No Reason Why (Second Edition)

A Canadian Force Has Arrived at Hong Kong

—C Force sets sail

When the Royal Rifles of Canada returned from Newfoundland after ten months and learned that they were to continue coast defence and guard duties for an indefinite period, they were extremely disappointed. Major Price set to work on C.G. Power, and it would appear that he got rapid results, though almost certainly not the results he had expected. When the warning order of 9 October reached the unit the next day, all ranks were, quite naturally, highly excited. Rumours about their prospective destination proliferated, and when Captain W.A.B. Royal and an advance party were sent off to Vancouver, most of the men in the battalion guessed that they would shortly be heading for Singapore. Lieutenant Colonel Home was soon privately informed that his battalion was going to reinforce the Hong Kong garrison. 95-1

Shortly after the warning order arrived, a group of Ordnance officers from National Defence Headquarters descended on Valcartier (where the Royal Rifles had moved on receipt of the order) and went through the unit's stores in what appeared to the regimental officers to be a very rushed and haphazard fashion. All men in the battalion were given 48 hours leave in rotation. This was barely enough time for the men from Gaspé, who, in some cases, had to spend half of it travelling.

The officers in particular had a great deal to do over this period, preparing for the move. Two, Captain Dennison and Lieutenant Blaver, were sent down to Toronto to meet the reinforcements and go over their records. As mentioned, an attempt to get "R" recruits from the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Rifles of Canada to go "active" with the 1st Battalion was a dismal failure, with the single man who volunteered later deserting.

As for the Winnipeg Grenadiers, there is very little in the records which tells of their last few days in Canada. The St. Charles Range near Winnipeg was set aside for them for a week to fire musketry classifications. Officers were summoned back from leave, and the men returning from Jamaica were given short leave. Like the Royal Rifles, the Grenadiers were reboarded medically and issued with new drill uniforms. Lieutenant Colonel Sutcliffe began to suspect during the last few days that many men were going to miss the sailing. 96-2 When the battalion entrained on 25 October 1941 for Vancouver the Grenadiers did, in fact, have 40 men absent without leave. The number of these absentees has occasionally been cited as an example to give an exaggeratedly dismal impression of the battalion's morale. These men were almost all from the rear party that had been the last to leave Jamaica. They had arrived back in Winnipeg on 10 October 1941 after 18 months without leave. Their leave had been cut short when the warning order came in, and, in consequence, many of them stayed away over the weekend (25 October was a Saturday). None, apparently, were trying to avoid overseas service - they simply wanted more time with friends and relatives, and, because they had not been informed of the sailing date, they felt sure that they would be able to catch up with their unit on the coast. Of the 40, the vast majority returned to the Depot of their own volition. In the event, they were not severely punished.

The Royal Rifles entrained 23 October 1941 and headed west. The personnel of C Force Headquarters were picked up in Ottawa and elsewhere along the way. The two senior officers, Brigadier Lawson and Lieutenant Colonel Hennessy were among those who boarded the train at Ottawa. Four days later the train arrived in Vancouver. Lieutenant Colonel Home had been made responsible for the military administration of the Awatea. Captain Bush, the Staff Captain, had already flown out to Vancouver a few days earlier to commence this administrative work. The elements of C Force Headquarters who were not on the train were, in many cases, from the Vancouver area, and all joined the ship directly.

The Winnipeg Grenadiers rolled in on 27 October as well, minus four men who had deserted the train at Kamloops. The absence of the four men was not immediately noticed - a reflection of the fact that the Grenadiers had a large number of new men and officers on strength who were unfamiliar both with each other and with the original members of the battalion.

At the wharf the scene was one of intense activity as stores were loaded and the men embarked. Brigadier Lawson (according to Captain Bush and in contradiction to Major Gwynne's testimony at the Commission) "was extremely disappointed that no unit transport was aboard ship. He was advised that it was aboard a freighter lying along side of us..." 97-3 Either Bush is mistaken or someone had not told Lawson the truth because neither the MT nor the second ship was in Vancouver on 27 October.

Further trouble soon broke out with the troops. According to Lieutenant Colonel Home, Major Gwynne, the Embarkation Staff Officer, was only interested in getting the men on the ship as soon as possible. 97-4 It was very crowded in the men's quarters, and their resentment was in no way diminished by the fact that the officers' quarters were comparatively spacious. In the words of one soldier, Rifleman Skelton:

October 27 - After breakfast we finished packing our kits ready to detrain at Vancouver. We passed through Vancouver to the docks, detrained, formed up and marched off to the ship which was waiting for us. It was a great sight, but of course there were no bands, few people, but a bunch of officers and NCO's, snapping orders all around... Expecting a good meal it turned out to be salted ham, bread without butter, and nothing to drink but water... We walked around deck and nearly everywhere was Out of Bounds, No Smoking Below Decks, [underlined in original] and only smoking in rooms, - officers had the smoking rooms, indeed the officers had everything... Things begin to look bad. Supper came and the lads waited hours for it and it turned out to be tripe and onions, and it really was tripe. One thing led to another and all the troops were going to march off the boat. The lads of the Winnipeg Grenadiers were just barely back from Jamaica and had served sixteen months guard duty. They had been treated rotten all the time and they swore they would not take any more. Fifty men got off and the first time arguing was all the result they got. The third time the plank was raised and there was nearly a riot. The officers had everything and the rest nothing, so you can hardly blame them. Finally everyone calmed down and all the excitement was over. Late the same night we crowded the rails as we pulled out of Vancouver harbour... We were the first Canadian troops to leave Vancouver. 97-5

Skelton's impressions are largely confirmed by the reports of senior officers. Lawson stated:

While the officers, W.O.s and N.C.Os and the men generally realized that conditions would improve, some 30 or 40 men determined to break ship. They were, however, restrained, force being necessary at one period to do this. The men implicated were, I understand without exception, those who had not been with the unit long enough to get to know, or be known by their officers. 98-6

Major Gwynne reported that approximately fifty men forced their way off the gangway into the shed, but were "persuaded by their officers and NCO's to return in a matter of about 20 minutes." 98-7

C Force sailed that same evening of 27 October. Its personnel strength was 1,975 - 96 officers, 1,877 other ranks and two civilian Auxiliary Services supervisors. Included were two nursing sisters, two medical officers in addition to the regimental medical officers, two officers of the Canadian Dental Corps with their assistants, three chaplains, and a detachment of the Canadian Postal Corps. The force was short 51 men who were absent without leave, all but one from the Winnipeg Grenadiers. In addition to those who had not embarked in Winnipeg or had jumped the train en route were a few who, employed in such duties as loading stores on the ship, simply did not board and their absence went unnoticed until after the ship had sailed.

After this inauspicious embarkation things improved, including the food. An entry in Brigadier Lawson's diary - "Issue Trg Order" - shows that training was started the next day, but not without some difficulty: "29 October - A little trg commenced, but have to put on pressure. 30 October - Trg Winnipeg Grenadiers going well, but Royal Rifles of Canada still sticky." 98-8 Rifleman Skelton records the same picture: "1 November - I was just up on deck and we had drill on 2-inch mortars. 8 November - We have been drilling every day, Bren guns, 2-inch mortars, and anti-tank rifles. They keep us busy with that plus boat drill, fatigue duty, etc." 98-9 A certain amount of actual firing of the Brens was done and lectures were given on Hong Kong, the Japanese Army, and other subjects.

Captain Billings of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals gave very intensive training to his personnel on ship as "Brigadier Lawson had warned all ranks that we might be at war when we landed at our destination." 98-10 This belief is reflected in Lawson's diary: "10 November - News says war in fortnight. Hope our transport arrives. 12 November - Winston Churchill says the United Kingdom will declare war if Japanese do so against US. Wish he would let us get to Hong Kong first." 99-11 Lieutenant Colonel Home said later that, on the whole, the training carried out on shipboard was very beneficial, but the crowded conditions of the ship handicapped the process to some extent. 99-12

Of the men in the force, not all were on the Awatea. 105 men of C Company of the Royal Rifles of Canada were on HMCS Prince Robert, the armed merchant cruiser which acted as Awatea's escort. On this ship training was even more greatly hampered, but they did get the benefit of the Royal Canadian Navy's opinion, which was that "the balloon will go up before we reach the Far East." 99-13

 On 1 November the ship reached Honolulu and tied up near a Japanese ship. No one was allowed ashore, but the dock authorities had arranged a show of hula girls on the wharf for the men. One of the nursing sisters recalled that "The troops went wild - threw money and cigarettes to the girls." 99-14

The night after leaving Hawaii, Brigadier Lawson disclosed to the officers that Hong Kong was their destination. This puzzled some of the Royal Rifles officers who had attended a course at Kingston in August 1941. Colonel Dewing, General Staff Officer at Singapore, had lectured to them on the Far East. He had stated quite explicitly that Hong Kong would not be defended in case of war. "Was policy changed... or was there no policy at all?" they quite naturally asked themselves. 99-15

One Rifleman, D.M. Schrage, died at sea. It was reported as a case of heart failure, but in fact the man was a diabetic and did not tell the medical officers in time. He died from lack of insulin. Schrage was a Toronto volunteer and had apparently had the impression that he would not be allowed to go if he was a known diabetic.

There was also one stowaway, a Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps private who had helped store medical supplies at Vancouver and decided to stay on. Every report on this man, Private Harvey J. Perry, from Captain Bush, the nursing sisters, and the medical officers, was very good, and medical orderlies were needed in Hong Kong. The Brigadier applied to National Defence Headquarters for him to stay with C Force, but he was ordered back on the Prince Robert.

On Friday 14 November the Awatea and Prince Robert pulled into Manila harbour. There they picked up an additional escort, HMS Danae, a British cruiser. Danae had been provided as the result of a message from the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy's China Station which stated, "In view of altered circumstances request you will provide cruiser escort for Awatea from Manila to Hong Kong. " 100-16 George Drew, at the inquiry, claimed that the message proved that the United Kingdom authorities were aware of the imminence of war in late 1941. 100-17 Whatever the "altered" circumstances, the most likely being the new Tojo government in Japan while another was a German merchant raider in the area, the troopship steamed into Hong Kong on 16 November with two warships beside her and the antiquated aircraft that represented Hong Kong's air strength - all five of them - roaring overhead. The ship tied up at Holt's Wharf in Kowloon as the men gazed around at the oriental city.

Back in Canada, National Defence Headquarters was clearing up a few administrative details. The Vice Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier Kenneth Stuart, wrote a memo to the Minister advising that the maintenance of C Force, with the exception of men, should be undertaken by the British. Sailings from Canada to Hong Kong were too irregular, he argued, to permit the efficient replacement of material from home. The British could work out the cost and send the bill from London. 100-18 A preliminary report was ordered on the reasons for the MT missing the boat for Hong Kong. A memo from Major General Crerar suggested that the War Office should be asked to supply such papers as a map of Hong Kong (!), Defence Scheme papers, and information on artillery forces there. Crerar thought that, "We should keep 'up-to-date' on Far East, especially Hong Kong, in view of our particular military committment there." 100-19 It is astounding to contemplate that only after the two battalions had been sent to Hong Kong did it seem desirable to learn something about the place. Even more incredible is that most of what Crerar had requested was already available at National Defence Headquarters!

On the political level the Canadian government prepared to reap the Public Relations harvest associated with the landing of the troops. It was arranged that the General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong would send a one-word signal - "Zebulon" - when the men had landed safely. The discussion went on from there to the wording of the public communiqué, which the British had agreed to let Canada release first. The Canadian government wanted a big splash with a long message issued, including the sentence "Hong Kong constituted an outpost which the Commonwealth intended to hold." The draft was sent to the United Kingdom for approval, and the Canadians were probably somewhat crestfallen when the reply requested that the communiqué should not "be on such a scale as to over-emphasize the strength of our defences in Hong Kong. " 101-20 This should have given the Canadian government cause to think, but there is no indication that it did so. The final statement agreed upon was rather bald:

A Canadian force, under the Command of Brigadier J.K. Lawson, has arrived at Hong Kong after a safe and uneventful voyage, the Canadian government announced at Ottawa today. The Canadian troops will serve with other units of His Majesty's Forces making up the Hong Kong garrison. The strength of the force was not disclosed.

London was supposed to release the news three and a half hours after Canada, but there was a leak somewhere. On 11 November the Daily Telegraph successfully pinpointed Hong Kong as a future Canadian theatre of involvement but no one appears to have noticed. 15 November this paper again hinted at "expected developments in Canadian participation in Far Eastern defence." In Ottawa, officials were a little disconcerted and annoyed, feeling that it would "destroy the value of the news announcement of the Hong Kong arrival of Canadians.... You will appreciate the trouble we have had in this regard in the past, and we had hoped that on this occasion, it could have been avoided.” 101-21

The announcement nevertheless went off quite well. Mackenzie King made a little speech saying that defence against aggression anywhere meant protection for Canada. 101-22 Some Tory papers actually lauded the Liberals for the action - King and his cronies, although not bringing in overseas conscription, were finally commencing to take the war seriously. The Kingston Whig-Standard described Hong Kong as "essentially a strong point inside Japanese lines" 101-23 King was delighted to observe all this favourable publicity. Canada now had her forces on three continents, and was doing her full share in Commonwealth defence.