The man under whose command the Canadian Force was to serve was Major General C.M. Maltby, who had taken over from Major General Grasett as General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong in July 1941. Maltby was an Indian Army Officer who had at one time commanded the Indian Army Staff College at Quetta. He had the reputation of being an efficient soldier, which is not surprising considering his background, but many found him difficult to get along with. He is reported to have been rather unimpressed by one of his original battalions at Hong Kong, the 2nd Royal Scots, 108-1 and his initial low opinion of the Canadians was to mean that he took a very jaundiced view of their actions during the battle.
Maltby seems to have fallen heir not only to his predecessor's command, but also to his optimism. He, too, had a low opinion of Japanese military capability, and tended to believe only the most understated reports of Japanese strength in South China. To do Maltby justice, however, he was meticulously thorough in his defence preparations and surveyed all the ground personally. Over-confident he may have been, but negligent he most definitely was not.
The piece of real estate that Maltby was charged with defending presented many difficulties both to the defenders, and, apparently, to any potential attackers. By far the greatest land area was the mainland portion of the colony, the leased "New Territories". The bulk of this land mass of approximately 360 square miles consisted of a peninsula, stretching 15 miles from the city of Kowloon at its tip to the Chinese border at its base. Most of this area was mountainous and sparsely populated. The Island of Hong Kong had an area of 32 square miles averaging approximately eight miles from east to west and four miles north to south. The south coast was broken by several prominent peninsulas and deeply indented bays. The capital, Victoria, occupied most of the north coast directly opposite Kowloon, and the famous Hong Kong harbour was formed by the passage between the north coast of the Island and the Kowloon peninsula. Most of the Island terrain was mountainous with steep-walled valleys, gaps, and passes between the mountain ridges.
The official total strength of the Hong Kong garrison in early December 1941 was 13,981 all ranks and in all corps, however this figure included such groups as nursing sisters, the St. John Ambulance Brigade, and the Hong Kong Mule Corps. The actual number of regular infantrymen was 5,422. Approximately 6,000 others, such as the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, and Royal Navy, could be considered part of the fighting forces.
The Royal Navy component of the defence was only a pale shadow of the powerful China Squadron of the peacetime years. Until the day before the Japanese attack the principle units were three First World War "S and T" class destroyers, the Royal Navy's smallest and oldest destroyers. However, during a discussion in early December between senior British and American naval officers, the United States agreed to send four destroyers to Singapore if Britain would reinforce Singapore with its three Hong Kong destroyers. The Royal Navy was probably only too happy to salvage something from what promised to be a futile defence, and HMS Thanet and HMS Scout sailed for Singapore on the night of 7 December. The third ship, HMS Thracian, was undergoing repairs and could not leave the harbour. A flotilla of eight motor torpedo boats (MTB's) were also on hand for the defence of the island, but these were very early models with little more than machine-guns and depth charges to use against the enemy. The remaining naval defence consisted of four river gunboats and a number of minelayers and auxiliary patrol vessels. The total number of naval personnel was 1,300 British and 300 Indian and Chinese. The air strength of the garrison has often been derided, but its weakness may be an indication that the Royal Air Force took a more realistic view of Hong Kong's prospects than the other two services. At the tiny Kai Tak airfield on the mainland were three Vickers Vildebeestes, former torpedo bombers now used as target tugs, and two Supermarine Walrus amphibians. These latter aircraft are usually credited to RAF strength, but it is more likely that they belonged to the Royal Navy. These five aircraft represented an RAF and RN Station Flight maintained for the peacetime training of the garrison only and were not regarded as part of the defences.
The fixed defences of the colony were primarily designed to counter an attack from the sea, and in the event of such a purely naval attack could probably have withstood anything short of a major battle fleet.
The fixed coastal guns consisted of eight 9.2-inch, fifteen 6-inch, two 4.7-inch, and four 4-inch weapons. There were also six 18-pounder and four 2-pounder beach defence guns. Around the coast of the Island was a ring of 72 pill boxes, field works, and barbed wire entanglements. The strongest portion of these defences and all the coastal batteries were designed to counter a seaborne attack from the south. An enemy landing from this direction would have had to deal with the heavy guns of the fixed defences, go through minefields that were reputed to be sown more thickly than those protecting the Firth of Forth, break through the beach defence guns and pill boxes, and then contend with land mines, barbed wire, and the infantry. The defences on the north side of the Island facing the mainland across the harbour and the Lye Mun Passage (approximately 450 yards at its narrowest point) were not nearly as formidable. The big coastal guns would have little effect on a landward assault or a crossing in small boats, not because they were unable to fire to the north they were able to do so--but because, as in the case of Singapore*, they lacked suitable ammunition. Most of their ammunition was designed to pierce thick armour plate to reach the magazine of an enemy warship. While a 380-pound, 9.2-inch armour-piercing shell would have a distinctly traumatic effect on a Japanese soldier if it hit him directly, with its thick casing and relatively small bursting charge it could do little damage if it exploded deep in the ground or water. The supply of ammunition suitable for use against troops was only sufficient to furnish 25 rounds per gun. This was unfortunate as the mobile artillery was far less formidable, consisting mainly of obsolete weapons--four 60-pounder guns and twelve 6-inch, eight 4.5-inch, and eight 3.7-inch howitzers. Anti-aircraft guns were in even shorter supply and able to provide very little defence. The troops manning these vehicles were the 8th and 12th Coast Regiments, 5th Anti Aircraft Regiment, and 965th Defence Battery of the Royal Artillery, all containing many Indian personnel, and the 1st Hong Kong Regiment of the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery, consisting of Indian troops under British officers. Another important component of the garrison was formed by the 22nd and 40th Fortress Companies of the Royal Engineers, many of whose men were Chinese.
*Contrary to popular myth, many of Singapore's guns (including the huge 15-inch weapons which were capable of 360° fire) did not "face the wrong way", they simply lacked the correct ammunition.
The backbone of the defence should the Japanese establish a foothold in the colony consisted of the six battalions of infantry--two British, two Indian, and two Canadian. The senior battalion, both in the Army List and in service in Hong Kong, was the 2nd Battalion, Royal Scots, which had arrived in Hong Kong from India in 1936. Most of the men of this battalion were Lowland Scots. They had the reputation of being excellent fighting men, but the general concensus of opinion seems to be that their long stay in Hong Kong had taken the edge off their efficiency, and there is no doubt that their sickness rate, particularly from malaria, was regrettably high. Furthermore, the Battalion was split between three locations, and while some field training had been carried out, "the periods in which the Battalion could train as a unit were too short for the liking of experienced senior officers." 111-2 This hardly seems to show Hong Kong as an ideal posting for the Canadians to complete their tactical training.
The other British battalion, the 1st Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, was recruited from the London area and had been overseas since 1931 and in Hong Kong since 1937. It, too, was growing stagnant from overlong garrison duty at Hong Kong--probably the "softest" posting in the Empire--and, like the Royal Scots, had lost experienced personnel in postings away from the unit and from Hong Kong due to the expansion of the wartime army. The 1st Middlesex had been converted to a machine-gun battalion and its primary duty was to man the static defences around the Island.
The two Indian battalions were the 5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment. Both were regular battalions of the Indian Army with long and honorable histories. While they had not been exposed as long to the enervating Hong Kong garrison duty, the Indian battalions, even more than the two British, had lost many of their officers, NCOs, and trained men who had been transferred, and replaced by partially-trained recruits. This had changed them from crack regular battalions equal to the best in any army to units of far more dubious reliability. The Rajputs were a particularly sad case. They had been in Hong Kong since October, 1940, but had not received vehicles and mortars until August 1941. 40% of the men were partially-trained recruits who had arrived in October 1941. It is easy to see why, in the eyes of some Canadian officers, the Winnipeg Grenadiers and Royal Rifles were not markedly inferior to other units in Hong Kong. 112-3
A not inconsiderable part in the defence was played by the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps. Conscription had been introduced for British residents of Hong Kong in early 1941, and most men of military age had ended up in the Volunteers. In addition, substantial numbers of European nationals, Chinese, and men of other Asian races had voluntarily enlisted. The Volunteers, who trained part time before the Japanese attack, provided no less than five batteries of artillery and seven infantry companies in addition to other arms. The ranks of the Volunteers embodied men from all walks of life, many of them men who were well aware that they would be fighting in the most direct way for their homes and families and so threw themselves into their duties with intense determination. Indeed, one group of men who were over 55 years of age, and so ineligible for service in the Volunteers, formed their own group. Unfortunately there were others who were conscripts in the most reluctant sense of the word. As a result, in the test of battle, many Volunteers fought with a courage and determination equal to the best of the regular garrison, while others were merely an encumbrance to the defence.
All told, including non-combatants, the garrison comprised 8,919 British, Canadian, and colonial personnel, 4,402 Indians, and 660 Chinese. As the C Force records state, it was "hardly a combination likely to make an efficient fighting force" 112-4
Before Maltby had received word of the despatch of the Canadians, defence plans had envisaged the main effort being devoted to the Island, with little more than a delaying action being fought on the mainland in order to allow demolitions to be carried out. The action was to be fought by a single battalion, the 2/14 Punjabs. As the Gin Drinkers Line had been abandoned before completion and was, in any event, far too long for one battalion to hold, it played little part in the proposed delaying action. The Punjabs were only intended to fight rear guard actions astride the main defiles leading up to it. It was essential that they be able to disengage on the mainland with minimal losses as they would be required to help defend the Island. The defence of the Island itself was based on an all-round scheme. Even with the loss of the mainland, the possibility of a seaborne landing on the south coast was to haunt Maltby right to the bitter end.
The news that two Canadian battalions were being sent to Hong Kong was responsible for a marked change in these plans. One of the reasons for requesting reinforcements was that the single battalion on the mainland simply could not provide sufficient time for an effective program of demolition to be carried out. This argument obviously carried some weight as it was repeated by the War Office in the minute to the Prime Minister. In January 1941 Brooke Popham had estimated that the Punjabs might have to be evacuated after 48 hours, but "if the one battalion could be multiplied by three the period of resistance would in all probability be multiplied by six." 113-5 If Maltby concurred with this assessment, as he must have, his decision to detach three of his six battalions to the mainland made sense-the increased time they might win for him would probably be worth the risk inherent in attempting to evacuate a force of that size back to the Island. What is questionable is the way he chose to use them on the mainland. Maltby intended to man and hold the Line with three battalions up, less one company to cover demolition teams between the Gin Drinkers Line and the frontier, and negligible reserves. General Bartholomew had estimated in 1937 that it would require four battalions to fight a delaying action and seven to have even a chance of holding the Line. Maltby's decision to attempt to hold nearly eleven miles of incomplete defensive positions with three battalions could only have been based on a faulty appreciation of Japanese military ability. Yet if the Japanese succeeded in breaching the Line, the weak defence, lack of reserves, and proximity to the harbour would crush any hope of continuing resistance on the mainland, and the only recourse would be a hasty evacuation in front of the advancing Japanese. In short, from a delaying action on the mainland, Maltby had gone to an "all or nothing" defence of the area.
Maltby's new plan entailed the division of his infantry force into two brigades, an Island Brigade and a Mainland Brigade. Brigadier Lawson was to command the Island Brigade, which consisted of the garrison's machine-gun battalion, the 1st Middlesex, which would be deployed all around the island manning the 72 pillboxes and other static defences, and the two Canadian battalions, which would take up positions to defend against a landing on the south coast. The Mainland Brigade was to hold the Gin Drinkers Line with, from west to east, the 2nd Royal Scots, the 2/14 Punjabs, and the 5/7 Rajputs holding approximately equal portions of the Line. These were to be supported by about half the available mobile artillery. The Mainland Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Cedric Wallis who had previously commanded the 5/7 Rajputs. Wallis was a dedicated and energetic officer whose personal courage was beyond question, but some of the Canadians, particularly the Royal Rifles, were subsequently to question his military judgement.
The plan for the defence of the mainland envisaged the three battalions manning the Gin Drinkers Line with the exception of one company of the Rajputs as brigade reserve, one company of the Royal Scots as local reserve, and one company of the Punjabs to initially operate forward of the Line in the New Territories. This last unit was to fight a short delaying action and assist in demolitions before retiring to the Line, which was to be held as long as possible. Maltby estimated this at a minimum of seven days. Should the Line be penetrated the brigade would be evacuated to the Island with the exception of the Rajputs, who were to hold Devil's Peak commanding the Lye Mun Passage as long as possible.
The Gin Drinkers Line was a system of entrenchments protected by barbed wire and reinforced at critical points by concrete pillboxes. Construction had been abandoned in 1937 and, except for parts of the centre, the defence work was largely incomplete. In addition, there had been considerable deterioration over the intervening years. As soon as the new plan was formulated, working parties from the three battalions of the Mainland Brigade commenced repair and construction activities. Once the Canadians had arrived, the battalions of the Mainland Brigade took up their positions in the Line in order to facilitate this work.
Thus the Canadians arrived in Hong Kong to find themselves part of an exceptionally heterogeneous force which, due to an entirely new defence plan, was in an uneasy state of flux.