No Reason Why (Second Edition)

Naval Base to Outpost

—defence policy for Hong Kong

The colony of Hong Kong was, in 1941, one of the smallest but most valuable jewels in the British Empire's crown. The actual island of Hong Kong had been ceded to the United Kingdom by China in 1842 as part of the spoils of the Opium War, and it is ironic that exactly one century later it was to return, albeit temporarily, to Asiatic hands. When it first came into British possession it was practically uninhabited and of little obvious value. It was, however, in a very strategic location for trade with all of southern China. Under British rule and law Hong Kong rapidly developed as a trading port in its own right and as a base for the commercial and military exploitation of one of the richest areas in China. In 1860 the closest portion of the mainland, the Kowloon Peninsula, and its adjacent islands were ceded to the British, and in 1898 some 360 square miles of territory inland from Kowloon, which became known as the New Territories, was leased from the Chinese government for ninety-nine years, that is, until 1997.

During the palmy years of the Pax Britannica, Hong Kong was the headquarters and main base of the China Station of the Royal Navy. Even when there was no real military threat there were abundant British political and commercial interests in East Asia that frequently required protection or reinforcement. Hong Kong was therefore maintained in a reasonably high state of defensive preparedness, while troops from its garrison could be conveyed where they were most needed by the long arm of the Royal Navy.

This state of affairs was to last until the end of the First World War. With the added protection to British interests in the Far East afforded by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1904, the Royal Navy was able, during the 1914-18 conflict, to reduce its China Squadron to a minimum. However, by the end of the "War to End Wars”, Great Britain was becoming a little embarrassed by her aggressive protegé and was establishing stronger ties with the United States in the face of the increasing likelihood that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would shortly be terminated, a 1921 War Office study concluded that “there was no chance of making Hong Kong sufficiently secure against attack." 6-1 Therefore Britain turned to Singapore, where through the 1920's and 1930's, they constructed a massive and well-protected naval base, in fits and starts due to periodic economic problems, changes in government, and disarmament conferences. The Washington naval treaties of 1922 which, among other provisions, prevented the signatories from upgrading their existing bases in the Northwest Pacific, further reinforced the naval importance of Singapore, and diminished that of Hong Kong.

Despite this the Royal Navy still maintained a moderately strong presence at Hong Kong. Normally stationed there were an aircraft carrier, a cruiser squadron, and destroyer and submarine flotillas. The colony's fixed defences were still formidable though they could not be expanded or modernized, while its infantry garrison usually consisted of four battalions. In 1936 the Hong Kong defence scheme stated that, despite the gloomy prognostication of the 1921 study, "Hong Kong is ... a strategic point vital to the conduct of our Fleet, Army, and Air Force.” 6-2

The first attempt to examine Hong Kong in light of the need for defence against a possible Japanese attack appears to have been made in 1935. The Inspector of Fixed Defences, General Barron, made a personal inspection of the defences and submitted a report. Barron stated that the defence of Hong Kong posed a different problem from other British defended ports abroad for several reasons. It was open to attack from the rear either across the frontier or by a landing in the Leased Territories. Its great distance from the United Kingdom meant an exceptionally long period before relief could be expected to arrive. Barron described the Hong Kong defences as “deplorable” and stated that the island of Hong Kong would be "easy prey ...and that in the face of a determined attack by land or sea the fortress could not hold out even for the arbitrary period before relief.” Barron considered that because of the irregular coastline the only practical defence line on the mainland was one just three miles from Kowloon which stretched from Junk Bay on the right via Razor Hill to Tide Cove, and from there along the Shing Mun River to Smugglers Ridge and Gin Drinkers Bay. The defence line eventually established along the evocatively named terrain was to become known as the Inner Line or, more familiarly, the Gin Drinkers Line after the bay on its left flank. General Barron recommended an extensive modernization program for the fixed defences, the construction of a system of pill-boxes and splinter-proof dugouts along the Gin Drinkers Line, and an increase in the garrison from four to six infantry battalions. 7-3 His plan was adopted, with some modification, by the Committee of Imperial Defence in January 1936. The Committee noted, in passing, that three of the main problems in defending Hong Kong were the presence of large numbers of Chinese, the reliance on imported food, and the fact that approximately half of the island's water supply was piped from the mainland. 7-4

With the start of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 the defence of Hong Kong came under increasingly close scrutiny. The Chiefs of Staff made an appreciation of the situation in June 1937 and came to the conclusion that 'the retention of Hong Kong is not essential for the security of Singapore, ie it should be treated as a valuable outpost only.' 7-5

In view of the lapsing of the Washington Treaty and the resulting need to strengthen the Hong Kong base the General Officer Commanding, China (in charge of British troops in Hong Kong and other detachments actually in China at Shanghai and Tientsin), General A.W. Bartholomew, had prepared a report on the defence of Hong Kong, which he submitted in July 1937. In this "Report on the 'Unrestricted' Defence of Hong Kong ...” he argued that 15-inch coast defence guns, a division of infantry, and an air garrison of five squadrons would be necessary. General Bartholomew, who seems to have been the only realistic Hong Kong Commander in the years immediately before the Japanese attack, believed that at least a division was necessary to hold any portion of the mainland, and he queried the wisdom of making any resistance at all to a mass attack. 7-6 He was subsequently to state that with his current garrison "the chances, however, of effecting a prolonged resistance seem slight." 7-7

Through 1937 and 1938 the defence of Hong Kong was being considered by the Chiefs of Staff. With the feeling in 1937 being that it would be useless to lock up eight or nine battalions in Hong Kong, the suggestion was made that the garrison be reduced to two battalions, which should be sufficient for symbolic prestige and adequate to maintain law and order. 8-8 This reduction was never carried out, however, because in the face of the subsequent Japanese aggression it was felt that such a move would be seen as a weakness on the part of the United Kingdom. In July 1938 a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff prepared a policy draft on Hong Kong defence which was to form the basis for defence plans until just before the Japanese assault on the colony. After reviewing the pros and cons of evacuation this draft noted that the defence of Hong Kong presented serious problems, including the absence of an adequate airfield and the lack of a suitable position for a defence line. Also, the Japanese occupation of southern China would render the possibility of a successful defence even more unlikely. When it was considered that Japanese artillery near the Gin Drinkers Line could bring the harbour under fire, and that the scale of air attack was likely to be high, it was not recommended that Hong Kong be held as either a major or minor naval base. The defence of Hong Kong should therefore concern itself solely with denying the use of the harbour to the Japanese. Four battalions would be adequate for this. They could fight a rear guard action from the frontier to the Gin Drinkers Line, conduct a limited defence of the line, and then retire to the island, accepting the loss of a great deal of naval equipment and facilities as inevitable. A stand was not to be made on the Gin Drinkers Line because, in view of its length (10 1/2 miles), a division would be required to hold it. For this reason and because of expense, work on it was to stop immediately. The garrison was to remain at four battalions instead of the six authorized in 1936. 8-9

British policy regarding Hong Kong had by this time evolved to the point where the colony was treated as an outpost--that is, a fortress whose function was to delay the enemy--and it continued to be regarded officially as an outpost right up to the time of Japanese attack.

When Canadian-born Major General A.E. Grasett succeeded Bartholomew as General Officer Commanding, China in November 1938, he was fully briefed on the new defence policy and warned to keep the decision not to make a stand on the Gin Drinkers Line a secret. 8-10 Grasett had a low opinion of the fighting quality of the Japanese Army. This opinion led him to consider the War Office decision not to make a stand on the Gin Drinkers Line an error.

Accordingly, he attempted throughout his Hong Kong appointment to obtain one or two extra battalions for the Hong Kong garrison, and his perseverance in this crusade after his appointment had ceased was responsible for the involvement of Canadians in the battle for Hong Kong. His first attempt was made in a report dated 1 May 1939 when he stated that if reinforcements could be made available through the evacuation of troops from North China or elsewhere, the additional battalions would be employed on the mainland to stiffen resistance on the Inner Line of defence. However, somebody at the War Office was obviously not convinced. On the bottom of this report was written in ink: "We have cabled him [Grasett] to say that this extra battalion, even if available, should not be allowed to change his mind as to policy, ie, no undue holding of mainland." 9-11

There were no major changes in either policy or actual military presence at Hong Kong until June 1940 when France capitulated, Italy entered the war and Britain and the Commonwealth stood alone. Britain would now have to maintain a large Mediterranean fleet, and ships of the Royal Navy from all around the world were recalled to provide it. Almost every unit on the China Station sailed west, and the once-proud China Squadron was a pale shadow of its former self. The altered war situation meant that naval, air, and military reinforcements for the Far East would become much more difficult to provide and their passage east would not be particularly easy. In addition, Japan had begun to flex her muscles, a fact that was not lost on British planners. In late October 1940 the Chiefs of Staff Committee on the Far East submitted a very interesting document which translated the political situation into military terms. After noting that Japan's long-term aim was to exclude Western powers from the Far East, the Committee predicted that her immediate aim was "likely to be the exclusion of British influence from China and Hong Kong." The Committee then stated that the British garrisons in North China (Tientsin and Shanghai), being strategically useless and in a tactically hopeless position, should be withdrawn. Turning to Hong Kong, the Committee reported:

Hong Kong is not a vital interest and the garrison could not long withstand Japanese attack. Even if we had a strong fleet in the Far East it is doubtful whether Hong Kong could be held now that the Japanese are firmly established on the mainland of China, and we could not use it as an advanced naval base.

After repeating that Hong Kong was an outpost, the Committee recommended that if a general settlement became possible with Japan, Hong Kong should be demilitarized for a suitable quid pro quo. In any case, “we do not recommend that our garrisons in China or Hong Kong should be reinforced in any circumstances." 10-12

The precarious position of Hong Kong was also recognized by the Admiralty. In the standing orders for the British merchant fleet in case of war with Japan the Admiralty advised: "Ships between Singapore and Japan proceed Singapore if possible, otherwise to Philippine Islands. Ships not to proceed Hong Kong or ports in British Borneo unless no other course open to them.” 10-13

To counteract this grimly realistic viewpoint, a curious redirection with regard to Hong Kong was occurring in British military circles actually in the Far East. The new Commander-in-Chief the Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, had arrived in Malaya in October 1940, and at once had begun to take a more optimistic view of the British position in the area. In late December or early January he had visited Hong Kong, where the General Officer Commanding, Major General Grasett, also was optimistic about the possibility of successfully resisting a Japanese attack.

Grasett does not appear to have convinced Brooke-Popham of the ultimate defencibility of Hong Kong, but he did make the point that reinforcing the garrison would improve the defence capabilities of the colony and would have a desirable political effect. Brooke-Popham wrote to his superiors in early January 1941. His first paragraph stated: “Policy for defence of Hong Kong in event of war must remain unchanged viz defence of island for longest period in hope that situation may so develop that relief may be effected [author's italics]."' Brooke-Popham then listed the main arguments against reinforcement: the need for troops in Malaya was greater, the stronger the Hong Kong garrison the greater the loss if it fell, and finally that "we have no good reason for basing plans on probability of relief [author's italics)." Following this he pointed out the arguments for sending reinforcements: the repercussions from an early fall would be great, reinforcement would boost Chinese morale, and it would be in line with the policy of firmness toward Japan. Because of these factors, stated Brooke-Popham, "I propose to increase the garrison from four regular infantry battalions to first five and then six battalions, as soon as I judge one or two battalions can be released from Malaya by additional battalions from India though these might be of  lower standard of training.” 10-14

This proposal was sent by the Chiefs of Staff to General Ismay, who was Winston Churchill's personal Chief of Staff and Military Secretary, and who passed it on to the Prime Minister. Churchill's reply to Ismay showed, in no uncertain terms, that he wholeheartedly agreed with the policy his Chiefs of Staff had maintained till that date:

This is all wrong. If Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of increasing the garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolical scale. Any trouble arising there must be dealt with at the Peace conference after the war. We must avoid frittering away our resources on untenable positions. Japan will think long before declaring war on the British Empire, and whether there are two or six battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference to her choice. I wish we had fewer troops there, but to move any would be noticeable and dangerous. 11-15

At the next Chiefs of Staff meeting on 8 January 1941 Brooke-Popham's proposal was considered, along with Churchill's memo. On 10 January the Chief of the Imperial General Staff recommended that Hong Kong should not be reinforced, but that the official "period before relief” be increased from 90 to 130 days. This did not mean that it was expected to relieve the fortress after this time but simply that its reserves of food and ammunition should be increased. The Chiefs of Staff also re-examined the air attack scale predicted for Hong Kong. In 1938 this had been assessed by the Committee for Imperial Defence as frequent heavy and medium attacks by land-based aircraft. Since then the Japanese had obtained at least two more airfields within 100 miles of Hong Kong and probably more. It was now estimated that "the scale of air attack on Hong Kong would be something like the heaviest imaginable.'' 11-16

When the Chiefs of Staff communicated their reply to the Commander-in-Chief Far East on 14 January 1941, they minced no words. No reinforcements were to be allowed:

We view Hong Kong as an undesirable military commitment but demilitarization is not now possible (due to the political effect on China and Japan).... an increase of the regular infantry garrison from four to six regular battalions would unlikely influence ... the Japanese and could not affect the ultimate result. It would, however, increase the loss should the fortress fall. As you say, We have no good reason for basing plans on a relief of the garrison being possible. 11-17

Brooke-Popham was not easily rebuffed. On 19 January he reiterated his pleas. This time he reasoned that military operations might be hampered in the event of an attack because of the probable necessity of using troops to aid the police in dealing with the Chinese population. One battalion was now allotted to the mainland, but if this allocation was raised to three battalions the time factor of the delaying action would be increased by six. The two extra battalions would, in addition, allow reserves for relief of the soldiers in the pill-boxes who were now suffering from malaria. Turning to strategy, Brooke-Popham stated that now that the Australians were reinforcing Singapore it was not a question of cutting losses, but of retaining places for future offensive operations! 12-18

The Chiefs of Staff examined this second request. They concluded that:

1. admittedly the 3600 police then in Hong Kong could not control the Chinese, but an additional two battalions would not markedly improve the situation;
2. the Japanese would soon learn the exact scale of reinforcements and plan accordingly; and
3. as far as keeping bases was concerned the Committee did not consider that Hong Kong could hold out for 130 days. It would be undesirable and unreasonable to expect the United States Navy to relieve it, and it was unlikely that the British Fleet could relieve it within 130 days. 12-19

On 25 January 1941 the Air Ministry passed on this negative response to Brooke-Popham's request. 12-20 The subject was to lie dormant for another eight months. Unfortunately for Canada, it was then resurrected.