During the 18 days of the battle for Hong Kong, people in both Canada and England were almost completely in the dark about the situation in the colony. The situation reports from Maltby's headquarters were markedly vague. Major events, such as the evacuation to the island and the Japanese landings there, were, of course, identifiable, but there was little more solid information. It was nevertheless apparent within a short time that Hong Kong was going under. Canadian interest in the battle was understandably high -this was the first time the Canadian Army had been in action in the entire war, but even the highest government circles were starved for news. On 19 December, the Cabinet War Committee was informed that the situation was very grave, and that no word had as yet been received from Brigadier Lawson. 215-1
Almost the only information available to the ordinary man was that published in British newspapers, and these were widely quoted by the Canadian papers. It was in these reports that the Canadian people read for the first time that Hong Kong had always been known to be very exposed to attack. The Canadian government was quite upset over this, and the British High Commissioner was more than a little embarrassed. He therefore sent off a telegram dated 18 December, 1941 to the Dominions Office pointing out that United Kingdom newspapers were saying (with perfect accuracy), that Hong Kong was of minor value and its retention had never been seriously counted upon in a war with Japan. He reminded his government that Hong Kong had been represented to Canadians in a very different light when their troops were sent. If it was now publicly announced that Hong Kong was of little importance, the Canadians would naturally ask why, in that case, their troops had been senselessly sacrificed. 216-2 This was a reasonable question, of course, and British government spokesmen soon exchanged their excuses for others even more flimsy, but presumably less offensive to Canadians. They then said that the damage to the American fleet at Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the Prince of Wales had upset all their plans. This explanation (also offered by General Stuart before the Royal Commission), is utter nonsense as neither the British nor the American fleets had any intention of sailing for Hong Kong. In the case of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, even the brief sortie up the Malayan coast and return on which they were sunk, was a calculated gamble and the risk they ran was understood. To speak of the United States Fleet, even if it had emerged from Pearl Harbor unscathed, steaming through the teeth of Japanese opposition, to the relief of a British colony on the Chinese coast hundreds of miles from any American interest is even more ridiculous.
The unadorned fact is that there was neither the intention nor the capability to rescue Hong Kong in the event of war, and to say otherwise was a downright lie, though perhaps considered justifiable in the interest of wartime morale.
On 21 December, 1941, the Director of Military Operations and Plans at the War Office reported to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that resistance was weakening and would have no "direct influence on operations in the Far East in the way of tying up Japanese forces." As far as Hong Kong was concerned, the outpost policy was no longer an abstraction, but a grim reality. Although the function of an outpost (to tie up the enemy forces) had not been fulfilled, the fate of an outpost had to be borne-- the garrison was to fight to the last, not for political benefits, no longer even for military benefits. The only value left in fighting to the end was that the "psychological aspect was of overwhelming importance particularly with an Oriental enemy." 216-3 The military role of Hong Kong had never been of great magnitude -certainly not worth six battalions -but now men were to continue fighting and dying for the lofty purpose of out-psyching the Japanese!
On 20 December, The Times of London had spoken up for Canada (perhaps because Canada would not speak up for itself). The loss of Hong Kong, ran its editorial, would be grievously felt. "Its dangerous exposed position was well understood", although recent reports tended to downplay this. The Times concluded that "the loss of the Island after so brief, though gallant, a resistance is bound to give fresh impetus to the well-justified demand of the Dominions to be given a more adequate share in determining policy and strategy, especially in those parts of the world in which their vital interests are at stake or in which their forces are engaged."
But was there a renewed demand for a voice in determining policy? Certainly not from Canada. Prime Minister Churchill, in Canada a few days after the fall of Hong Kong, expressed regrets to the War Committee of the Cabinet for the loss of the two battalions. "He spoke feelingly of Hong Kong, saying that he was not sure at first about sending Canadians, on the theory that if war did not come, they would not be needed, and if war did come, it would be a difficult place to hold. " 217-4 After this display of Great Strategy in Action, the War Committee was subdued and appreciative. Churchill also thanked the Canadian government for the lack of recriminations on the United Kingdom's Far East policy. Australia, he hinted, had been rather abusive. 217-5
The Dominions Office had done its part toward calming Canadian storms in the unlikely event that any might arise. On 26 December 1941, the Office sent condolences and thanks to Canada for its part in Hong Kong. "The defence of Hong Kong will live in History as yet one more chapter of courage and endurance in the annals of the British Commonwealth. " 217-6 (It will live as representative of other things as well, such as thoughtlessness, crass stupidity, and short-sightedness. "History" is not as malleable as the great men tend to think it is.)
Mackenzie King, for his part, offered the condolences of the Canadian government to the people, especially to the bereaved families. He compared the defenders of the Colony to Dollard des Ormeaux and his men in their stand against the Iroquois at the Long Sault, saving Montreal at the cost of their own lives. He repeated the line about the Prince of Wales disaster and Pearl Harbor transforming the defence into a delaying action. 217-7 King's statement appeared to satisfy the Canadian people for the time being.
Meanwhile, all levels of government concerned themselves with a real effort to gain information on casualties and prisoners of war. Lawson, Hennessy, and Lyndon (the Brigade Major), were known to be dead, but the Department of National Defence had little other information. In the United Kingdom, the men of the Hong Kong garrison were simply posted as missing until definite information came in. Canada refused to adopt such a procedure however, preferring to wait for more exact information via the protecting power (Argentina) and the Red Cross. 218-8 This was very slow in coming, as the Japanese were most unco-operative. By late 1942, there were still many men unaccounted for, despite very considerable efforts directed by Lieutenant Colonel F.W. Clarke (whose son had been a Captain in the Royal Rifles of Canada). The families of some of the men became very impatient, quite understandably, and one letter writer accused the government of withholding information for political purposes. 218-9
This was not an isolated reaction, and soon the whole Hong Kong affair was being used as a political football. In February 1942, a Reverend B.C. Eckert in Welland, Ontario, charged that the King government was deliberately withholding the Hong Kong casualty lists until after the by-elections of 9 February 1942. He claimed: "Ottawa knows them, and more are buried in the blood-stained soil of Hong Kong than are in Japanese prison camps." 218-10 This was totally untrue, but there were many who were prepared to believe it.
Much of the information that did come in was contradictory and confusing. An example of this was the case of Captain H.S.A. Bush, the Staff Captain. He was originally reported to have been killed along with the other officers at Brigade Headquarters, and his wife was so informed. A message from the British Military Mission in Chungking on 30 January 1942, advised that a full stop should have come after Lyndon in the original telegram, and that Bush was only slightly wounded. Lieutenant General Stuart then "advised Mrs. Bush that we have strong reason to believe that her husband is alive." This was, in fact, the case. Bush had written the original telegram reporting the deaths of the ‘C’ Force Headquarters officers, and had thrown in his own name as slightly wounded to let his wife know he was still alive. Instead she had grieved over his death for a month. 218-11
Earlier in January 1942, the Department of National Defence announced that the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of Canada were to be reconstituted. In the case of the Royal Rifles, the 2nd Battalion went active, but the Grenadiers did not have a reserve battalion. The new 2nd Battalion, Winnipeg Grenadiers, remained a training battalion for the rest of the war, and the 2nd Battalion, Royal Rifles went to England in January 1945, with Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lamb as Commanding Officer, and Major Alan Laurie, former 1st Battalion Officer, as Second-in-Command. It was disbanded immediately upon arrival to supply reinforcements to other units. 219-12
Meanwhile, National Defence personnel were still sorting out ‘C’ Force's administrative debris. For example, the discovery that sales tax had been included in the price quoted on 52 cases of Pure Marmalade shipped on Awatea resulted in a flurry of correspondence between Headquarters and the General Officer Commanding, Pacific Command. The number and weight of boxes of bacon, cheese, and butter were also examined, and the information exchanged between the Headquarters in cables marked "Secret". 219-13
In January 1942, the British government once again asked Canada for two battalions to garrison an island colony, and the response given illustrated the fact that Canada had at least awakened to the thoughtlessness behind the despatch of the Hong Kong force, and was resolved to avoid a similar occurrence. These units were requested for the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic to prevent a possible combined German/Japanese/Argentinian attack(!). The chance of this was exceedingly remote, but the British represented it as a pressing threat. It is probable that the main motive was a desire to make a show of strength in the face of a long-standing Argentinian claim on the Falkland Islands, a situation in some ways analogous to Chiang Kai Shek's desire for Hong Kong. The Japanese were bold in January 1942, but it is difficult to see why or how they would want to attack the Falkland Islands.
Norman Robertson wrote a memo to Mackenzie King on the subject dated 16 January 1942, wherein he advised against acceptance:
The effect on Canadian public opinion of the capture of another two Canadian battalions in an isolated outpost cannot be ignored.... The public has taken the loss of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Quebec Royal Rifles with a great deal of fortitude, but some questions have been raised as to whether sufficient consideration had been given beforehand to the position in which they would be placed at Hong Kong and to the amount of support which it would be possible to give Hong Kong in case of attack.... [If Canada decides to take this on], it might be advisable to insist on having full details beforehand of plans for defence of the Islands and to have the adequacy of these examined. ... there would be little point in sending in an infantry force as lambs to the slaughter, with no air defence and a very uncertain assurance of naval defence. 219-14
If such elementary prudence had been exercised four months earlier, it could have prevented the loss of the Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadiers.
The government heeded Robertson's advice and, after some hesitation, refused the British request. As Angus Macdonald, Minister for Naval Services, said: "We have had too many examples of hopeless defences of islands without adequate air support. 220-15 The government also wished to avoid trouble with the United States, where Franklin Roosevelt and public opinion were both strongly against any signs of "imperialism".
By this time, all government hopes for a quick burial of the Hong Kong affair had been dashed, and the public, headed by George Drew, Conservative leader in the Ontario Legislature, was beginning to clamour for more facts. Drew was campaigning in the South York by-election on behalf of Arthur Meighen, the federal Conservative leader who was attempting to win a seat in the House of Commons. In a speech on 12 January 1942, Drew claimed that compulsory military service, for which the Conservatives were pressing, was absolutely necessary -witness Hong Kong. "Let us consider the most terrible example of this shortage of trained men. At the last moment, a large number of untrained men were attached to the forces leaving for Hong Kong." Drew went on to say that young men had been shoved into battle without weapon training. In a final, powerful entreaty, he cried, "What a cruel betrayal of public duty it is for anyone who knows the truth,o try to convince the Canadian people that the present system of raising men has not failed, and failed miserably." 220-16 Meighen lost the by-election to the CCF candidate, but not before Drew had unleashed a storm of controversy.
The day after Drew's speech, the newspapers (especially the Globe and Mail, whose publisher was friendly with Drew) demanded that evidence be provided to rebut Drew's statements, or the government admit their truth. Shortly after Parliament reconvened late in January 1942, Ralston, still Minister of National Defence, in a long speech dealing with ‘C’ Force, admitted that some men included in the force had not been fully trained. He claimed that the reason had not been lack of men, but lack of time and the need for secrecy. Ralston assured the House that the failure of MT to accompany the force had been investigated and action taken. 220-17
This mollified the House for a time, but the members soon scented blood, and both major opposition parties called for a parliamentary inquiry. Mackenzie King acceded to this, but later suggested a Royal Commission instead. Why the Conservatives did not put up more resistance to this old Liberal trick is a puzzle. Even though the Liberals would have outweighed them on Committee, the evidence would have been out in the open. Despite the probability that any censure of the government would be voted down, a parliamentary inquiry would have been much more to the Tories' advantage than a closed Commission. Nevertheless, they made little objection to King's suggestion.
George Drew had already shown a talent for instigating Royal Commissions. He had accused the government in 1938 of irregularities in awarding a Bren gun contract. The appointment of a Royal Commission had damped down that controversy, and the almost indigestible and incredibly dull report extinguished it altogether.
Some squabbling took place in early 1942 before the Commissioner was appointed. The Tories wanted to embarrass the government, but they wanted something else even more -evidence that the army was desperate for men. With this in mind, R.B. Hanson, acting leader of the Opposition, wrote King on 31 January, 1942, to express his anxiety that the Commission not be hamstrung by narrow terms of reference. What he wanted were terms "wide enough to enable the Chief Justice to report on the general manpower situation." 221-18 Hanson had received a draft copy of the Order-in-Council appointing the Commission with the Chief of the Supreme Court, Sir Lyman Duff, as Commissioner. To the terms of reference such as authorization, selection, and composition of the Force, Hanson wanted to add "including the whole question of trained manpower available for the expedition..." 221-19 The government ignored this suggestion and published the order without amendments.
Hanson was annoyed, as he had understood from a discussion with King, that the Prime Minister was amenable to Hanson's suggested changes. On 13 February, he wrote to King to express his disappointment. King replied that the Commissioner would look into manpower in any case, at least insofar as it had touched upon ‘C’ Force. The inquiry was to deal with Hong Kong, however, and if it became an investigation of manpower, it would be "turning the Chief Justice of Canada into an arbiter on questions involving serious political controversy." The Commission had been appointed "to put it on a plane quite above political considerations''. No amendments would therefore be made, but the government would not impinge on the Commissioner's complete freedom to wander where he would 221-20
The Liberals had succeeded in getting their Commission. They also received good publicity by appointing Sir Lyman Duff as the Commissioner. No one could raise a cry of partisanship with the Chief Justice of Canada in the chair. The Liberals pulled off another coup by appointing George Campbell, a prominent Conservative lawyer from Montreal, as Counsel for the Government. As the Liberals had taken such a high-minded attitude, Hanson at first hesitated to appoint Drew, who was only too obviously a partisan, as Counsel for the Opposition. But, as Hanson explained to another Tory MP, "Mr. Meighen just insisted on this appointment going to George Drew, and I didn't have much alternative. " 222-21
The Commission first met on Monday, 2 March 1942, and closed its hearings Tuesday, 31 March 1942. Nearly 300 exhibits were produced and over 60 witnesses called. The Commissioner conducted the hearings fairly in that he put no obstacles in the way of evidence being submitted, but as previously noted, he unfortunately heard (and for the most part believed) testimony from those with an interest in the decision of the Commission. In effect, he treated as expert evidence the testimony of the men who were being investigated, that is, the General Staff and the Office of the Controller of Transport.
Equally unfortunately, the hearings were in camera. This was only necessary for a small part of the investigation, when the telegrams between countries were produced, or when exact numbers of men were being talked about. Nothing else needed to have been hidden behind a curtain of security, and a public hearing might have resulted in a more realistic finding or a less placid acceptance of the one that was made. There was sufficient evidence presented to justify a censorious finding, and some of this was evidence presented by the General Staff itself. For instance, training manuals and circulars which stressed the importance of good training were ignored by Duff, while the very men who had produced them testified with straight faces about the overriding importance of "character". The Commissioner refused to censure the lack of weapons training of the two battalions and virtually ignored their weakness in tactical training, a weakness that was to prove very costly.
Only the Quartermaster General's Branch received any censure in the final report, and Duff knew quite well that the people involved had already been dealt with. Reproaching this Branch was merely flogging a dead horse, although this would not be evident to the average person reading the report. These men deserved more than just a mild reproof, as the presence of even a few vehicles at Hong Kong would have helped ‘C’ Force in its desperate battle, but Duff, again ignoring evidence to the contrary, refused to make a finding on whether these vehicles had been needed.
When Duff's report was published in early June, 1942, (it was delayed as Drew was unable to present his argument for some time due to illness) the government was happy, the Opposition disappointed, and Drew furious. Round One was over.
Mackenzie King sent a note to Duff, telling the Commissioner that he could not say "how greatly relieved in mind I am at the conclusions reached. I feel that no finer tribute could have been paid my colleagues in the Defence Department. This report will help to give the people of Canada a confidence in their administration which means everything to the country's war effort. " 223-22 And there perhaps lies the rub; Duff, no matter how impartial, could hardly, in mid-1942, have called into question the entire management of the war. Even a mild censure of the government's role in the affair could have had very wide political repercussions. Duff would no doubt have been prepared if necessary to do this in the case of impropriety or illegal activities on the part of government members, but not in judging the management of the war effort. That was the duty of Parliament or, in the final analysis, the electorate. The Liberals felt justifiably secure with a Commission -a few generals might be castigated but the government was safe. As it happened, even the generals escaped unscathed, except for Schmidlin.
For most Tories, that was the end of the affair, but Drew stated vehemently that the report was demonstrably false and withdrew to prepare notes to prove his case. Hanson accepted Drew's charges: "the Report nauseates me and I cannot believe it reflects the evidence." 223-23 Most of his caucus, however, were not enthusiastic about pushing the matter. Tempering their desire to cause trouble for the Liberals was the realization that proving the ministers and generals incompetent would seriously hurt the war effort. The Quebec Tories were especially sensitive to this possibility. Drew and his mentor Meighen, wished to press on, but finally Hanson decided that he would go along with the majority of the caucus and the matter was officially closed.
Drew had meanwhile been making inflammatory speeches in his most flamboyant style, one of which led to his being charged under the Defence of Canada regulations on the grounds that his speech was prejudicial to recruiting. Meighen, writing Hanson, put forward the theory that Justice Minister St. Laurent went after Drew because he "wants a set-off against his prosecution of Chaloult [an anti-war agitator]. He has had a hard struggle to find one." 224-24 There may be truth in this theory and Drew would have been a good choice -he was not exactly loved in Quebec.
The Tories once again began to smell blood, but, as Meighen had reported to Drew, acting leader Hanson was getting cold feet. On 11 July, 1942, Drew sent Mackenzie King a 32-page letter alleging that the Commissioner's findings were completely at a variance with the evidence, and outlining where and why this was so. 224-25 Copies were sent to the leaders of the three opposition parties and most major newspapers. A public uproar ensued, even though the papers had not been allowed to print sections of the letter quoting evidence heard before the Commission in camera.
Rejoicing was not universal among the Conservatives, many of whom disliked Drew. One of the latter wrote to Hanson "to express the hope that you will ignore his situation and let him stew in his own fat". 224-26 Hanson was inclined to agree. If Drew had passed the substance of the letter to the opposition members, they could have ambushed the government during the House question period and scored some valuable points. Instead the government had been furnished a plan of the Tories' attack and had promptly sat on the whole affair. King, on the advice of George Campbell, decided not to table the letter on the grounds that it would violate a promise made to the United Kingdom about keeping documents secret. 224-27 He refused to move from this position and neither the letter nor the Commission evidence was tabled. This was all the more infuriating, as all party leaders, most members of parliament, and the editors of most of the major newspapers had read the letter but were not allowed to discuss it publicly.
Hanson accused Drew of disloyalty to the party, as Drew had been appointed as Counsel for the Opposition, and certainly not, as he claimed, counsel for the "public". Drew, for his part, felt that he had been forced to act on his own because the federal Tories had been too frightened to go on. 224-28 Relations between the two men, never warm, cooled still further.
In the meantime, Drew had acquired some strange bedfellows, including CCF Member of Parliament T.C. Douglas. Douglas had given evidence at the Commission, as he knew some officers who had been posted to the Winnipeg Grenadiers. He wrote to Drew: "I had expected the Report to be whitewash, but I hardly expected the Report to read like the brief for Government Counsel." Douglas believed that Duff had turned his testimony around when including it in the report, giving it the opposite construction to that intended by Douglas. 225-29 In parliament, Douglas called the Report "preposterous", prejudiced", and "amazing", and added that if Duff had treated the rest of the evidence the way he had treated his, it was bound to be inaccurate.
The Liberals had by then decided to drop charges against Drew, but Justice Minister St. Laurent refused in parliament to apologize to Drew for charging him in the first place. The latter had been righteously indignant when he was charged, but now he was angrier still, having been deprived of his chance to stride into court like a modern Socrates and smite the hypocrites hip and thigh. Writing to St. Laurent he said, "Not having apologized for the cowardly course you followed in dropping the charges which you laid against me, at least it might have been expected that you would exercise some caution when you indulged in further slander." 225-30
Newspapers began to ask why the charges were dropped. The government announced that according to its legal advisors, the matter was before parliament and if it came before the court, it would be sub judice and therefore, parliament would be unable to discuss it. Yet, the Liberals were clearly on the defensive for a time, and their apprehension can be seen in the notes of some of their meetings. These consist to a large degree of personal attacks on Drew's character and professional conduct. 225-31 Ralston had some notes prepared to use in the House, which contain such references to Drew as, "He wormed his way into the Court Room under the pledge of secrecy" and then proceeded to tell all when the Commission's findings did not agree with his. His use of evidence heard in camera was an affront “to the honour of the Bar in this country". The United Kingdom would probably not feel the same confidence as before in passing on secret information, 225-32 There was probably some truth in this. The High Commissioner to Canada expressed his feelings very plainly in a personal letter to Mackenzie King 21 July ,1942. He even gave King advice on how best to muzzle the opposition and the press. 225-33
In the end, the Liberals just sat out the storm. They were able to plead diplomatic reasons for not tabling the evidence or Drew's letter, which contained evidence. The Commissioner's report was after all on their side, and no one could actually prove it wrong. The Conservatives themselves were not united on the issue, as some believed that national considerations outweighed political ones. They also did not relish the idea of the Chief Justice of Canada being called in effect a liar or an incompetent, and feared that this would backfire. Thus, the controversy eventually died down.
It is not too cynical, at least in this author's opinion, to say that this whole distasteful episode demonstrates that ‘C’ Force, having been sent mainly as a political gesture, was having its autopsy used for political reasons as well, even on as low a level as party in-fighting To the relatives of the men at Hong Kong, it could not have been a pretty sight.
For these people, a long and anxious wait was beginning. Atrocity stories had begun circulating, and these were confirmed by Anthony Eden in the British House of Commons on 10 March, 1942. 226-34 When the Japanese had captured Hong Kong, British and Canadian soldiers had been bayoneted, shot, and beheaded after surrendering, Asiatic and European women had been raped, and wounded soldiers murdered in their hospital beds. There was now an increasing amount of evidence to the effect that conditions in the prison camps were deplorable. The British originally wanted to withhold this information, but when confirmation came from escaped British officers, they felt they had to publish it. Periodically throughout the war, the Allies launched publicity drives concerning the Japanese treatment of prisoners of war in an attempt to get the Japanese to improve conditions, but there were no indications that these had any effect. The Japanese simply reminded the world about British atrocity stories during the First World War (for example, Bloody Boches Bayonet Belgian Babies) and claimed the current stories were a pack of lies. Meanwhile the prisoners went on dying. A total of 264 ‘C’ Force men died after the surrender.
Except for concern for the prisoners, and a very moderate amount of publicity at the time of their return, little more was publicly heard of the matter for a few years. In 1948, the Hong Kong affair was resurrected, but interest quickly petered out. This new eruption had been occasioned by the publication of General Maltby's report on operations in Hong Kong, which, even after deletions made at the request of the Canadian government, seemed to indicate that there was some truth in Drew's contentions. The report created a demand that the Commission evidence now be tabled in the House of Commons and this was done, except that the telegrams between the United Kingdom and Canada were not included. The Conservatives requested King to ask the British for these, King did, and was refused. 227-35 Drew made a personal appeal to Anthony Eden to use his influence to have the telegrams released, but was rebuffed. 227-36 The government was loath, in any case, to have the inquiry opened again. Earlier in 1948, the Minister of National Defence had asked the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes, for his comments on the Drew letter of 11 July 1942, along with the Duff report. Foulkes detailed reply (see Appendix C) was probably the first honest analysis the government had seen, and it left no doubt that ‘C’ Force had been inadequately prepared for its responsibilities. Most of the evidence was now open to the public (with the exception of the Drew letter King would not stoop to tabling it), but without the high-level telegrams, interest soon waned. This was particularly unfortunate for the Hong Kong veterans, as they were at that time making their first efforts to obtain special treatment. The revelation of the background to their plight might well have generated much-needed public interest and support.