The Island
—20 December
As this second day of the battle for the Island dawned, both sides had problems to solve. Colonels Shoji and Doi, with two battalions of each of their regiments milling around in the Mount Nicholson - Wong Nei Chong Gap area, had to get organized and secure these features before they could swing west, according to plan. Colonel Tanaka, now no longer directly confronted by the enemy, intended to drive his 229th Regiment through to the south coast at Repulse or Deep Water Bay, cutting the Island in two, before he moved west. Maltby, on his part, had to clear or dominate the Gap and, if possible, link up the two brigades.
A particularly tragic event for the Canadians on 20 December was the death of Colonel Pat Hennessy, the Senior Administrative Officer of C Force. The Japanese were still shelling the Island from the mainland and a heavy shell hit the house on Victoria Peak in which he was working, killing Captain Davies, the Field Cashier, and mortally wounding Hennessy. He was an able and popular officer and his death meant that the senior Canadians in Hong Kong were the two battalion commanders, each desperately busy and serving in separate brigades under British officers.
East Brigade
It was Brigadier Wallis' firm intention to push west at the earliest opportunity in order to link up with West Brigade. The most direct route, via Gauge Basin south of Mount Parker, was initially ruled out as the Volunteers in the area had been pushed back by Tanaka's 229th Regiment. Wallis therefore determined to move up the coast road to Repulse Bay and then advance north toward Wong Nei Chong Gap. He had urged Lieutenant Colonel Home to have the Rifles ready to move by 5am, but Home felt that it would be at least 8 before he could re-establish communications between his companies.* A Company, which had spent most of the previous day marching and counter-marching, was ordered to form the advance guard, and moved off. At almost exactly the same time as A Company of the Royal Rifles began to move, the first of Tanaka's men reached Repulse Bay. Having arrived at Wong Nei Chong Gap in the early morning and finding Doi's and Shoji's Regiments taking up position, Tanaka ordered his men to move south. By 8am the Island's defenders were effectively cut in two.
*Little wireless was used during the battle by the defenders, who had to rely on either runners and despatch riders (who were handicapped by unfamiliarity with the ground and by its rugged nature), military field telephones, or the civilian telephone system. The Japanese did not make any attempt to dislocate this system, preferring to listen in. They must have been caused some annoyance by the Royal Rifles officers, most of whom were bilingual and who therefore deliberately spoke French on the telephone.
At the foot of the cliffs overlooking Repulse Bay stood the Repulse Bay Hotel, a palatial establishment with nearly two hundred civilian guests still in residence and a garrison of 50 Middlesex, Volunteers, and naval personnel. Some of Tanaka's men climbed down the cliffs and surrounded the hotel, occupying several outbuildings. The advancing A Company of the Royal Rifles was soon informed that the Japanese held the Hotel garage, and was ordered to brush this opposition aside and carry on. The company cleared the Japanese who were in approximately platoon strength, but with machine-guns from the garage by 11am. By this time there were two companies of the enemy on the hillside and more were on the way. A Company pushed on, under increasingly heavy fire, until it was forced to deploy into defensive positions in the area of Repulse Bay and Eucliffe Castle (a large mansion just before the junction of the coast road and the north/south road). Later that day a message reached the company that the Hotel was to be held at all costs for the sake of the women and children there.
Next to move forward was D Company. It was decided not to send this company by road - Wallis had recorded in the Brigade Diary that A Company's advance was "slow and over-cautious. Men were taking cover every time a distant shot or a burst from a machine-gun was heard ..." 168-1 When Wallis went on a reconnaissance of the road, however, just before D Company was to move off, he found it was more than a matter of distant shots and bursts - he spent several long minutes in a roadside ditch with Lieutenant Colonel Home and Major Parker under enemy fire. He therefore decided to send D Company to Wong Nei Chong Gap via the east side of Violet Hill, the highest hill feature between the Stanley area and the Gap. It does not seem to have occurred to Wallis that if the enemy were at Repulse Bay, they must of a certainty have already occupied Violet Hill directly behind it. Nevertheless, D Company moved off at 11am through exceedingly rough country. They were totally unfamiliar with the terrain and had absolutely no idea what they might encounter, as "Brigadier Wallis' information about enemy strength and positions was negligible." 168-2 The company spent the day moving through the hills and along the concrete water catchments. One platoon surprised an artillery pack train and inflicted heavy casualties, and another climbed high enough to fire on the Japanese artillery positions in Gauge Basin, though at least one of these guns began to return the fire. Lieutenant Power, commanding the platoon, noted that the way forward beyond Violet Hill to the Gap was open country and an unobserved approach would be impossible. The company was coming under increasingly intense fire from Violet Hill, and, finding its position was untenable, withdrew. During the withdrawal the mortar section attached to the company was forced to destroy the mortar they had manhandled up the hill and jettison the ammunition. D Company arrived back at Stanley View at 11pm, exhausted.
B Company, like A Company the previous day, was to have a particularly frustrating experience. In the morning they were ordered to take up a defensive position behind A Company, half-way between Stanley View and Repulse Bay. The company quickly carried out the order, marching from Sugarloaf Mountain to Stanley Mound and taking up positions on and around the Mound. At 4pm B Company was ordered to advance along the road (despite the fact that it had been judged unsafe for D Company that morning), pass through A Company at Repulse Bay, and continue to the curve in the road west of Eucliffe. The company moved off but at 4:30 was informed that Brigade Headquarters had changed its plan and B Company was now to fall back on Sugarloaf Mountain. The company had retired as far as Stone Hill by 5:30 when it was ordered to turn around again and advance on Repulse Bay. Half an hour later this order was rescinded and B Company was directed to return to Sugarloaf Mountain. By the time the company reached Sugarloaf it was dark and raining. One platoon failed to report in that night.
Headquarters Company was also ordered that morning to move up the road to the Repulse Bay area. Between Stone Hill and the Bay they came under artillery fire, and at 10:30am the company was ordered to halt at the outskirts of Repulse Bay. The road there being swept by small-arms fire, the men were forced to get under cover. Headquarters Company stayed there from 10:30am to 5pm, receiving no orders and, despite continuing Japanese fire, no casualties. They were finally ordered back to Palm Villa.
C Company, aside from a temporary move to Palm Villa, spent a comparatively inactive day after their extensive fighting of 19 December. Major Bishop led a patrol in two Volunteer carriers and had a brief clash with the enemy at Tai Tam Reservoir.
The day's operations had left East Brigade back where it started, except for A Company of the Royal Rifles which was holding out at Repulse Bay. There can be no denying that the Rifles had been a little slow at times, though how much this can be attributed to their lack of training and fatigue and how much to command indecision is debatable. Once again, the artillery had let the brigade down badly. No fire support at all had been given the Royal Rifles, because the coast defence guns could not be brought to bear and the few mobile guns available "were only getting in position and sorting equipment and were unable to fire at this time."
West Brigade
By the early morning of 20 December the two West Brigade battalions that had borne the brunt of the fighting were in dire straits. The remaining Royal Scots were positioned on the lower slopes of Mount Nicholson and were just barely hanging on. D Company Headquarters of the Winnipeg Grenadiers was continuing to hold out in Wong Nei Chong Gap. The Grenadiers' B Company was still at Pok Fu Lam and C Company, less one platoon, was at Aberdeen. The other three companies had almost ceased to exist, except for a few small groups of men cut off in the hills, trying to make their way to safety. Z Company of the Middlesex, the surviving Rajput company (B), and B Company of the Punjabs held the line from Leighton Hill to just north of Jardine's Lookout, and were not under attack by the Japanese infantry, although they were under pressure from the Suzukawa Engineering Unit. The rest of the garrison's regular infantry was still approximately in their pre-invasion locations.
Although Brigadier Lawson had been killed in the morning of 19 December, a new Brigade Commander was not appointed until nearly noon the next day. He was Colonel H.B. Rose, the British regular officer who commanded the Volunteers. Rose's plan, or the one that was imposed on him by Maltby, was simply for the remaining Royal Scots and Winnipeg Grenadiers to attack east, clear the Gap, and push through to East Brigade. For some reason, the Royal Scots could not or would not make the attempt, so the sole attack in West Brigade to fall on the Japanese that day was made by B Company of the Grenadiers. At 10am B Company was brought east from Pok Fu Lam to receive their orders. They were to attack Wong Nei Chong Gap from the direction of Wan Chai Gap. The attack was late in getting under way, apparently because B Company was waiting, in vain, to hear the Royal Scots would participate. In actual fact the Royal Scots company on the eastern slopes of Mount Nicholson withdrew that evening. B Company, Grenadiers, finally moved off alone in the pitch blackness and the pouring rain. The company split into two parties which were to circle Mount Nicholson from opposite directions and meet just above the Gap on the far side of the mountain, where they were to spend the night before attacking at dawn.
In the meantime the Japanese were starting to sort things out. Colonel Doi and Colonel Shoji, who according to his own estimate had already lost 800 men in endeavouring to take the Gap, had intended to co-operate in taking Mount Nicholson. But Doi, habitually the most active and aggressive of the Japanese regimental commanders, reverted to his old tricks and, upon noticing the fog and rain, decided to stage an immediate attack. He used his 1st Battalion, with three companies up and one back. As the Royal Scots had withdrawn from the eastern slopes Doi encountered no opposition until the main body of B Company of the Grenadiers came round the mountain. When B Company reached the area where they intended to spend the night they collided with the three Japanese companies and a fierce fight ensued. Eventually the Grenadiers retired to Middle Gap on the west side of Mount Nicholson to wait out the night, having lost two officers, a sergeant, and 20 men in the encounter.
There was little other activity in West Brigade that day. One company of the Punjabs had been moved south to Aberdeen. Also at about this time the Middlesex machine-gunners not directly engaged were withdrawn from the coastal pillboxes. For the most part, however, they were not thrown into the battle, but were concentrated at Little Hong Kong and Pok Fu Lam in the locations the Grenadiers had formerly held before being committed to the fighting.