"Two important factors have decided me to compile this report without further delay.... The first and most urgent one is the necessity for a very accurate recording of events as they occurred. This would not have been so important, but for the fact that it has become very evident that we, [the Canadians] are being blamed by the Imperial staff for the early fall of Hong Kong. And while it is not definitely known that the Imperial staff are going to adopt this attitude in their official report, every precaution must be taken to ensure that any attempt to make ‘C’ Force the scapegoat, is adequately challenged by a submission of the facts while they are still fresh in the memory.” 228-1
Lt. Col. G. Trist, Winnipeg Grenadiers
Trist, who had taken command of the Winnipeg Grenadiers after Lieutenant Colonel Sutcliffe's death in prison camp, knew whereof he spoke when he wrote these words in the summer of 1942, while the regimental diary for the period of the battle was being compiled. As the immediate post-war Canadian summary (see earlier content) commented, the strained relationships and antipathies which resulted from the issuing of orders which were impossible to execute, gave rise to mutual distrust and recrimination, with leadership, training. tactics, and even courage called into question. The British were to imply that the Canadians had played a major role in the failure to make a better defence of Hong Kong, and there can be little doubt that they genuinely believed this. Some of the implications did go into the official report, although Canadian protests forced the removal of some of the more blatant ones, and most other accounts either skate politely around them or accept them wholesale. There has never been a great deal of furore on the subject from Canadians, who seem not to realize or to care how their soldiers have been maligned. Nevertheless, as these implications are based almost entirely on either ignorance, misinterpretation, or wilful blindness to the evidence, they should be examined in the light of all the available facts to see how they stand up.
The theme-setter for the British was a Captain P.A. MacMillan, one of Maltby's staff officers who had escaped from Hong Kong when it surrendered. During his debriefing he commented on the Canadians:
...they made the most elementary tactical mistakes.... Had we in the morning of December 18 [sic] two fully trained battalions capable of carrying out the counterattacks ordered in the difficult country of Hong Kong, we might have localized Jap penetration, prevented further landings and dealt with what was already ashore. 229-2
MacMillan's statement does little more than indicate how out of the picture Fortress Headquarters really was. By the morning of 19 December, there were six battalions of Japanese ashore and established on the highest ground in the east of the Island. The various counterattacks failed simply because they were ill-conceived, unsupported, and numerically unequal to the task. MacMillan's two hypothetical battalions would have fared little better than the Canadians, even if used in a less piecemeal fashion.
The repetition of the gist of MacMillan's statement is a continuous thread running through most British post-war reports, narratives, and apologia. From the extent to which this theme permeates their writing on the subject, it is obvious that the British, ignoring the lack-lustre performance of the rest of the defence and the fact that the Canadians were more successful than any other component of the garrison whether in attack or defence, seized upon a very real Canadian weakness, their lack of training, to explain the unsuccessful defence.
Maltby's initial public statement concerning the Canadians was glowingly effusive. During an interview on Formosa just after the Japanese surrender, he declared:
I am proud that I had the honour of commanding such a gallant body of men. ...The Canadians had no time to learn the ground they had to fight over. Their primary task was seaward defence of the Island's southern shores. The odds were 6 to 1 against them, but the battle lasted 17 days. A Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers fought so magnificently, the Japs believed the sector was held by two battalions... The Royal Rifles of Canada fought gallantly in heavy gear up the steep hillsides. They fought to exhaustion after suffering heavy casualties. I want all the world to know that those boys, inexperienced as they were, fought gallantly, and those who died, died with their faces in the right direction. 230-3
Strangely enough, this was more accurate than almost anything Maltby was to say later.
Maltby compiled his official report on the Hong Kong battle in late 1945, submitting it to the War Office on 21 November 1945. As was the custom, it was to be published in the official London Gazette shortly afterward, in early 1946. Instead, it was not published until 29 January 1948. One reason for the delay was Canadian protests over part of the contents. Senior Canadian military officers and government members felt they would be in for trouble if the report were published in its original form. As Hume Wrong, the acting Under Secretary for External Affairs, wrote to Lieutenant General Foulkes, Chief of the Canadian General Staff, "Certainly the passages seem to me to be designed very effectively to re-open the Hong Kong controversy in Canada. " 230-4 With the aid of Field Marshal Montgomery, some of the offending portions were removed. It seems regrettable that these alterations were made not in order to protect the men of ‘C’ Force from unfair insinuations, but simply to shield the Canadian government from the possibility of being exposed to the hostile public criticism it so richly deserved.
In the initial draft of his report, Maltby, to do him justice, admitted that the account was compiled mostly from memory and that "memory is a fickle jade". This comment was eliminated from the published version, possibly because it might detract from its authenticity. Throughout the narrative, it is obvious that Maltby relied on his own information or that supplied by his staff. He admits in his first draft that he obtained little from other sources, including the Canadians. Information from the Japanese was not yet available at the time he wrote it. It is therefore doubly unfortunate that this report was even allowed to be published, and yet it still stands as the official story on the battle for Hong Kong, being rarely challenged. It is nonetheless valuable as a document illustrating the British impression of the Canadian role in the battle. Maltby's general comments on the Canadians in the final report are accurate as far as they go, though only lukewarm:
(b) Royal Rifles of Canada and Winnipeg Grenadiers -These two battalions proved to be inadequately trained for modern war under the conditions existing in Hong Kong. They had very recently arrived in Hong Kong after a long sea voyage, and such time as was available had been devoted to the completion of the south shore defences and making themselves au fait with and practising the problems of countering a south shore landing. In this role they were never employed and, instead, they found themselves counter-attacking on steep hillsides covered with scrub, over strange country, and as a result they rapidly became exhausted. Many individual acts of gallantry were performed, their stubborn defensive fighting at the Wong Nei Chong Gap and in the area of Mounts Cameron and Nicholson was marked, and the losses they incurred were heavy and deeply regretted. 231-5
The version Maltby had originally submitted to the War Office is far more disparaging. The first portion reads:
These two battalions proved to be inadequately trained for modern war. Though possessing first class material, this lack of training rendered them incapable of fire and movement, and consequently when launched in many local counter-attacks (and it was on these counter-attacks that the defence of the island depended), they suffered heavily and accomplished little.
The next portion is the same as the published version, with the added comment: "Ably led, well-trained and with more time available, a very different story might have been recorded. It was unfortunate that troops in this state of training were despatched to an area where a crisis might develop at any moment. " 231-6 Whether these comments were eliminated at Canadian request or not is uncertain, but there is little doubt that they reflected Maltby's true feelings. One cannot but agree with his last sentence. Unfortunately, in this report he omitted what he did mention in his first statement after the war, the enormous odds faced in these counter-attacks and the fact that the Canadians did far better than might have been expected even of well-trained troops. He never noted at any time that responsibility for the fact that the Canadians carried out these ill-conceived counter attacks lay at Fortress and Brigade level. The implication that they were not "ably led" is no doubt based on the considerable antipathy that developed between senior British and Canadian officers. All the evidence indicates that leadership on the officer and senior NCO level was at least equal and frequently superior to the rest of the garrison.
One of Maltby's first comments on the Canadians in the battle for the Island refers to an unsuccessful counter-attack on Sai Wan Fort "organized and led by an artillery officer". This is the Bumpas episode (see previous description), wherein a staff officer disrupted a prompt and possibly effective attack and substituted another which proved unsuccessful. Maltby might better have described this fiasco as "disorganized and misled by an artillery officer".
The story of the siege of Repulse Bay begins with A Company "cooperating in clearing the Hotel grounds”,when in fact they were responsible for relieving the defenders. Several times in his account of the Repulse Bay episode, Maltby includes the substance of conversations with a resident of the Hotel, but never anything from Canadian sources, and his account differs in several important respects from the records of the Royal Rifles who were there.
In describing the attack of B Company, Winnipeg Grenadiers on Mount Nicholson, Maltby initially stated that, "Artillery support had been arranged, but owing to a late start by this company, nothing was achieved, nor was the preliminary clearing of Mount Nicholson affected." Through Canadian representations, the comment about the late start was removed, as the delay had been caused by the wait for co-operation from the Royal Scots. As Doi's battalion had taken Mount Nicholson two hours before the time Maltby had set for the attack, it could hardly have succeeded in any event. Maltby does not mention the battle of that evening or the renewed assault by B Company the next morning, when this understrength company gave a Japanese battalion a very bad time and came within a hair's breadth of retaking the mountain.
This is one of the most annoying characteristics of Maltby's report. Small and insignificant actions and events executed by other units, especially those witnessed by senior officers, are recounted in great detail, but major Canadian fighting is ignored or given a brief and frequently inaccurate mention.
The sorest point with the British as far as the Winnipeg Grenadiers was concerned, was the loss of Mount Cameron. Admittedly, the loss was a most serious blow, as Mount Cameron was the key West Brigade position. Yet there is scarcely any cause for reproach. 100 Grenadiers and 30 Engineers occupied the top of a rocky feature where they could not dig in. They were bombed, shelled, and mortared for two days, and then attacked by a battalion plus a company. They fought fiercely and caused many casualties (both facts confirmed by the Japanese) before the Engineers' flank gave way, for which they can hardly be blamed. The surviving defenders destroyed their equipment and retired to avoid being surrounded.
In his published dispatch, Maltby said that Colonel Rose had reported that Mount Cameron had been lost, the troops were coming back in disorder, and an attempt was being made to rally them. There is a definite tone to Maltby's comments on the episode that indicates he thought the withdrawal unnecessary. Fortress Headquarters' ignorance of actual events was illustrated in a post-war letter from Brigadier Peffers, one of Maltby's staff officers:
Towards the end of the fighting, this battalion [Winnipeg Grenadiers) was holding a position (Mount Cameron] covering one of the gaps -Wan Chai Gap -and withdrew from its position somewhat precipitately. What caused the withdrawal I have never been able to find out. It seemed to be one of those inexplicable things which happen in war... 233-7
Acting Brigadier Rose said, immediately post-war, that he had the impression that a patrol had penetrated the line and somebody had hastily given the order to withdraw. This "patrol" was a far cry from the more than 1000 Japanese that actually made the attack.
There seems to have been an enormous amount of resentment among senior British officers over the loss of Mount Cameron. This can only be laid to their wilful and persistent refusal, then and at other stages of the battle, to believe reports in general and Canadian reports in particular, about Japanese strength and the scale of engagements. At least one Canadian officer believed that the reproaches and friction resulting from the loss of Mount Cameron contributed to Lieutenant Colonel Sutcliffe's early death in prison camp. Whether this is true is impossible to determine, but it does give an idea of the dislike and mistrust that existed.
The final straw from Maltby's point of view was probably the report that Bennet's Hill had surrendered on 25 December. This was untrue, but he reported it as fact in his post-war report.
The personality conflict and antipathy were even worse in East Brigade. After the disintegration of the Rajputs in the first hours of the invasion of the Island, Brigadier Wallis, described by one senior British officer as having a weakness for interfering with the disposition of his subordinates, was reduced to a single battalion, the Royal Rifles, on whom the success or failure of his plans was to depend. As the battle progressed, what little mutual confidence had existed between Wallis and Lieutenant Colonel Home rapidly evaporated. Wallis watched each counter-attack fizzle out in failure, while Home saw his companies decimated in futile and ill-planned attacks against impossible odds with no support. The resulting antagonism was to end in what is probably the most notorious confrontation of the battle, and one which must have done much to prejudice British opinion against the Canadians.
It must be remembered that most Canadian officers in both battalions of the rank of major or above were decorated veterans of the First World War. They had served in the Canadian Corps, probably the most efficient unit of that size on either side and one that was noteworthy, not simply for the courage of its soldiers, but for the skill and high degree of intelligence and planning shown in its operations. All of these officers had a very sound idea of the useful, the possible, and the practical, probably far more so than their British counterparts. After 20 December, Home was the senior Canadian officer, responsible not only to his local British superiors but to his men, the Canadian government, and the Canadian people. Available opinion from his officers indicates that he took these responsibilities very seriously. Sutcliffe had contacted Home several days before the surrender, to see if the latter could do anything about the way his troops were being employed, and Home, apparently, had spoken to Wallis several times on the subject.
The crisis came on the morning of 24 December. Wallis was later to state that Home, in the interview that led to the relief of the Royal Rifles in the line, demanded to speak to the Governor, saying that further resistance was useless. Wallis claimed to have then told Home,that Maltby could not be ignored in that way, and gave him the choice of fighting on or marching out under a white flag. Home decided to adopt neither course, talked to Maltby, and the relief was arranged. 234-8
Wallis' version is flatly denied by the Canadians at Stanley, who state that capitulation or a separate withdrawal was never discussed, but only the subject of relief for the exhausted Rifles. Bitter protests were made to Maltby during captivity when the Wallis story became known. When it is considered that Home agreed to put one of his companies in the line again after four hours' rest and committed another, albeit after protest, to a suicidal attack in which he had no confidence on the afternoon of 25 December, it appears far more likely, to this author at least, that the Canadian version of the story is the accurate one. Wallis was under tremendous strain and may well, in retrospect, have interpreted Home's request as desire to surrender, particularly if he knew Home's opinion of operations to date.
Whatever the truth of the matter, Wallis' version received wide credence and poisoned still further the relations between British and Canadians. In its most exaggerated form, British prejudice against the Canadians led to the assertion that their lack of training and low morale made them a liability in battle, was directly responsible for several major debacles, and led to the early fall of the Island. The equivalent Canadian opinion was that the British were incompetent, expected the Canadians to do most of their fighting for them, and, when they failed to do the impossible, used them as scapegoats.
Expressing the British opinion in its most virulent form is one Tim Carew, many of whose statements anent the Canadians in his two books The Fall of Hong Kong and Hostages to Fortune 235-9, are sufficient to bring every man of C Force to his feet shouting, "It's a damned lie!" For example:
The Winnipeg Grenadiers and Royal Rifles of Canada were not called upon to put their valour to the test in a counter-attack role because the Canadian contingent as a whole had ceased to exist as a cohesive force -leaderless, dispirited, demoralized and exhausted, they had scattered to the four corners of the island: some sought solace in sleep, others in looted liquor. Others, again, were fastened upon avidly by unit commanders and were coerced and cajoled, sometimes at gunpoint into fighting again.
This is as of 20 December 1941, when both Canadian battalions had been involved in, and would continue to be almost wholly responsible for, the major counterattacks of the campaign. Writing of the prisoner-of-war period, Carew portrays the British as stoical, cheerful soldiers, while the Canadians skulk around, paralized by their own lethargy. Space precludes the otherwise simple task of making a point-by-point refutation of Carew's comments. The only reason for not treating them with the contempt they deserve by ignoring them completely is that both books have had a wide distribution and have therefore been responsible for the sole knowledge many people have of the Canadians at Hong Kong.
It is unlikely that the British tendency to fix a large portion of the responsibility for the early fall of the Island of Hong Kong on the lack of fighting ability and spirit of the Canadians is a deliberate Machiavellian ploy to excuse their own shortcomings, such as is so often attributed to the minions of "perfidious Albion" by a sizable school of historical authors. However, it is no less worthy of refutation, simply because its origin and basis lie in ignorance rather than dishonesty. Fortunately, the total available evidence is more than sufficient to do so.