The Island
—8-17 December
When the Canadians moved into their battle positions during the afternoon of Sunday, 7 December, the threat of war did not seem unduly serious. The Royal Rifles' diary entry for the day records. "the general consensus of opinion here in Hong Kong by those who should know is that war will be averted." Captain Billings, the Canadian Signals Officer for the Mainland Brigade, was told the same day by the Brigade's Staff Captain, that the manning exercise "had no special significance" 136-1
Once war was officially upon the colony, the customary noble phrases were sounded. General Maltby's order of the day was:
It is obvious to us all that the test for which we have been placed here will come in the near future. I expect each and every man of my force to stick it out unflinchingly, and that my force will become a great example of high hearted courage to all the rest of the Empire who are fighting to preserve truth, justice and liberty for all the world.
J.L. Ralston sent this message to Brigadier Lawson: "Concurrently, with Dominion's Declaration of War against Japan, I send you assurance of the complete confidence that Forces under your command will in the days that lie ahead, worthily uphold the best traditions of Canadian Arms”. Lawson answered: "All ranks much appreciate your message. We shall do everything in our power to maintain the best tradition of the Canadian Army."
The movement of the two Canadian battalions to their war stations was made more difficult by the lack of vehicles. Before the Japanese attack, the Royal Rifles had "only five trucks available for all regimental duties," 137-2 and the Grenadiers were little better off. Commandeered civilian vehicles became available after 8 December, but the Royal Rifles never had more than 12 trucks at one time, and although the Grenadiers had 30, they had to share these with Brigade Headquarters. What trucks were available were not the specialized army vehicles required and were inadequate in both number and quality. There were only twelve carriers in the colony, and one had been loaned to each Canadian battalion. These were retained right to the end. On 8 December, men of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, working with their civilian counterparts, participated in collecting the commandeered vehicles -a total of 85 trucks and 25 cars.
With the exception of D Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, who were briefly moved to the mainland, the few days between the initial Japanese attack and the complete evacuation of the mainland were comparatively uneventful for the Canadians, who quietly manned their battle stations and waited. The Japanese air effort over the Island was begun on a small scale. After the bombing of Sham Shui Po Barracks, the rear echelon of the battalions, including the orderly room, battalion stores, and pay documents, was moved to the Island. Also on that first day of war, 3-inch mortar bombs were issued and at least one section of the Royal Rifles mortar platoon had their first chance to fire their weapons before the Japanese invaded the Island.
The civil population on the Island was beginning to create problems. The colonial government had become increasingly disorganized, and, even before the Japanese landing, fifth column activities commenced. There is little doubt that reports of sabotage by enemy sympathizers were considerably exaggerated, but some were true. Much of the sabotage was directed toward the transport, both by the drivers and others. Approximately 40 of the vehicles in the central military transport pool were reported as disabled on 9 December, and the next day there were reports of "trucks wilfully damaged and several run into [the] large ditch surrounding the racetrack. " 137-3
With the beginning of the evacuation of the mainland, there were changes in the military dispositions on the Island. Although Maltby stated afterward that he had not anticipated holding the mainland indefinitely, these changes nevertheless seem to have taken many of his subordinates by surprise, particularly the Canadians.
The operations on the mainland were, on the whole, a failure. No appreciable delay was imposed on the enemy. In addition, the British had a rude awakening with the realization that the Japanese soldiers were available in large numbers and possessed considerable initiative and expertise in night work, and that Japanese airmen were not, after all, near-sighted maladroits flying ancient aircraft. Probably the worst result was the effect on the morale of the defenders and the loss of "face" before the Chinese population, which could only encourage the opponents of the British regime. On the other hand, the demolitions of supplies and installations on the Kowloon waterfront before the evacuation had been very effective, and the Mainland Brigade and most of its equipment had been brought back to the Island with small losses.
Maltby was now faced with the problem of how best to defend the Island. Despite the fact that the enemy was in possession of the mainland, he still considered an attack from the sea on the south coast of the Island a strong possibility. He therefore thought that he should dispose his forces so that they could counter an attack from almost any direction. The most obvious solution, the creation of a powerful counter-attack force at a central point that could be rushed to any threatened area, was impractical because of the poor roads, severe lack of vehicles, and Japanese command of the air. Maltby had two alternatives -either to concentrate a large proportion of his forces on the enemy's probable direction of approach or to provide approximately equal defensive strength at all points. He chose the latter.
Maltby decided to base his defence on the existing 72 pillboxes around the coastline, manned by the Middlesex and backed up by the two Indian battalions on the north coast, and two Canadian battalions on the south coast, all four dispersed in company positions. The Royal Scots, whom Maltby considered in need of rest and recuperation, were kept in the Victoria area as Fortress Reserve. They had, however, manned the northeast coast for two days until the Rajputs were available to relieve them.
In addition to the redisposition of forces, there was a command reorganization as well. Brigadier Lawson had commanded the Island Brigade during the fighting on the mainland, but he agreed that it was impractical for him to command all the forces available on the Island after the evacuation. On 12 December, he made this entry in his diary: "Find I am in command of all troops on the Island. Quite impossible with staff and facilities available. I got to Fortress HQ for discussion, Arrangements made for East and West commands."
The final organization distributed the garrison between two new brigades, East and West. East Brigade was commanded by the former commander of the Mainland Brigade, Brigadier Wallis, and included the Royal Rifles and Rajputs. West Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Lawson and included the Grenadiers, Punjabs, and Royal Scots. The Middlesex was under Fortress Headquarters, but the pillbox detachments (each usually of nine men and two to four machine-guns) were under the operational command of the relevant brigade. In addition, most of the Middlesex men not assigned to pillboxes had been formed into a company and were entrenched on Leighton Hill just east of Victoria. The various Volunteer and artillery units, both mobile and fixed, were also under the control of the brigade in whose area they were located. The dividing line between the two brigade areas was a short distance to the east of the main north-south road, which ran from the north coast through Wong Nei Chong Gap to Repulse Bay. Brigadier Lawson continued to occupy his former tactical headquarters at Wong Nei Chong Gap. Brigadier Wallis established his at Tai Tam Gap where the Royal Rifles headquarters was situated.
A major disadvantage of this new arrangement from the point of view of ‘C’ Force, was that its two battalions were separated and only one remained under Lawson's command. This seemed unfortunate at the time, and was to prove increasingly so during and after the battle and in post-battle repercussions.
On 13 December, a Japanese "peace mission" under a white flag, crossed the harbour from Kowloon. It brought a demand from General Sakai for the surrender of the colony, and the threat of heavy aerial and artillery bombardment if the demand was refused. The Japanese request was rejected almost immediately, and the enemy thereupon put their threat into effect. They possessed complete command of the air and so were able to bomb as and where they wished, and between over-hasty British road demolition and Japanese engineering efficiency, heavy artillery fire was coming down on the Island almost as soon as the Japanese surrender demand was rejected.
The artillery arm was one of the most efficient branches of the Imperial Japanese Army. In the bombardment of Hong Kong, it was aided by the fact that the Japanese knew the exact position of most of the British fixed defences due to pre-war espionage. Counter battery fire from the Island was largely ineffective. The Japanese were able to continually change their fire positions, thanks to the mobility of their guns, while the heaviest British guns, those of the coastal defences, were handicapped by their lack of suitable ammunition. It was at this point that the possibility that abandoning the Devil's Peak position had been a great mistake must have struck Maltby forcibly. Certainly, as long as it was held, the British would have possessed an excellent observation point on the mainland from which to direct their own fire, the enemy would have been denied this position, and they would also have seen an invasion of the north coast of the Island as a far more risky endeavour. With hindsight, it can be seen that the Rajputs would have contributed far more to the defence of the Island by holding on at Devil's Peak as long as possible than they could or did from their positions on the Island. To what degree this could have been deduced at the time is another question.
The rapid development and weight of the Japanese artillery bombardment was a shock to the many British, both military and civilian, who had held an exaggerated belief in the efficacy of the road demolitions and in Japanese military incompetence. Rumours were widespread, possibly the wildest of which was that the Japanese had before the war, smuggled a 9-inch siege gun over the border in pieces (presumably in the suitcases of Japanese tourists) and assembled it surreptitiously in Kowloon! This rumour probably originated in the fact that the Japanese did site some of their light mobile guns in buildings during the bombardment, opening the doors for each shot.
The Japanese bombardment had an immediate effect on the civil populace, and in the city of Victoria especially, conditions deteriorated rapidly. Refugees from China had swollen the population of the colony in the years immediately preceding the Japanese attack, and the government had neither done anything about the situation nor made allowances for it in planning for a siege. As soon as the bombardment commenced, the roads became choked with Chinese streaming out of the city and across the Island to the comparative safety of the south. Rice distributions degenerated into riots. Chinese civilians who had been employed on defence work failed to report, and most of those serving as military transport drivers deserted.
The military effect of the Japanese shelling and bombing was also considerable. On 13, 14, and 15 December, several of the big coast defence guns (whose position was known to the inch by the Japanese) were hit. On the latter day, a systematic shelling of the pillboxes along the north coast commenced and several were knocked out. In addition to these obvious preludes to invasion, the enemy was observed collecting small craft in Kowloon Bay, and this could have only one meaning. On the night of 14/15 December, the sole destroyer, HMS Thracian, made a sortie, and sank two vessels in this area, but the accumulation of boats continued.
Some of the Canadians were more exposed than others to Japanese action. At Bowen Road Military Hospital, the shelling was very heavy. The hospital often shared the shells with the military targets surrounding it.
On 9 December, some of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps details had been moved to the Deep Water Bay area, and were working around the clock from this depot, supplying the troops with what little transport they had. With this group were six members of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, who apparently were far from being "volunteers”. "Because of their attitude, [they] were more hindrance than assistance. They claimed that they had not volunteered for service, but had been “conscripted”, and they did not hesitate to tell us so. They would never go out on a night guard unless accompanied by a Canadian.” 142-4
The Winnipeg Grenadiers were in the southwest with the bulk of the Island between them and the enemy, and so were not directly affected by the Japanese artillery. This was not the case with the Royal Rifles, who were occupying an area extending from Repulse Bay in the south to Lye Mun in the north, almost all of which was exposed to Japanese shellfire. Commencing on 13 December, all company positions and Battalion Headquarters at Tai Tam Gap were the targets of a bombardment of increasing severity. Water, electrical power, and telephone connections were constantly disrupted. Indeed, the telephone system, which the Canadians had been informed was as good as that of the fortress of Gibraltar, was put out of action in the first stages of the bombardment.
Monday, 15 December, saw a continuation of the bombardment. All Rifles' positions were shelled, and as always, the northernmost position around Lye Mun, held by C Company under Major Bishop, was the most heavily hit. It was this company that was to participate in an event that is one of the minor mysteries of the siege.
At about 9:30 on the night of 15 December, the Volunteer artillery battery at Pak Sah Wan on Hong Kong Island at the eastern entrance to the Lye Mun Passage, opened up with artillery and machine-gun fire and illumination and were joined by other batteries firing into the Passage. After this heavy burst of fire, the Pak Sah Wan artillery men precipitately abandoned their positions and headed south at top speed. Reaching Lye Mun Gap, they were halted by Major Bishop, and informed him that the Japanese were "thick as leaves in the battery position". Realizing that this evacuation meant that his left flank was up in the air, Bishop immediately led a party to re-occupy the position and found it totally deserted, with no sign of friend or foe. Two hours later, a platoon of Rajputs moved into the area, but C Company of the Royal Rifles still held their advanced positions until the next day when the artillery returned. The artillery officer in command admitted that his battery had sustained no casualties during the "Japanese attack". 143-5
The story still persists that the Japanese had attempted a landing on the north shore that night. Carew and Ferguso, in their luridly coloured narratives of the siege, give detailed accounts of the attempt and its defeat by the garrison -including some Canadians. 143-6 Maltby also recorded the endeavour in his postwar report. No record of such an undertaking appears in any Japanese account -and the Japanese in their comments on the battle were markedly uninhibited in detailing both their successes and failures. No accounts, except of the false alarm described in the preceding paragraph, appear in British or Canadian records -and surely they would not have been reticent in recording such an apparent victory!
What seems to be the most likely solution is that the "landing force" (if, indeed, there was anything moving in the Passage) were Chinese escaping from the mainland -a common event. Certainly the impressions of the officer commanding the battery, at any rate, warrant taking with a pinch of salt.
The previous day, this same officer, a local magistrate, had been in to see Banfill at the Lye Mun Advanced Dressing Station. His battery had been shelled or bombed and several of his men were wounded. The officer himself had his head and arm dressed, but on examination he revealed no wounds at all. He asked Banfill, "Have I got to go back to that horrible place?", and when Banfill answered "yes", he jumped into his car and roared off, but returned to his post later. When the Japanese landed on 18 December, his battery was quickly surrounded and captured, but he was to boast in the prisoner of war camp about what a great stand he had made. 143-7
Banfill does not appear to have been a man to suffer fools gladly, and a clash he had with the colonial administration on 17 December, was another example of the increasing Canadian-British friction and mistrust, which seem to have been even more virulent at Lye Mun than elsewhere. On that day, Banfill had phoned the Chief of Civilian Medical Services on the request of Mrs. Tinson, who ran the civilian first aid post next door to Banfill's Advanced Dressing Station at Lye Mun. Banfill told him that this post was not getting any cases to speak of, was in an exposed area, and should be moved, as the women and the Chinese helpers were getting nervous. The Chief of Civilian Medical Services accused Banfill of interfering and said that Lye Mun was no more dangerous than any other area. Banfill told him to come down and see for himself and hung up. The next day, 18 December, the Governor himself came down and gave Banfill & blast for sticking his nose in and for "addressing a representative of the Crown in a scornful manner." 144-8 Miss Lois Fearon, who was present, heard the Governor say that "the Japs wouldn't land". 144-9 The tragic sequel to that remark is recorded in the next chapter.
The two days following the invasion scare witnessed an increase in the enemy bombardment. The Japanese heavy bombers were now available and, with their help, by the end of 16 December, more than half the pillboxes in the Rajputs sector of the north shore had been knocked out. The Royal Rifles recorded that their men were showing the strain of constant bombardment. C Company had been pulled back to Sai Wan and Lye Mun Gap, and now there were "no Canadians on North face of Island". 144-10 Nevertheless, 13 Platoon of C Company was dive-bombed at Sai Wan and suffered five casualties. The next day, shellfire was landing as far south as Stanley, and this area was also bombed. In addition to artillery shells, mortar bombs were landing in the Royal Rifles area. When some of the mortar positions were located in the Devil's Peak area, the battalion called for return fire, but none was provided. The Canadian Service Corps detachment at Deep Water Bay reported that by 17 December, in addition to vehicles immobilized through sabotage, no less than twenty had been put out of action by the Japanese artillery.
That same day, another Japanese surrender demand was sent across the harbour from Kowloon. As it was essentially the same as the request received four days earlier, it was rejected. As Brigadier Lawson wrote in his diary: "Jap envoy came over and said that all military installations have been destroyed, no use going on fighting. Governor told them to go back and destroy some more."
Despite these and other brave words from the defenders, there was little doubt in anybody's mind that the Japanese would shortly try their fortunes on the Island.