden looked them over, and thought they were good potential for any battalion. Major C. Goodday, the Commanding Officer of the A-10 Advanced Training Centre, was also asked to recruit volunteers. He assembled his men together and told them that a Quebec regiment wanted men. No men came forward. When he reported this to Brigadier McCuaig, the Brigadier asked if he had told the men it was an English, not a French, unit. No, Goodday hadn't; he re-assembled the men and made a further pitch. Five men came forward that day; 11 came forward the next morning. Of these 16, 11 had over 16 weeks, while 5 were in their 12th week of training. When he was calling for recruits, Goodday was not aware that they were destined for overseas. 75-20

In January 1942, when this whole question was being looked into by National Defence Headquarters on its own initiative, the Adjutant of A-10 informed the Camp Commandant that "there was merely a call for reinforcements" to the Royal Rifles, "no information as to whether they should have completed their advanced training. " 75-21 Goodday defended those recruited from his Centre in a letter, saying, "they were young men full of enthusiasm to get into a fighting unit, and had received training in rifle, LMG, and gas. " 75-22

Although there appear to have been 388 men in Camp Borden who had completed Advanced Training, only 49 had actually volunteered. The reason for this is quite simple. Men, on enlisting, signed up with a particular regiment and after training were posted to it, where they usually had friends, relatives, or people from their own area. Most of the men in the Advanced Training Centre at Borden were earmarked for regiments already overseas. The 11th draft to England had been warned already, and the men who were not on it were quite confident that they would be on the next draft to their own units. They were therefore not too interested in service with the Royal Rifles.

The Royal Rifles still needed a number of men to complete their war establishment with first reinforcements. In hopes of obtaining those men the District Officer Commanding contacted Brigadier Stevenson, Officer Commanding the 10th Infantry Brigade, who asked Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Gamey, Officer Commanding the Midland Regiment, to have 52 men ready to go to the District Depot the next day. As the Midland Regiment was strung out on guard duty over four counties in the Niagara region at the time, Gamey had to let his company commanders select the men. When the offer was made nearly everyone in the battalion volunteered, as the unit had been on either Coast Defence or guard duties for many months.

All the men chosen by the Company Commanders had been in the army for a considerable time-two had joined in 1941 (March), the rest in 1940. They had all done TOET's in rifle, Bren gun, grenade (dummy), PAG (protection against gas), and judging distances, yet had rarely fired a rifle. When, on one of their brief and infrequent trips to the range, they fired a classification, 11 of the 52 had failed, 5 had qualified as 3rd class shots, and 9 had either not finished or never actually fired a rifle. This accounts for almost half the men sent. No 2-inch mortar training, anti-tank rifle, or Thompson submachine gun training had been given them. Gamey said in his testimony that the men were as good as any in Canada. He later qualified this and said they were as good as any who had had the same opportunities for training. Gamey explained that Coast Defence and guard duties left him very little time to train. At Saint John, New Brunswick, he could train two companies at a time (including the Headquarters Company) but at Niagara there was no opportunity to train at all; guard duties had kept them completely busy the whole time. 76-23

A further comment on the men from the Midland Regiment, which was no more than rumour, was that all the men selected were the trouble-makers of the unit. This was repeated in a letter to Drew from George White, a Tory MP, dated 26 February 1942. 76-24 White's source of information is unknown, and it is difficult to place much credence in such a sweeping assertion without more evidence. The possibility of its being at least partially true cannot, however, be ignored. A more reliable source in this regard was the father of a Winnipeg Grenadier who wrote to Drew 19 January 1942 (before the Commission was appointed): "... after nearly two years of soldiering, he was not a soldier yet. Their stretch in Jamaica was a joke as far as training was concerned." This is probably a legitimate comment on the battalion's state of training. The father also spoke of the reinforcements to the Grenadiers, "three of whom I know personally. Some soldiers!!" 77-25

Altogether the two battalions received 115 men as reinforcements who had had less than 16 weeks' training. If we add to that the 75 "raw" men who joined the Winnipeg Grenadiers in Jamaica in June 1941 (who, on the move from September onward, could not have received much training between June and October) and the 62 men sent to the Royal Rifles from the Regimental Wing (where there was not even a rifle), we arrive at a larger figure-something around 250 men. These latter 137 men were never considered by the Commission at all; as they were Royal Rifles or Winnipeg Grenadiers in October, they simply did not count as reinforcements.

In arriving at a finding on the reinforcements, the Commissioner accepted the testimony of the senior officers who claimed that such a small number of partially trained reinforcements, estimated at 6%, would not seriously affect the quality of the troops. The figures in the foregoing paragraph, however, give a percentage of 12½%. In other words, one man out of eight was only partially trained. Apparently the Commissioner was particularly impressed by the testimony of Lieutenant General A.G.L. McNaughton, who dropped in to give his "unbiased'' expert opinion. The General was not being investigated, so his testimony was seen as valid in the extreme, however it is obvious to anyone who has read Crerar's correspondence with McNaughton that they were old friends. When the training of the reinforcements being sent to the Corps in England was receiving criticism, Crerar asked McNaughton to lend him support. McNaughton released a bulletin praising extravagantly the quality of men coming out of the Canadian training camps and wrote back to Crerar, "I hope this suits the purpose" or words to that effect. 77-26

McNaughton went into the familiar "character and morale" routine. The Commanding Officer of the units had been given the chance to inspect the men, and as the men were keen on seeing action, and full of character, the matter of training was secondary. For a battalion to absorb 10% to 15% recruits was no problem, and implied no unfairness either to the recruits or to the original members of the unit. 78-27

Taking into account McNaughton's testimony, the need for secrecy, the need for speed, and the desirability of choosing men from only a few Districts, Duff concluded that the business of reinforcement was done competently and that no unfairness resulted to the men from this aspect of the expedition. Besides, said Duff, with Lawson around, the 3 weeks on the ship and the 3 weeks at Hong Kong would have sufficed to train the newcomers adequately. Duff also made it a point to emphasize that the requisite trained men were in fact already in Canada; that is, the volunteer system was working well.

What Duff unfortunately did not stress in his 1942 report was that many of the volunteers should never have been accepted as adequately trained for overseas service. Between the acceptance of the British request and the sailing of the Awatea only one month was available for finding reinforcements for the two battalions, and perhaps this was considered justification for the lack of complete training. In any event, between 9 October and the end of the month, two insufficiently-trained battalions were reinforced, united, and put under the command of a newly-organized, unfamiliar, and partly inexperienced Brigade Headquarters, and sent to Hong Kong to fight for their lives.