The Island
—21 December
21 December was to see the last offensive efforts designed to make headway against the Japanese and rejoin the two brigades. It also marked the last day in which the Royal Navy was able to take any offensive action whatsoever.
After her successful operation on 14/15 December, HMS Thracian had been damaged by grounding and then run ashore on Round Island off the south coast of Hong Kong. The motor torpedo boats, after a costly attack against the Japanese troop movements between the mainland and Island on 19 December that caused casualties on both sides, no longer attempted to intervene and were instead used to ferry ammunition and other vital supplies to Stanley. The river gunboat, HMS Cicala, which had bombarded the enemy on 20 and 21 December from Deep Water Bay, was bombed and sunk on the 21st. Surviving Royal Navy personnel were to serve as infantry, and all fought bravely until the capitulation.
East Brigade
The activities of the East Brigade on 21 December fell into two parts. The earliest and major effort was the attempt to break out to the West Brigade area. Instead of trying the Repulse Bay route again, the Royal Rifles and a Volunteer company were ordered to drive due north to Tai Tam Tuk, then turn west and head down a small road to Wong Nei Chong Gap via Gauge Basin. A disadvantage of this route was that enfilade fire could be directed against them not only by infantry, but also by the artillery sited above and to the north of them on Mount Butler and Jardine's Lookout. As well, the Japanese had brought their reserve troops across from the mainland. One of these units, the 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment, was in the hills above the road to Tai Tam, and was to be reinforced by another, the 1st Battalion, 230th Regiment, that same day. The only apparent merit of East Brigade's plan was that it had not yet been tried.
Within 15 minutes of starting out the leading company had met with very strong resistance from the surrounding hills. The Royal Rifles sent out small flank guards to clear Notting and Bridge Hills on one side and Red Hill on the other. Because of the pressure of fire, more and more men were sent off to the flanks, until eventually the whole advance guard was involved. The main guard, D Company of the Royal Rifles, also became caught up in the fighting. When Major MacAuley, commanding the advance guard, asked for reinforcements from the main guard to continue the attack, he was told that D Company was already engaged on his flanks!
By 1pm the firing from Bridge, Notting, and Red Hills had ceased and the attack was able to proceed. A machine-gun post at the crossroads north of Bridge Hill was shelled by the Rifles' 3-inch mortar, then rushed by the advance guard and wiped out. At 5pm the Japanese sent some light tanks (probably armoured cars) down the road. The vehicles caused some casualties, but were forced to retire by a steady stream of fire from all sides. However, at 6pm the advance to Gauge Basin was ordered to halt, and the troops were brought back to their original positions in the Stanley area.
Although, according to Wallis, he had earlier begun to "realize that the Battalion was incapable of real fight," he almost changed his mind that day. Reporting to Maltby he said that "he was very worried over the terrible slowness and lack of training of the Royal Rifles, but that they were really doing their best... and fighting gamely." 173-1 For his part Maltby recorded, incorrectly, that the attack had failed by 10:30am, but he added that the Royal Rifles had made "a great effort." 173-2
The pattern of failed counter-attacks was a common one throughout the battle for Hong Kong. In terms of human achievement, however, the one to Gauge Basin was a success. It had cleared the Japanese off the road to Tai Tam, beaten off a light tank or armoured car attack, and driven the Japanese off the flanking hills. But with the troops engaged on the flanks, the small numbers of the Royal Rifles and Volunteers prevented any advance. In the end the offensive thrust had been watered down to such an extent that the advance halted, and the column was ordered back to the Stanley area. It is probably fortunate that they never got any further. If any men had survived running the Gauge Basin artillery and light arms gauntlet, they would still have had to crash through four battalions to get into the West Brigade area.
Meanwhile, at Repulse Bay, A Company of the Royal Rifles was holding out against Japanese fire from the hills above. Early that morning the company had received an order from Fortress Headquarters to advance down the road, clearing the houses as it went along. This command was soon cancelled, but at 1pm two platoons were ordered to move north to a position known as the Ridge where an Ordnance Depot was located, approximately 400 yards south of Wong Nei Chong Gap, clear the road at that area, and wait.
The civilian telephone system was still functioning and the Japanese had not cut the lines leading to the Repulse Bay Hotel. Some of the residents had been in direct contact with Maltby and managed to convince him that things were not going as they should in the area. Maltby immediately ordered a Major Templer of the Royal Artillery to proceed to the Hotel, take command of operations in the area, and make an assault on the Gap. Brigadier Wallis was far from happy with this division of responsibility and the diversion of part of his force. Nevertheless, Templer took two Royal Rifle platoons - one from Headquarters and one from C Company - two Volunteer machine-gun crews, and two trucks and arrived at the Hotel at 3pm. He immediately loaded A Company onto the trucks and they roared off, picking up some of the Ridge force en route. They advanced quickly toward the Gap in the gathering darkness, intending to attack the police station. Then, realizing the strength of the Japanese and learning that some of the Brens were jamming, Templer decided not to press the attack and withdrew to the far side of the Ridge.
One possible benefit of this futile exercise was that Templer, who appears to have had Maltby's ear, presumably was able to convince him that the Gap really was occupied by large numbers of Japanese and that it would take more than platoon and company attacks to evict them.
Two of A Company's platoons were not destined to spend the night behind the Ridge. They were ordered to occupy a concrete water catchment in the hills in order to prevent the Japanese from using it as a supply route. These platoons started out at 7:30pm, moving into the area occupied by Tanaka's two battalions. Soon after midnight they were ambushed and suffered severe casualties. One platoon made it back to the Hotel, the other took cover in Overbays House, 300 yards south of the Ridge.
The Royal Rifles were forced to stand-to for a period that night due to a false alarm about a possible landing. Apart from that and a few snipers, the battalion front was quiet. The unit diary recorded "All ranks of the Battalion very tired - no sleep, little food, constant hill-climbing."
West Brigade
If there was one group of men on the Island during the night of 20/21 December who knew what the morrow would bring, it was the men of B Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers. The Japanese had occupied Mount Nicholson, and at dawn B Company was going to try to take it away from them. The attack went in at 6:45 from both sides of the mountain and over the crest. All the attacking troops were heavily and immediately engaged by the enemy, and, eventually, the overwhelming odds told and the Canadians were forced to withdraw. Of the 98 men that had gone into action, all the officers, the Company Sergeant Major, seven NCOs, and 29 men were casualties. Yet in that grim battle the Grenadiers had made Colonel Doi's 1st Battalion fight for its life. Doi wrote, "At dawn on the 21st, the enemy counter-attacked with about 400 men, but they were repulsed after fierce fighting. In that engagement the unit defending the summit exhausted all its hand grenades and fought by throwing stones. This fighting cost one of the companies about 40% in casualties, including the company commander and platoon leaders." 176-3
There was no hope whatsoever now of wresting Mount Nicholson from the Japanese. Therefore, as B Company pulled back, Lieutenant Colonel Sutcliffe informed the Grenadiers' Second-in-Command, Major G. Trist, that the attack had failed and ordered him to form a new line on Mount Cameron, the next hill to the west. Trist mustered 100 all ranks - almost the entire battalion strength available and fit for duty except for most of C Company, still at Aberdeen - and moved to Mount Cameron under continual artillery fire. The new position was very open and no shovels or other entrenching tools were available, though in any case these would have been of little use in the rocky terrain. The line ran along the ridge immediately behind the crest. Throughout the day the Grenadiers were hit by very accurate artillery and mortar fire. Meanwhile, D Company Headquarters continued to deny Wong Nei Chong Gap to the enemy. Captain Bush, the Staff Captain, recorded that:
the position was being fired upon from all sides. It might be compared with the lower part of a bowl, the enemy looking down and occupying the rim. The main road running through the position was cluttered for hundreds of feet each way with abandoned trucks and cars. The Japanese were using mortars and hand grenades quite heavily. Casualties were steadily mounting, but at the same time reinforcements were trickling in, in the form of stragglers... 177-4
Bush and Captain Billings, the C Force Signals Officer, both wounded, had escaped from the Gap on the night of 20 December.
On this day as well, A Company of the Punjabs at Aberdeen was ordered to break through to Repulse Bay. Due to detachments manning pillboxes in the Victoria area, the company had been only 45 strong when it went into action on Caroline Hill on 19 December. By now it was down to 25 all ranks. They moved east, led by the Punjabs' Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kidd, and accompanied by a small number of naval personnel. The bulk of Tanaka's two original battalions were still in the Repulse Bay area, but some advanced elements appear to have been on Shouson Hill at the foot of Deep Water Bay. The Punjabs put in a courageous attack against superior numbers and accomplished nothing except the loss of the majority of their force, including Lieutenant Colonel Kidd.
As the day ended, West Brigade was hoping to hold the new line centered on Mount Cameron, despite the day's losses. Shoji's 3rd Battalion was closing in on the shelters in the Gap, and the 2nd must have participated in the morning's battle on Mount Nicholson as it reported the battalion commander wounded and the Adjutant killed in that location. Meanwhile, the 228th Regiment under the energetic Colonel Doi was preparing to follow up its success on Mount Nicholson and assault Mount Cameron.