The Battle for the Mainland
—8-13 December
Though many criticisms can be levelled at General Maltby's defence plans and his appreciation of Japanese intentions and capabilities, he cannot be accused of having been caught napping. Although Japanese preparations and the advance of Sano Force to positions near the frontier had been made under maximum security conditions, reports had nevertheless filtered through to Headquarters, China Command of suspicious Japanese activity. Therefore, late on Saturday, 6 December, Maltby issued a "warning of impending war", and next morning at 11am, all units of the garrison were ordered to occupy their war stations. This decision is all the more to Maltby's credit, when one remembers that he did not believe a Japanese attack was imminent or even possible. Because he accepted the optimistic reports of his intelligence organization (see earlier detail), he reported to the War Office on 7 December that he thought reports of Japanese troops massing near the border were exaggerated and were merely rumours being spread by the Japanese to conceal their numerical weakness in South China. 127-1
*Due to the International Date Line, the Japanese attack on Hong Kong was Monday, 8 December, while at Pearl Harbor it was Sunday, 7 December.
When the manning order was issued to the Island Brigade on the morning of Sunday, 7 December,* the two Canadian battalions moved from their barracks in Kowloon and ferried across to the Island to occupy their defensive positions on the south coast, and the Middlesex fully manned the pillboxes around the Island. The Volunteers were deployed to their battle positions, mostly designed to guard vital installations. Brigadier Lawson occupied his Island Brigade Headquarters in Wong Nei Chong Gap, a position which was at the centre of the Island's road network. General Maltby and his staff were already in Fortress Headquarters, a well-protected underground installation in Victoria. The three battalions of the Mainland Brigade were already in position in the Gin Drinkers Line, and Major G.E. Grey's C Company of the Punjabs, with its accompanying Engineer demolition teams (nearly all from the Volunteers), were on the alert just behind the frontier. All units of the Hong Kong garrison were at their war stations, ready and waiting, fifteen hours before the Japanese made their first move, thanks to Maltby's determination not to take the slightest chance.
At 4:45am on 8 December, Fortress Headquarters picked up a Japanese message warning that war was imminent (in actual fact Pearl Harbor and Malaya had already been attacked). Immediately the troops on the frontier were ordered to commence the first series of demolitions. Two hours later the garrison was informed that they were at war.
The first hostile Japanese action was an air raid carried out by all available aircraft on Kai Tak airfield. The installation was severely damaged and all but one of the Walrus and Vildebeeste aircraft were destroyed. Although the garrison's tiny air force could not have markedly affected the outcome of the siege, the aircraft might have survived to fly a sortie or two if they had been dispersed or protected by shelters or blast walls. Presumably, participation in the defence of Hong Kong had been so entirely discounted, that no protective measures had been taken. While Kai Tak was still under attack, bombing and strafing runs were made on Shamshuipo Barracks. Here, Japanese intelligence was at fault -almost all of the Canadians had moved to the Island. Although considerable damage was done and Mainland Brigade Headquarters was forced to move to its incomplete battle headquarters north of Kowloon city, the only casualties were two men of the Royal Canadian Signals, who were wounded.
The Japanese ground attack developed early that morning, with elements of all three infantry regiments of Sano Force crossing the frontier. By early the next morning all British forward troops had been forced back to the Gin Drinkers Line. By that evening they had taken up their positions in the Line.
There can be no question that Major Grey's Punjab company and the Engineers did as well as they could possibly have been expected to do. Their task was to carry out a series of demolitions on the roads, railway lines, and bridges between the Line and the frontier, and to inflict what casualties they could, in order to impose the maximum delay on the enemy. Grey's main problem was to avoid becoming cut off. For their part, the Japanese expected and were prepared for such a move and were indeed surprised at how little resistance they encountered before they reached the Line. Their tactics were simply to move their infantrymen around any resistance, and their strengthened engineer units, who knew almost exactly what demolitions would be carried out, were fully prepared to replace or repair destroyed or damaged installations. Grey's little command was greatly outnumbered by Japanese troops flooding past on either flank, not hesitating to cut across country. In one case, a party of 150 Japanese landed behind them in sampans. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that some of the withdrawals were rather precipitate, and that it was often impossible to wait to confirm the result of the demolitions. It is very much to their credit that this little force was able to carry out sixteen major demolitions, inflict casualties on the Japanese -for example, one Punjab patrol staged a highly successful ambush on the night of 8 December -and retreat to the Line with minimal casualties. On the other hand, there can be no denying that some of these demolitions, as Maltby was to write in his report, "failed to provide the measure of delaying action anticipated." 129-2 This can be attributed both to the need for haste and to Japanese preparedness. As an example of the latter, when the two bridges at the frontier were being readied for demolition, the Japanese refrained from interfering, instead concentrating on the preparation of temporary replacements which they rushed into position almost before the dust had settled.
The Japanese forward elements had reached the Gin Drinkers Line by the early afternoon of 9 December. They had expected a greater delay in the advance to the Line than they actually experienced, and, as they anticipated considerable difficulty getting through or around the Line, they did not contemplate making an immediate assault. They were particularly handicapped because, due to the recent reactivation of the Line, they did not know in what force any portion of it was held or what improvements had been made to the works. The Japanese intended to halt in front of the Line to prepare for the next stage of their attack, which they anticipated would be ready "within a week". 129-3 Maltby had estimated that by holding the Gin Drinkers Line Japanese occupation of the mainland could be delayed for a week. He might well have been right if both his and Japanese plans had not been dislocated by the initiative of a Japanese regimental commander.
Beyond the fact that it had little depth and could be outflanked from the sea, the Gin Drinkers Line had other weaknesses. It was sited on very irregular, broken terrain which gave an attacking force considerable cover both from view and from fire, and made it difficult for the defensive positions to provide mutually supporting fire. Probably the greatest weakness of the Line on 9 December 1941, was the fact that it was so thinly held. Instead of the optimum thousand yards defensive front per battalion, each of the Mainland Brigade battalions were responsible for over three miles, or almost five times that distance. Maltby, recognizing this, had ordered the Line to be defended by a system of "platoon localities" relying on "fire by day and patrolling by night" to cover the gaps. 131-4 In view of the extent and nature of the terrain, this was far more easily said than done.
The key position of the Gin Drinkers Line was the Shing Mun Redoubt, held by the Royal Scots. Situated in the western sector of the Line, it was a complex of pillboxes linked by fire trenches and underground tunnels. From the high ground on the north end of Smugglers Ridge, it overlooked the Jubilee Reservoir and dominated the land approaches to Kowloon. Despite its importance, all that could be spared to hold it was a single platoon of Royal Scots plus a Company headquarters and an artillery observation post.
The Japanese infantry advancing on the Line consisted, from west to east, of elements of the 230th, 228th, and 229th Regiments. Colonel Doi of the 228th commenced a reconnaissance of the Redoubt position at 3pm on 9 December. With no interference from the defenders he was able to continue his survey for two hours until the weather deteriorated. Doi formed the impression that the Redoubt was lightly held and the garrison did not expect an attack. Therefore, having earlier obtained his divisional commander's permission to exploit any opportunities that might present themselves, and undeterred by the fact that he was poaching in the sector allotted to the 230th, he determined to organize an immediate attack. 131-5
As soon as his troops had come up, Doi ordered his 2nd Battalion to reconnoitre on the left and the 3rd Battalion to undertake the actual assault with two companies leading. The men moved up through the darkness in single file without being detected by the defenders, while an obstacle-clearing team cut the wire in front of the Redoubt. The attack went in at 11:00 pm, preceded by a volley of hand grenades, and despite a fierce fight put up by many of the little band of defenders, by 1:00 am on 10 December, the Shing Mun Redoubt, the key to the Gin Drinkers Line, was in Japanese hands.
This was definitely a disaster, and Maltby, in his postwar report, laid the blame for the consequent early withdrawal from the mainland squarely at the door of the Royal Scots, although, he said, later fighting on the Island "did much to retrieve their prestige". 132-6 An officer at Fortress Headquarters stated that the loss of the Redoubt "caused real chaos at Fortress HQ. I have never seen General Maltby more shocked or angry." Maltby may have had some justification, probably either Doi's reconnaissance party, the wire-cutting team, or the approach of the 228th's 3rd Battalion, could have been picked up by more aggressive patrolling, and Doi later stated that the defenders were overconfident and unready. 132-7 Nevertheless, it was very difficult country for a single platoon to cover, with or without patrols, and too many of the garrison, at all levels, believed the myth that the Japanese were poor at night work. In fairness to the Royal Scots however, it must be said that given Japanese efficiency, the nature of the Line, and the numerical strength of the defenders, the Japanese could almost certainly have punched through the Line at any point and at any time they chose to make a serious attack. It was the garrison's hard luck that Doi's initiative had brought it about sooner rather than later, and at such an important point.
In the meantime, Maltby had to make up his mind what to do. As soon as it was known that the Redoubt was under attack, he had moved D Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers over to Kowloon, but neither they, the Royal Scots reserve company, nor the Rajput company that formed the Brigade reserve were ordered to counter attack because "the nearest troops were a mile away, the ground precipitous and broken, and the exact situation around the Redoubt very obscure. " 132-8
That same morning, Colonel Doi must have been asking himself why he even bothered. He received orders to withdraw from the Redoubt and was told that he was in trouble for operating in the 230th's sector, despite the earlier permission he had obtained. He refused to move, and by noon, when his superiors realized what an opportunity Doi had handed them, he was told to remain.
The British made the next move -the Royal Scots withdrew from their portion of the Gin Drinkers Line to try to establish a new defensive line running from Golden Hill to the coast. This was done with considerable difficulty between dusk and midnight on 10 December, but no interference was experienced from the enemy. Early the next morning, the new positions were attacked by Colonel Shoji's 230th Regiment, which had moved forward into its allotted sector. The Royal Scots were routed in a battle on Golden and Black Hills. The Japanese simply threw in three well-supported battalions against a single, understrength one and took the ground. The entire left flank of the mainland defences had crumbled in two short encounters. The Japanese advance was temporarily halted by a counter-attack by D Company of the Royal Scots, but the lost positions could not be recaptured.
The Punjabs, who held the centre of the Line, were now in a hazardous position, particularly as the road to Kowloon ran almost parallel to the Line for a considerable distance. With the left flank gone, the Japanese would be able to cut the escape route of the Punjabs and Rajputs, both of whom were being engaged in a desultory fashion by Colonel Tanaka's 229th Regiment, which had crossed Tide Cove in order to come up against the right flank of the Line. Faced with this situation, Maltby decided to bow to the inevitable and evacuate most of the Mainland Brigade to the Island. The order was issued at mid-day on 11 December. Earlier that morning D Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers had been rushed up to fill the gap between the unbreached portion of the Line and the Royal Scots, who had formed a new line extending obliquely back into Kowloon. That afternoon the Grenadiers came under artillery and sporadic small-arms fire-the first Canadian Army unit to do so in the war -but suffered no casualties.
The evacuation took place that night. The Royal Scots moved back to Kowloon and crossed to the Island, as did many of the military vehicles. D Company of the Grenadiers covered the Royal Scots' withdrawal and followed them three hours later. Unfortunately, when the Canadians pulled back from their line, they found that their vehicles had already departed, as an unidentified officer had told the transport NCO that D Company had been cut off. The company's support weapons and ammunition had to be manhandled as far as Kowloon, where two trucks were commandeered. There was no enemy pressure, though the Grenadiers reported some trouble with fifth columnists as they moved through the panic-stricken crowds in Kowloon. The Punjabs and Rajputs also disengaged and headed southeast to the Devil's Peak Peninsula. There the Punjabs were to be evacuated while the Rajputs were to hold a previously prepared defensive line. The Punjabs' evacuation proceeded slowly and some were still on the mainland when the Japanese attacked the next day, 12 December. This assault took place in broad daylight unsupported by mortars or artillery, and was repelled by the Rajputs with the help of supporting fire from mobile artillery and from guns on the Island. The Japanese suffered losses and withdrew, after which the remainder of the Punjabs were successfully evacuated.
Stonecutters Island off Shamshuipo was also evacuated and the guns of the coastal battery there were destroyed. This did not prevent Japanese aircraft from attacking Stonecutters Island over the following three days and "silencing" the guns. 134-9 Apparently the Japanese Army Air Force was as accomplished as its Western counterparts at attacking non-existent targets with wildly successful results.
Despite the Rajputs' success on 12 December, Maltby decided early the next morning that the mainland should be completely. abandoned. This was not according to plan, although Maltby did not admit as much in his postwar report. The Canadians had been told in their November briefing that the Gin Drinkers Line would hold for some time, and if it became necessary to fall back to Devil's Peak that position was to be held for as long as possible. It was a key position, as it dominated the Lye Mun Passage, and would afford an excellent artillery and observation post to the enemy. Maltby's original intention to hold Devil's Peak is indicated in the letter of one of his staff officers, who explained that the defence plan was "to withdraw this brigade [Mainland Brigade] less a detachment, which was to hold a mainland position to the last." 134-10 When the latest defence scheme was prepared, Maltby had assured the Naval Officer Commanding, Commodore Collinson, that even if the Gin Drinkers Line fell Devil's Peak would be held for seven days. He apparently changed his mind, because he feared the Rajputs might be completely stranded due to lack of sea transport. Collinson was less than happy about this alteration, but reacted admirably, and the mainland was completely abandoned by 9:20am on 13 December, with little interference by the Japanese.
The Japanese, in fact, were very much surprised to see the entire mainland evacuated so quickly, and this threw them into confusion for some time. They were far ahead of schedule, as they expected the main defence to be on the Gin Drinkers Line, and when the Line collapsed so quickly, they were taken aback. Japanese casualties during the capture of the mainland were approximately 400 killed and wounded, which probably appeared to be a good bargain.
The Japanese were not the only ones who were surprised. Immediately before the evacuation, Lieutenant Colonel Home and other officers were called to a conference with Brigadier Lawson. They were informed that things were not going well on the mainland and that the troops were to be evacuated and the garrison re-organized into two new brigades. A short while later, Brigadier Wallis and his staff arrived and the reorganization took place. "The officers of the new Brigade Staff were in a highly nervous state and apparently very tired." "Troops withdrawing from the Mainland, tired, hungry, and disorganized.... tea was served to them as they passed through Tai Tam Gap." 135-11 The Canadians could get little information from Wallis and his staff, and were under the general impression that a large battle had been fought. But when Captain Banfill, the Royal Rifles' Medical Officer, set up an Advanced Dressing Station for two companies of Rajputs coming in, there was not a single casualty among them. (In the fight on the mainland and the shelling and bombing of the Island to 17 December, the garrison's casualties were 46 killed, 65 missing, and 93 wounded, totalling 204. Most of these were Royal Scots -the two Indian battalions had not been heavily engaged.) The Canadians, having been told that Devil's Peak, at least, could and would be held, were astonished to see the mainland handed over to the enemy in only five days, and judging by casualties, without much of an attempt to stop them. The British, they thought, were a little bit rattled.
The British officers reassured the Canadians that the demolitions on the mainland had been so extensive that it would be many weeks before the Japanese could bring up their artillery. 135-12 The next day the first heavy shells began exploding on Hong Kong Island.