October 1941 saw a great increase in tension between Japan and the United Kingdom/United States front. As George Drew pointed out in his argument before the Royal Commission, at the time the Canadian battalions were requested the situation had supposedly improved. Earlier it had not been felt right to send more troops to Hong Kong. In October 1941, with the situation once again deteriorating, why did the Canadian government not reconsider? 102-1
There are two answers to this question. Diplomatically, it would have been almost impossible for Canada to refuse to send the two units after Tojo took power, as it would then appear that Canadians were only willing to go where there were no risks involved. Also, the information on the situation in the Far East being received by the Canadian government was of a very conflicting nature--some of it pointed to an early war, while other evidence tended to indicate that the situation was not as serious as it might be. The government also continued to think of the little Canadian force as a "deterrent", even after Tojo's accession to power. This illusion operated at high military levels as well.
Early October was rather calm in Japan. The British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, who had earlier been rebuffed by Eden for suggesting that Japan was weakening (see page 38), reiterated that a swing away from the Axis was occurring. Prince Konoye, the Japanese Prime Minister, was sincere in his efforts to avoid war, but Sir Robert warned that if there were no real signs of progress in the United States-Japanese talks the extremist elements would become more vocal. 103-2 Perhaps Konoye (who used to dress as Hitler at fancy dress balls) really was a "moderate", whatever that might mean in Japan, but like one of his predecessors, the "moderate" Prime Minister Yonai, he fell from power for being too soft. His War Minister, General Tojo, took over as Prime Minister on 16 October 1941.
*The fall of the Konoye cabinet on 16 October 1941 resulted in an alert being sent to the United States Pacific Commanders that war was imminent and measures should be taken accordingly. The Canadian government was never told of this warning.
Craigie, the eternal optimist, was still able to take a cheerful view of this event, which had given most other knowledgeable westerners a nasty shock.* He reported to London that the new cabinet was not as extreme as it appeared at first sight. Although Japanese demands would become more strident, war in the near future was still unlikely. 103-3 (Sir Robert was again indulging himself in what appears to have been his favourite pastime--picking out the least objectionable ministers, labelling them "moderates", and assiduously looking for the smallest hint that they were "gaining control".) The new cabinet, in fact, contained extremists in every vital portfolio. The holdovers from the Konoye cabinet (hardly a conciliatory group itself) were mainly in unimportant posts. Tojo, reported to Mackenzie King as "much more likely than Prince Konoye to seek a solution by positive action," was an undoubted extremist, "quite capable of making a prompt decision to break off the talks and launch upon further aggression without warning." 103-4
The change of government in Japan does not seem to have been discussed at the next meeting of the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet, which was held on 22 October 1941. There was, however, a lengthy discussion of measures to be taken in the event of war with Japan. 103-5 Whatever the official position of the respective governments, a growing number of people felt that time was running out. Lieutenant A.R.S. Woodside, the Intelligence Officer of the Royal Rifles, recalled, "During that time I had a number of talks with A.D.P. Heeney [who was then Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the War Committee] about the changing situation. And it is clear to me that he knew, I knew, and the Canadian government knew before we left that we were going to fight a war." 103-6
Soon afterward the British decided to throw another "deterrent" into the ring. This was HMS Prince of Wales, accompanied by HMS Repulse. The former was the pride of the Royal Navy, while the latter was also a formidable fighting ship. Churchill wrote Mackenzie King on 5 November 1941 telling him of these new actors in the drama, saying, "I am sure she [Prince of Wales] will be the best possible deterrent to Japan." 104-7 The tragic sequel to this need not be enlarged upon.
The diplomats seemed unsure all through this period of Japan's eventual course of action. A cable from Canadian Military Headquarters to National Defence Headquarters of 26 October 1941 contained the latest information from Japan, and said, "Consensus [of] opinion [is] that war in Far East unlikely at present.... when time arrives... initial movement of Japanese forces will probably be northerly against Russia and not to south against our forces." 104-8 The direction and time were wrong, but the prospect of hostilities was definitely considered probable. In his Royal Commission report Sir Lyman Duff quoted only the first sentence of this message, presumably to establish that war was not really expected.
On a less exalted level, there were many who were more knowledgeable than their superiors. The former Military Attaché for the United Kingdom in Tokyo, Colonel Mullahy, continued to pump out reports on the Far East which observed correctly that the Japanese army was getting out of hand, that Japanese public opinion was being railroaded into approval of the war, and that "things have been allowed to drift to the point where it is difficult for Japan to soften up without losing considerable face'." 104-9 Another man, who did not want to be identified, but who was apparently a businessman, gave an interview to Canadian Military Intelligence officers in Victoria, British Columbia in mid-November 1941. He had recently returned from Japan. Among his observations he noted that German influence in Japan was getting stronger. Reports belittling Japanese naval gunnery were false--it was deadly accurate. Japanese naval warfare, the man said, would not be conventional, but would "exhibit a pronounced element of surprise". The officers also noted: "Informant definitely says that no troops should have been landed [at Hong Kong]. Rather he says we should evacuate. He says it is not possible for us to conduct a defence for any length of time. He has learned from Japanese sources that no attempt will be made to capture Hong Kong by naval action alone." 104-10 The forced migration of Chinese into Hong Kong "would simplify a land attack". Such reports as these were usually buried somewhere in National Defence Headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Murray, GSO 1 (Intelligence) at National Defence Headquarters, was in charge of their collection and distribution, but it does not appear that even he made any attempt to read them with any consistency. The higher-ups as a rule were only interested in reading the observations of such optimists as Sir Robert Craigie. (As an aside, it is interesting to note that George Drew received a letter from a Major A.M.K. Hobbs in 1948 which claimed that Murray had recognized Japanese intentions. Hobbs, who worked in the National Defence Headquarters Intelligence section from 1942 to 1945, contended that it was common knowledge in late 1941 in the Intelligence section that war was imminent. He said that Murray had been intercepting messages from Japan and "was convinced that Japan would attack the United States in December 1941." Murray supposedly informed Norman Robertson and Hugh Keenleyside of External Affairs, but they apparently thought that he was crazy. He then relayed his information to the G.2 of the United States Army. Only Murray's lifelong attachment to the Liberal party had prevented him spilling the beans to the public after the war. 105-11 Hobbs' story seems to have little basis in fact. (Murray did intercept two uncoded messages from Japan but could make nothing out of them at all.)
Also in November 1941, the Dominions Office sent the Department of External Affairs a copy of the instructions given to the new Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. These instructions contained phrases such as, "While Japan remains neutral", "An outbreak of war with Japan'', and "It is possible that a part of the Eastern Fleet may be assembled in Eastern Theatre before outbreak of war with Japan," 105-12 Scarcely any doubt was displayed in this telegram that war was on the way, and sooner rather than later.
The minutes of the Canadian Cabinet War Committee throughout November and early December reflect a growing concern over the situation in the Far East. The brief period of hope in early October soon died away, and the Allies prepared for war. It was reported at the meeting of 27 November 1941 that the United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had told the United Kingdom that "the chance of Japanese acceptance of American proposals for a modus vivendi was slight. War and Navy Departments [are] impressing on United States Administration the military values of delay." 105-13 The news from then on worsened. In all the messages, telegrams, and reports of these last few weeks before war, there is not the slightest suggestion that the Canadian reinforcement of Hong Kong had had any diplomatic effect whatsoever. The strengthening of the colony had not "tipped the balance" as some had hoped it would. By the time the Canadians arrived the situation had deteriorated irretrievably and the Japanese probably took no notice of the arrival of the Canadian troops whatsoever, except on the most local of levels.
In Hong Kong the news that Canada would furnish two battalions and a brigade headquarters was undeniably a tonic. It also caused the War Office to become slightly more generous to the fortress. Major General Kennedy at the War Office sent a memo to the Director of Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defence saying that, in view of the decision to send the Canadian battalions, "I consider that the existing ruling that Commander-in-Chief Far East may not allocate anti-aircraft equipments to Hong Kong should be cancelled immediately." 106-14 As there were no more than 30 anti-aircraft guns in the colony at that time, most of which were obsolete 3-inch weapons, this step promised a very great improvement in its defences. Unfortunately, no new anti-aircraft guns reached Hong Kong before the Japanese attack.
The British Chiefs of Staff, however, were not getting sentimental. On 5 November 1941 they dealt with a memo which seemed to indicate that the Commander-in-Chief, Far East thought that the policy on Hong Kong had changed. On 6 November they told him, "Our policy regarding defence of Hong Kong remains unaltered. It must be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible," 106-15
In Hong Kong, however, the immediate defence policy was being altered. When the General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, Major General C.M. Maltby, heard that the Canadians were coming, the Gin Drinkers Line was brought back into the defence scheme. Nevertheless, work on it did not start until 14 November, two days before the Canadians arrived. It was not in good condition and a great deal of construction and repair was needed.
Japanese activity in the Hong Kong area increased during October and November. About 20,000 extra troops were landed in South China in October 1941, bringing the total to four divisions and one independent mixed brigade. A Japanese transport was stopped in Hong Kong waters and was found to have a Japanese general and his staff on Board, presumably making a reconnaissance. They were allowed to proceed after a warning. The Japanese Navy was said to be fully mobilized and ready for war, although Japan's armies were reported to be still in a position where sudden moves were unlikely. These events were seen by British Intelligence as "a tightening up to concert pitch rather than the final touches before plunging off the deep end." 106-16 (The mixed metaphor seems to be a standard form in military writing.) Japan was still thought to be fence-sitting.
The next month British Intelligence in Hong Kong reported that a move against Russia was unlikely. Troops were massing in Indo-China, possibly for an attack on Thailand. Closer to home, Japanese troops were reported as having established a lookout station on a small island near Hong Kong. The same report also noted an air attack on an airfield near the Chinese city of Namyung. The Japanese dropped 43 bombs from 14,000 feet and every one landed on the target. Despite this evidence, General Maltby maintained, right up to the time of the battle, a belief that the Japanese air force was poor, with inaccurate bombing and no aptitude for night flying. This opinion was shared by many British officers. 107-17
The senior naval officers in the Pacific were also putting their heads together. On 12 November 1941 the Commander-in-Chief, China Station and Admiral T.S. Hart of the United States Asiatic Fleet based at Manila issued plans for a defensive strategy in the Southwest Pacific. They decided to "defend" Hong Kong, most of the Philippines, and most of the Netherlands' East Indies and to "hold" Luzon (Philippines), Malaya, Singapore, and Java. "Defend" meant to continue resistance as long as possible, "hold" indicated the intention to repulse all attacks. Thus it was not considered feasible to retain Hong Kong indefinitely "if... attacked on a major scale". 107-18 These naval plans were made with the knowledge that the colony would soon be reinforced, but it is evident that a successful defence of the Island was still not viewed as likely, while the Chiefs of Staff telegram of 6 November 1941 attests that the arrival of the two extra battalions had not altered military policy.
Meanwhile, as the diplomatic and military prospects continued to darken, the Canadian troops sailed on into a death trap.