Soon We Shall Be Fighting For Our Own Lives
—the last three weeks of peace
When the Awatea tied up at Holt's Wharf in Kowloon the Governor of the Colony, Sir Mark Young, the General Officer Commanding, Major General Maltby, and the Naval Officer Commanding, Commodore Collinson, came on board to greet the Canadians. Some of the Canadian officers were not impressed; the British were "more English in their talk than was natural, and, brilliant in their trappings, seemed rather to be at some peace-time festival than on the verge of an outbreak of war." 119-1 This may be too harsh a judgement on men whose only aim, at that time, was probably to greet the Canadians and made them feel appreciated.
Major General Maltby and Brigadier Lawson confer after C Force's arrival
The Canadian troops disembarked, formed up, and marched through the city to Shamshuipo Camp on the northwest side Kowloon. The men were confined to the camp for the first two days while they settled into barracks, but the march through the city was of tremendous interest to them.
Brigadier Lawson had been given instructions in an Order-in-Council to place his forces "in combination with" the British forces in Hong Kong, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Act of 1931. 119-2 This essentially meant that, for the purposes of military operations, he was to come under the direct orders of the General Officer Commanding. The integration of the Canadians into the defence scheme soon began. Although the British War Office had been well aware that any troops sent from Canada would probably only be partially trained, they had not seen fit to pass this information on to the senior officers in Hong Kong. These were shocked to find that their reinforcements had so little training. Indeed, it was found necessary to organize a training course for NCOs, so that they, in turn, could train the men. Captain M. Weedon of the 1st Battalion, Middlesex Regiment supervised the course.
Canadian troops establish a Bren gun position
Training started after only a few days, but first the battalions had to settle in. Transport was hired to carry the goods to the camp, but Lawson noted on 19 November: "Bns still far from unpacked. Stores chaotic.” 120-3 The two Canadian battalions were in a camp that had been built on reclaimed land in 1927 at the time of some anti-foreign riots. The Royal Rifles were comfortably housed in Nanking Barracks, the Winnipeg Grenadiers in Han Kow Barracks, and the Jubilee Buildings at the top of the camp were set aside for officers and NCOs. The troops from 18 November to 6 December continued training, doing TOET's (in a potential theatre of war!), bayonet drill, and route marching. One platoon per company spent a few days in early December manning their positions in the defence scheme after a reconnaissance of these areas. Rifleman Skelton records: "We climbed mountains all day long and we are shown the many spots for which soon we shall be fighting for our own lives. Climbing is no joke, and these mountains are plenty hard on greenhorns like me."
There was also something of a war scare:
Nov 30: We were confined to barracks. Everything was to be packed and ready at a moment's notice. The Japs have declared war. We have been issued with ammunition and are waiting for the word to move. Dec 1: Japan declaring war another farce. Went over to the Island again tonight. 120-4
Soon after their arrival the Canadian officers, and later the NCOs, were taken on a tour of the Island and shown the defensive positions. Lawson inspected what was to be his Brigade Headquarters, pillboxes, and other works. On 19 November General Maltby spoke to all the Canadian officers. They were struck by some of the salient points he brought out, such as the lack of an air force, the proximity of the Japanese, the pitifully small anti-aircraft defences, the lack of significant naval support, and the number of Chinese refugees in the colony. 120-5 Both the Governor and the General Officer Commanding were new arrivals in the Colony (September 41 and July 41 respectively), and some of the British troops had been there for over four years and had stagnated in consequence. As Lieutenant Colonel Home wrote:
How even the thought that the Island could be defended without any fighters of the Air Force is beyond one's conception. The one belief that was current after checking up on the detailed defences was simply that England did not expect war with Japan in the immediate future. Any other belief can only lead one to the impression that those in authority were sublimely unconscious of what it was all about.... All officers were soon wondering what conceivable difference to the defence of Hong Kong two battalions and a Brigade Headquarters could make. 121-6
At the same lecture Major Bishop, who commanded C Company, Royal Rifles of Canada, had a run-in with the mainland Brigade Commander, Brigadier Cedric Wallis. Bishop had made a joke about the 6-inch guns at Lye Mun, which were, in fact, wooden dummies: "Well, they sure fooled me, but I bet they don't fool the Japs." Wallis was most definitely not amused. 121-7 After only two or three days in the colony the Canadians and British were already eyeing each other with mistrust, which was in no way to decrease before the capitulation. The Canadians began to believe that they had been thrown into the deep end as a political gesture: "Did England think she could bluff the Japanese from attacking Hong Kong by sending a token Canadian Force?" 121-8 The British, dismayed at the low level of training of the Canadian soldiers, were annoyed at their self-confidence and arrogance. There was friction amongst the lower ranks as the better-paid Canadians began to monopolize the sing-song girls in the Chinese areas and, as has been the wont of new regiments in a garrison since time immemorial, to generally throw their weight around.
The specialists in C Force Headquarters were immediately integrated, for the most part, into the British structure. Captain Billings became the Signals Officer for the Mainland Brigade. The Ordnance, Service Corps, and Provost details were tacked onto existing organizations. The medical personnel were similarly treated. At Hong Kong, instead of Regimental Medical Officers, there were Area Medical Officers. Captain S.M. Banfill, the Royal Rifles' Medical Officer, set up a medical post at Lye Mun in the cast end of the Island on 10 December while Captain Reid was stationed in the Grenadier area in the west. Captain Gray stayed at Bowen Road, the main military hospital in Hong Kong, and the senior Canadian Medical Officer, Major J.N.B. Crawford, was made Second-in-Command of the Field Ambulance Unit on the mainland.
There had been no desperate requirement for additional doctors in the garrison. Their real need was for male medical orderlies. These had been specifically requested, but two nursing sisters had been sent instead. They could not be used in the Canadian camp and were therefore attached to Bowen Road. The only medical orderly who came with the Canadians was the stowaway, Perry, who had been shipped back to Canada despite pleas from all concerned that he be allowed to stay. The two nursing sisters proved themselves of "incalcuable worth" 122-9 when the fighting began, even though they found Bowen Road and its practices to be "inferior and definitely antiquated." 122-10 It was already overstaffed before the Canadians arrived. The two nurses settled in and were shown around the Island a week later by the senior British nurse and her boyfriend, Lieutenant Colonel Lamb (a Staff Officer). "We were told how strongly fortified the Island was; in fact, it was impregnable. Later we learned that the majority of people in Hong Kong felt the same way.” 122-11 The only officer they talked to who thought there was going to be a war was a Canadian.
Despite some Anglo-Canadian friction, not all was gloom. The Canadian officers were apparently quite popular at the clubs and hotels, and gained reputations as good dancers. Many of the NCOs, such as Frank Ebdon, born in London, were soon drinking with the cockney sergeants of the 1st Middlesex. The men slowly began to fit into their unaccustomed surroundings. Chinese servants handled all the fatigue duties in Hong Kong, which pleased the troops. Few tactical schemes were undertaken before the attack, as both battalions were earmarked for a static defensive role-the exact opposite of the role they were eventually called upon to play. Summing up the last weeks before the war, "the general picture is one of co-ordinated and intense activity directed by a Commander [Lawson] who had no illusions of security." 122-12
Meanwhile, amongst the senior officers at Hong Kong, a curious air of optimism had begun to prevail. The Commander-in-Chief, Far East in Singapore had already been infected, but his delusions were dispelled by the War Office message of 16 November. This also informed him definitely that no fighters were to be sent to Hong Kong; that policy, too, remained unchanged. 122-13
At Hong Kong itself, the General Officer Commanding began to think even more positively, apparently helped along by Brigadier Lawson. On 19 November the Commander-in-Chief, Far East passed along a message to the War Office. This message stated that Lawson, then newly arrived in Hong Kong, had suggested that the United Kingdom ask Canada for more troops, thus enabling him to form the Canadians into a Brigade Group. These reinforcements would include an infantry battalion, a field regiment of the Royal Canadian Artillery, a field company of the Royal Canadian Engineers, and more signals, medical, and ordnance personnel. Lawson is reported to have said, "They will be thrown at us." 123-14
The original message from Maltby to Brooke-Popham explained why such a reinforcement would be desirable. The object was to be able to hold the Gin Drinkers Line permanently to ensure the safety of the Kai Tak airfield. In the future, a mobile brigade group could link up with Chinese forces. Maltby asked, "Is not the value of Hong Kong as a bridgehead increasing every day and Hong Kong becoming potential centre of ABCD [American, British, Chinese, Dutch] front?" 123-15 This message might cause one to suspect that Maltby was deranged. The Gin Drinkers Line had been designed for a full division to hold-Maltby would have seven battalions for the whole colony even if the extra men were sent. The Line was a weak one, where reserves could not be brought up quickly. Kai Tak, even if the Japanese could be held on the Line, would still be exposed to any weight of artillery barrage the Japanese cared to bring to bear on it (to say nothing of aerial bombing) because it was only a few miles from the Line, so the reason stated for holding the Line was patently absurd. As for Hong Kong becoming a centre for the ABCD front, Maltby must have let his imagination run away with him. It was not with hindsight, but before the war, that the Allies had realized that holding even Singapore and the Phillipines was going to be difficult!
After being studied at the War Office Maltby's message was passed on to the Chiefs of Staff. The first person to examine it noted that, while the additional artillery would be useful, it should be employed not for offense or defence on the mainland, but "to increase the powers of defence of the Island", 123-16 The Chiefs of Staff were either sceptical or bewildered and suggested that the General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong and Commander-in-Chief, Far East explore the reasons for this proposed additional reinforcement. 123-17
On 24 November the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Brooke-Popham, repeated the suggestion, followed by the recommendation that "If approval is given for this reinforcement scheme I think it should also be given in principle for the fighter squadron [that is, the squadron based at Hong Kong for which Brooke-Popham had been agitating]." The Air Chief Marshal ended with a not particularly subtle hint: "I leave to you the political aspect of having Dominion troops unsupported from the air. " 124-18
The War Office replied to Brooke-Popham on 27 November 1941. The Chiefs of Staff did not agree that the proposed reinforcements would enable the permanent retention of the Gin Drinkers Line or that Kai Tak would then be available for fighters. The provision of the full complement of a brigade group by Canada would, however, be welcomed, but it should be used to hold the Island, not the mainland. An approach would probably be made to the Canadian government, but only if the War Office could be assured that no one had given the impression to the Canadian government that air support for Hong Kong would be supplied, as otherwise they would make a decision on a false assumption. 124-19 The last sentence of Brooke-Popham's telegram had obviously not been lost on the War Office.
These assurances were forthcoming, and at a Chiefs of Staff meeting on 1 December 1941 it was decided that, as the Canadian government was not under any false apprehension, the way was now clear to invite Canada to complete C Force to a brigade group. 124-20 This was at least partially true, because the British, of course, never explicitly informed the Canadians that air support was definitely not available. For their part, the Canadian government would probably never have thought to ask! The chances are that Canada would have agreed to this proposal-Lawson seemed quite sure of it. In any event, the war mercifully put an end to these proposals and no request was ever sent.
It is difficult to know what to make of Brigadier Lawson's part in this suggestion. He was a distinguished veteran of the First World War, had been one of Canada's few professional soldiers between the wars, and was universally regarded as an efficient officer. His suggestion that more Canadian troops be sent to the isolated outpost of Hong Kong can only be explained by either personal ambition, which seems unlikely, or a grievous underestimation of the quality, determination, and number of the Japanese troops which might be sent against the colony.
In any event, Maltby had perforce to make do with what he had. The arrival of the two Canadian battalions had, he said, already "caused me to alter my plans to a certain degree", 124-21 that is, to decide to hold, at least temporarily, the Gin Drinkers Line. The Japanese, on their part, had already made their plans. In his post-war report on the fall of Hong Kong, Maltby stated that estimates at the time had suggested that two to four Japanese divisions were available for an attack on Hong Kong, but in his November lecture to the Canadians he claimed that the Japanese had only 5,000 troops, with very little artillery in the border area. Maltby seriously underestimated Japanese forces, abetted by his execrable intelligence organization, which submitted this gem on 7 December 1941: "The reports are certainly exaggerated and have the appearance of being deliberately fostered by the Japanese, who, judging by their defensive preparations around Canton, appear distinctly nervous of being attacked. 125-22 If Lawson accepted this appreciation, as Maltby seems to have, his suggestion makes more sense.
The detailed defence plan for Hong Kong was voluminous, and the Canadians scarcely had time to learn its basic points. They were also confused because,
the defences of the Island were primarily constructed in anticipation of an attack taking place on Hong Kong from the direction of the sea, while paradoxically all tactical manoeuvres, etc, were always carried out in anticipation of a Japanese attack across the border of the New Territories and moving southwards to Kowloon and Hong Kong. 125-23
The Canadians were not the only ones who were confused. In the previous plan, drawn up before the decision to send the Canadians to reinforce the garrison, the Gin Drinkers Line had been disregarded. One battalion, the 2/14 Punjabs, had been slated to fight a delaying action on the mainland, and the other three battalions were to stay on the Island. In the new plan, as Maltby admitted, only two out of the six battalions really knew their job: the 1st Middlesex on the Island, and the 2/14 Punjabs, who were still on the mainland. As the primary task of the Punjabs on the mainland had changed to one of static defence, only the role of the 1st Middlesex could be said to have remained unchanged.
Although the Canadians had ostensibly been rushed to the Far East because the threat of war was receding, by the time they set out for Vancouver the chances of hostilities had become much greater. No one, however, thought to reconsider the decision to send them. The original belief that plenty of time would be available for refresher training should have been dispelled by 27 October, yet still the troops were despatched. After 22 days in the colony, the first part of which was spent finding their way about, the Canadians were face to face with the battle-seasoned troops of Imperial Japanese Army; troops who had been in action in China for four years. Even counting the three weeks' boat trip and three weeks in Hong Kong, there were still men in C Force who had not been in the Army for 16 weeks.