In a study of any aspect of the war in the Pacific, one question that constantly arises is, how much of Japan's intentions did the Western powers know, and how much ought they to have known? This is especially pertinent given the fact that the first 100 days in the East were ones of unrelieved disaster for the Allies, and the subsequent course of the war was determined by the need to fight back from a long range.
In the case of the fall of Hong Kong, the question of how much the Canadian government knew or ought to have known in September,1941, was one of the major points examined in the hearings of the 1942 Royal Commission set up to investigate the sending of Canadian troops to Hong Kong. It also became a major issue when the Hong Kong controversy was re-opened in 1948. It is an important point, for the government leaders testified that the apparent unlikelihood of imminent war was a major factor in their decision to send troops to reinforce the colony. One may go on from this to ask whether the Canadian government should have realised that war with Japan, whether imminent or not, was a strong possibility, and given this, whether or not it was wise to reinforce Hong Kong.
The sources of information available to the Canadian government were varied. The major source for most members of the government was probably the public actions of Japan herself, as reported by the press. Canada had a legation in Tokyo which, of course, sent many reports back to the Department of External Affairs. There were also sources of information from returning businessmen, missionaries, and officers, which perhaps were not studied as closely as they might have been. Finally the Canadian government had access to almost all of the information available to the government of the United Kingdom. Military Intelligence was exchanged between the War Office and the Canadian Department of National Defence, while the British Secretary of State for the Dominions kept the Secretary of State for External Affairs informed on high level diplomatic developments. A connection with the United States prior to December 1941, via the Joint Board of Defence, does not seem to have been a route for information regarding Japan. United States Intelligence about the Far East reaching Canada invariably came via London.
When the decision to reinforce Hong Kong was taken by the Canadian government, Japan had been a major industrial power for over three decades. A closed society prior to 1857, Japan had since become the most modernized country in the Far East. In her foreign policy however, she soon began to show a willingness to resort to force which disconcerted those who had earlier applauded her drive for prosperity. Shortly after the First World War, Japan began to make ominous noises to China, demanding concessions in trade and even territorial rights. These external developments were matched by an increasing internal domination of Japan by the Army.
The long range plans of the Japanese were most succinctly presented in the famous "Tanaka Memorial" of 1927. Supposedly written by the Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Tanaka, in 1927, and presented to the Emperor, this paper has often been called a forgery. Nevertheless, with hindsight, it can certainly be seen to have been very accurate. The memorial began with the proposition that Japan must expand or die, because without the raw materials she needed to feed her industry, Japan would be slowly strangled by the other Great Powers. The key to this expansion was seen to be China. With China bent to Japanese will, the whole Far East would eventually fall under the hegemony of Japan, which would thus be guaranteed the resources she needed. The other powers could be excluded from the region and further advances into India, Russia, and Australia could be taken at opportune times.
Such a document might, with reason, have been dismissed as nonsense in 1927, but in 1931, Japan began to put her plans into effect, starting with Manchuria. A minor incident on the Manchurian Railway was the excuse for Japan to intervene, and the puppet regime of Manchoukou was set up, in contravention of the censure of the League of Nations. The Sino-Japanese war began in earnest in 1937, when another minor incident (this time in Peking), triggered a Japanese invasion of North China. Hostilities soon spread to Central China, and both Shanghai and Nanking were occupied in late 1937. The latter, then the capital of Chiang Kai Shek's government, was the scene of an incredibly barbaric occupation by Japanese troops, which did much to alienate public opinion outside Japan, especially in the United States.
Even after this, China refused to negotiate and the Chinese government retired to Chungking to continue the fight. The Japanese began to realise that they might have bitten off more than they could chew, as Chinese troops, beaten in almost every encounter, simply retired further into the vast interior and lived to fight another day.
The next stage of the war occurred when Japanese troops landed at Bias Bay on the coast of South China in October of 1938 and quickly took Canton. With this campaign, the Japanese came into possession of the whole coastline of China, a situation which they felt would force China to the bargaining table. Another effect of this campaign was to place Japanese troops within 20 miles of Kowloon and Hong Kong Island.
Paralleling these military ventures were developments inside Japan. A constant stream of propaganda flowed from the government-controlled Japanese press, emphasizing the need for Japan to break the power of the West in the Pacific area. It was stressed that the Japanese people had a sacred mission to restore Asia to the Asians and to establish a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" where the Asiatic races could develop their economies in harmony, free from the domination of the Western powers. Japanese society became more and more rigid, and those sections of the population concentrated in capital and labour who argued for a rapprochement with the West were gradually silenced. The military, and particularly the Army, gained an ascendancy over Japanese political life which precluded any possibility of liberalization. It was soon accepted as axiomatic that Japan must assert her "rights'' in Asia, with force if necessary. "With very few and trifling exceptions the whole nation is behind the present ideas of expansion." 15-1
The Japanese attempt to impose a new order on Asia was, of course, contrary to American and British interests. For many years both countries had affirmed an "open door" policy toward China which they were desirous of maintaining. In addition, Japanese naval control of the Pacific was a prospect which Britain at least could not afford to ignore, as it would imperil not only New Zealand and Australia, but India as well, and hence the life's-blood of the Empire. Shortly after the First World War, the United Kingdom began to take a closer look at defence requirements in the Far East. It was at this time that it was realised that Hong Kong could not be successfully defended, and the decision was taken to make Singapore the military and naval cornerstone of British power in the Far East.
While the Singapore base was nearing completion and the state of Hong Kong defence was still being discussed, Japan continued her southward thrusts. In March,1939, Japan seized the Spratly Islands, southwest of Indo-China, in the middle of a minor dispute over them in which Britain and France were also involved. These islands had little military value, but the action reiterated Japan's methods of diplomacy. When in June,1939, Japan acquired the large island of Hainan, 300 miles south of Hong Kong, "The isolation of the Colony was well-nigh complete. 16-2 Japan was definitely seen as the enemy by this time, and the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that possibly "The first intimation that we should receive that Japan has joined Germany and Italy against us would be an attack on Hong Kong." 16-3
Japan had already joined Germany and Italy on the philosophical level. Japan was not strictly Fascist in the European model, but many of the ingredients were there -nationalism, militarism, a strong contingent of secret police, and, especially, a virulent hatred of communism. In 1936, Japan, Germany, and Italy signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, an essentially toothless treaty, but one which nevertheless affirmed ties of kindred feeling between the three countries. This is not to say they were all good friends - they were not, but on their basic approach to foreign affairs, the German ideas of lebensraum were similar to Japan's "Co-Prosperity Sphere", and they could look on each other's ambitions with sympathy, particularly as their different "spheres" were very far apart.
The beginnings of the Second World War in many ways increased the tension in the Far East. It became much more likely that Japan would attack, yet the basic British defence policy did not change. All through the so-called phony war "the cornerstone of our strategy [was] the despatch to the Far East of a fleet of sufficient strength to bring the Japanese Fleet to action." 16-4 The United Kingdom could still envisage this as long as she could rely on France safeguarding the Mediterranean with her fleet.
The big change came about with the fall of France and the entry of Italy into the war. The immediate military effect was that Britain now had to maintain naval control of the Mediterranean as well as the Atlantic, and thus had no fleet for the Pacific. The "cornerstone of our strategy" was no longer applicable. The immediate political effect was that Japan began to make aggressive noises. On 20 June, 1940, the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo warned the government that Japan might take advantage of the European situation. 17-5 This was confirmed on 29 June,1940, by the statement of Mr. Arita, the Japanese Foreign Minister which redirected pressure toward French Indo-China. In Japan, however, Arita's statement was construed by some Japanese as being too soft on Britain and the Netherlands' East Indies and was considerably criticized. The Japanese were hardly being soft on the British- by late June they were pressing for the withdrawal of the Shanghai garrison, the closing of the Burma Road to China, and the closing of the Hong Kong border. Extremists and younger Army officers were clamouring for active collaboration with the Germans.
These extremists soon forced a showdown with the Yonai government, whose fall in mid-July showed the power of both the German Ambassador, (rumoured to have a big finger in the pie) and the Army. The more pro-Axis Konoye government took over. On 26 July , the Chief of the Canadian General Staff warned the War Committee that "Japanese expansionist ideas were to the south."
Canada became embroiled in a minor way with Japan in September, when the Canadian Pacific ship Empress of Asia was bombed by a Japanese patrol, who claimed they thought it was the target ship on which they were practising. Four Chinese servants were injured, two seriously. As the Empress was the largest ship in Japanese waters at the time and was flying the Union Jack, and as visibility that day was exceptional, (over 50 km), few believed it an accident. The Japanese stuck to their story, though they apologized and offered compensation. In view of the incredible record of airmen of all nations throughout the Second World War bombing friendly ships, despite distinctive appearance, adequate identification markings and perfect visibility, may well have been a genuine mistake.
September also saw major developments on the diplomatic and military fronts. Japan applied pressure to the hapless and helpless Vichy French colony of Indo-China and obtained permission to build and man airbases in the north. The Japanese Director of Military Intelligence told the British Military Attache at the time that "it was a matter of pure indifference to the Japanese Army whether or not we re-opened the Burma Road, since if we re-opened it, the Japanese would bomb it out of existence." 18-7
In early September, the Foreign Ministry of Japan was also shaken up, with 5 ambassadors and 19 ministers being recalled. The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that this reflected a new policy of "government by real he-men ... we intend to build up an iron Foreign Staff." 18-8. The Canadian Chargé d'Affaires reported that "the shake-up was brought about by Army influence", and was designed to force "the gradual disappearance of those with liberal ideology". 18-9. Perhaps the most ominous of the new appointments was that of Lieutenant General Tatekawa to the USSR. He believed in strengthening Tokyo/Berlin/Rome ties while becoming friendly toward the Soviet Union.
The new policy was soon put into concrete form. On 27 September, 1940, Japan, Italy, and Germany signed the Tripartite Pact. The Pact was designed, among other things, to keep the United States out of war, but its actual effect was to make public opinion in that country even more hostile to the Axis. Nevertheless, Japan had signed a definite defensive treaty with the two enemies of the West. On his way home, Foreign Minister Matsuoka stopped off in Moscow and, with Hitler's knowledge, signed a Non-aggression Pact with the USSR. The stage was now set for the Foreign Minister to "press on with just as much of a southern expansion policy as he thought he could get away with." 18-10. In October,1940, the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR was given wide powers to negotiate with the Russians on many topics which had proved to be stumbling blocks in the past. The stronger Russo-Japanese relations the greater danger to the south.
The United States finally began to react to the threat. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, made it plain to the British Ambassador in October that from then on, the United States would take a very tough stand with Japan. 18-11. The Commonwealth countries also began to work out a comprehensive policy involving sanctions against Japan.
On December 24,1940, the Dominions Office sent a telegram to External Affairs containing an appreciation of the situation in Japan. It noted two main currents within Japanese politics. The radical nationalists, the group presently on top, were totalitarian, pro-Axis, and in favour of an arrangement with the Soviets. The second faction, reactionary nationalists were more anti-Russian. Although they were anti-West as well, they were more willing to compromise for the time being. (A useful terminology is to call them the "Strike South '' and "Strike North" factions.) The Strike North group were represented in their clearest form in the Kwantung (Manchurian) Army. According to this appreciation of the situation, Japan appeared to be cooperating more and more with Germany, possibly because she wanted Germany's help "when and if the time comes for further developments in the south" 19-12. In the meantime, Japan was slowly infiltrating into the south. In late November it had been reported to the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet that Japanese forces were in virtual control of Indo-China. The naval and air strategical advantages accruing to them from this position would be hard to overestimate. The British stopped all trade to Japan in retaliation. 19-13
In late January,1941, Canada and the United Kingdom began to make arrangements with Argentina to act as their "protecting power" in the event of war with Japan. It was also reported to the Canadian Government that the United States and United Kingdom were to hold talks regarding a common defence policy in the Far East, to which the Dominions and the Dutch were to be invited. 19-14
Relations between the United Kingdom and Japan became even further strained in January over the use of the Japanese flag by German raiders and the Japanese provisioning of German ships sheltering in Japanese waters. It was finally being recognized that a crisis could be expected in the Far East. According to notes made for Prime Minister Mackenzie King in February, 1941, the "possible first move would be Japanese demand for the surrender of Hong Kong." 19-15. The danger in the area was repeated in several long memoranda sent from London to Ottawa. One of 7 February, 1941, said that the British and Americans were now closely involved in talks regarding the Japanese menace and the means of dealing with it. Both governments agreed that a tough stance was necessary. 19-16. Another 10 days later, noted that Japan was moving south on the diplomatic front. Militarily, their occupation of Indo-China and their influence in Thailand posed a grave threat to both Singapore and Malaya. 19-17
Throughout most of 1941, Japan blew hot and cold and played a war of nerves. The embargo imposed by the Commonwealth and United States had gone into effect. On 23 April,1941, it was reported to the Canadian Government that the export of copper, nickel, zinc, lead, antimony, cadmium, iron, and steel to Japan had been stopped. The Japanese ambassador to Canada was said to be indignant. 20-18.
At a meeting of the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet on 13 May, it was stated that Japan was "unshaken in her determination to stand with the Axis Powers". At this session there was also a discussion of Canada's war role so far. Canadian troops had not yet fired a shot, morale was slipping, and public interest was slackening. 20-19
In an appreciation of the situation sent from London to Ottawa for the perusal of the Prime Minister, it was stated that the United States attitude was something of a deterrent to Japan, but that the threat of attack was still great. 20-20 The British were evidently undecided though, because a new set of telegrams read to the War Committee on 3 June, 1941, stated that an early war with Japan was unlikely. 20-21
The opening of hostilities between Russia and Germany on 22 June,1941, made the prediction of Japan's actions even more difficult. The well-known Japanese hatred of Russia made war between those countries likely, yet this would be an aberration from Japan's long standing southward-oriented policy. A memo prepared on 23 June,1941, by Dr. H.L. Keenleyside for the Under Secretary of External Affairs, Norman Robertson, discussed the position. Keenleyside concluded that, all things considered, a Japanese attack on Russia was unlikely, despite the potential prizes - “it would seem rather more reasonable to expect that Japan would take advantage of Russian preoccupation with Germany to hold her continental boundaries with a minimum strength and to direct all her energies to increasing the tempo of southern advance." 20-22
Reasonably enough, British opinion on Japanese intentions was affected by the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia. The British government informed the Canadian government in July that they believed that "Japan's early entry into war could now be expected. The United States was of the same opinion..." 20-23. The Prime Minister also received a memo from the Department of External Affairs warning of imminent war with Japan. The direction was unknown, but the best guess was southwest through Siam and Indo-China. 20-24 During the summer and fall of 1941, the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet was kept constantly informed of the diplomatic and military situation in the Far East.
At this time, the various governments with interests in the Pacific area were holding discussions of the situation in relation to Japan. The attitude of the American and British governments toward Japan was becoming more strict. At the end of the summer the United States warned Japan that any further aggression would lead to hostilities. In Canada, the War Committee of the cabinet was discussing plans for the evacuation of Canadian nationals from Japan. The solid front displayed against Japan seemed to be having enough effect to produce a guarded optimism among Western governments, but the British government warned the Canadian Department of External Affairs that if the situation became favourable to the Japanese it was "unlikely that extremist elements could be restrained" 21-25. British, Canadian, and other Dominions' diplomatic and consular personnel in the Far East were being instructed when and how to send any information which pointed to the threat of war.
Besides all the information given to the government leaders, a steady stream of data was being passed to National Defence Headquarters from the British War Office. The Defence Schemes and appreciations mentioned earlier were also available a very short time after they were published or prepared. Hong Kong, in addition, was the site of a British Army Intelligence Unit, which published a monthly intelligence digest, 21-26 copies of which were forwarded to National Defence Headquarters. The troop dispositions of the Japanese, particularly in China, were recorded with some accuracy every month. The January 1941 issue of this digest noted that Japan was drifting into a position where she would have no option but to fight, while the February issue warned that "the showdown has been postponed rather than avoided". The Japanese were moving into the south, and the landing undertaken at Bias Bay in South China effectively cut lines of communication between Canton and Hong Kong and resulted in two brigades being positioned very close to the Hong Kong border. The March report stated that the Japanese were cooling a little due to United States toughness, and two months later it was suggested that the signing of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact would give an impetus to the southward expansion. This issue reported that both the Japanese Naval heavy bombers and the Zero fighters were of good quality. The June issue reported that troop dispositions in South China were sufficient only for garrison duty, but by the next month, troops were noted moving south.
In the following months, a partial mobilization seemed to have occurred in Japan, and submarines were noticed patrolling the Hong Kong approaches. Even so, the writers of the intelligence digest reported that the country was still sitting on the fence. In October, 1941, the report again noted the vacillation but stated that internal elements in Japan might force the issue particularly if there were a cabinet change. (The October issue dealt with the month preceding.) Junks in Hong Kong waters were being harassed, and Japanese planes continually violated Hong Kong airspace. By the end of September, extra squadrons of heavy bombers had reinforced Canton from Formosa and 30,000 Japanese soldiers were in the Canton area.
A further source of information available to National Defence Headquarters, was an extensive series of notes on Japan by Colonel Mullahy, the former United Kingdom Military Attaché in Japan. In early September, 1941, he submitted a resume called the "History of Militarism in Japan 1931-41", which chronicled the escalating scale of Japanese aggression in Manchuria, China, and the Far East, as well as the increasing influences of the Army in Japanese life. On 27 September,1941, he noted- "it is increasingly obvious that the divergence of view is very wide [between United States and Japan], and certain that the United States, backed 100% by the British Empire, will drive a very hard bargain with Japan." The Japanese were trying to appear conciliatory while at the same time tightening their grip on Indo-China. On 15 September,1941, Mullahy noted that a new Defence Headquarters set up in Japan, appeared to give the Emperor, and hence, he thought, the saner elements, more control over the Army and Navy. 22-27 (In the light of recent research, it now appears possible that Emperor Hirohito was actually very much involved with the planning and execution of all phases of Japanese expansion from 1921 onward.)
Not only was all of this information from British sources available at National Defence Headquarters, but a good many of the senior officers there had experience specifically with the Hong Kong problem, as the defence of the Colony was considered a "classic" staff college problem. Some officers, for instance Brigadier Macklin, the Director of Staff Duties, had even been to Hong Kong. When Lieutenant General Stuart, Chief of the General Staff, testified at the hearing of the Royal Commission, he stated that when he studied the problem in 1928, it was decided that Hong Kong could hold out for 60 days with a garrison of 6 battalions. (This was, of course, long before the Japanese squatted on the Hong Kong border.) It does not seem that the implications registered with him when he testified in the next breath, that by 1941, it was agreed that relief could not be anticipated before 120 days-that is twice as long as Hong Kong was expected to hold out under the easier 1928 conditions. 22-28
It is quite obvious that there was very little information regarding the Japanese menace in general, and the defence of Hong Kong in particular, that was not available to the Canadian government or its senior military officers at the time the decision was being taken to send Canadian troops to Hong Kong.
Japan was expanding aggressively, and the practically defenceless colony of Hong Kong was in its path. Yet with this knowledge readily available, the decision was still made to reinforce Hong Kong with Canadian troops. The only real question after all is said and done is - why?