Although the final decision to agree to the request by the United Kingdom Government was not made until 20 October 1941, the Canadian General Staff had commenced preparations well before that date to select the two battalions that would be required in the event of a positive response.
The selection process was set in motion on 23 September by Colonel W.H.S. Macklin, Director of Staff Duties, who soon produced a memo on the subject. As one criterion that he considered vital in making the selection was that "units farthest advanced in training should be given preference", 44-1 he requested Colonel J.K. Lawson, Director of Military Training, to prepare a list of battalions within Canada in order of training level. Lawson duly produced the list the next day. There were 26 battalions currently serving in Canada and Newfoundland and these were divided into three categories. The first category, Class A, contained those furthest advanced in training and consisted of the nine battalions of the 4th Division, which was earmarked for transfer overseas in the next year, and one battalion in Newfoundland. Of the seven battalions in the intermediate Class B, four were in the newly-formed 6th Division and three were employed on Coast Defence duties. Class C was composed of nine battalions "those units which, due either to recent employment or insufficient training, are not recommended by DMT to be available for operational consideration at the present time." 44-2
Macklin, after examining the list, noted that if any of the Class A battalions from the 4th Division were selected to go to Hong Kong they "could be replaced, in most cases, by units from the same area". Macklin was referring to the policy of having major Canadian formations contain units representing a reasonable geographical cross-section of the country. He also suggested the General Officer Commanding 4th Division should be consulted before any steps were taken. Macklin proposed two alternatives for selecting the Hong Kong units. The first was to choose two battalions from the 4th Division: one from the East, one from the West. The second alternative included four battalions from Colonel Lawson's Class B, from which the two for Hong Kong could be chosen. Units from Class C were not mentioned at all. 45-3
The first alternative was sent to Major General L.F. Page, General Officer Commanding 4th Division, for his comments. He replied in a memo strongly urging that the units not be taken from his Division. He argued that training would be disrupted at the Brigade level as one or more Brigades would have units of different levels of training. Moreover, taking two of his battalions would be very bad for morale, as his men would believe the Division was being broken up and would not go overseas at all. Class B battalions, he felt, would be just as well trained as any from the 4th Division. If, despite this, two 4th Division units were to go, Page reluctantly recommended that the British Columbia Regiment and either the Canadian Grenadier Guards or the Irish Regiment of Canada be chosen. 45-4
An officer such as Page who has devoted a great deal of energy and planning to creating a fighting formation cannot be accused of rationalization when he resists any attempt to dismember it-he has excellent reasons. Whether these reasons should prevail against higher policy is not for him to judge. Certainly the arguments of the 4th Division's Commander must have carried some weight, as he was not required to give up any of his battalions. After Page's reply was received, the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of Canada were selected from Class C. In other words, Macklin's second alternative, the battalions in Class B, appears to have been completely ignored.
On 30 September 1941 Major General Crerar submitted his recommendation to the Minister of National Defence. Outlining his reasons for choosing the Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadiers, he wrote, "As these units are going to a distant and important garrison where they will be detached from Canadian forces, a primary consideration is that they should be efficient, well-trained battalions capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion in any circumstances.” It would be unsound, he said, to "disrupt" the 4th Division, and it seemed to him best to select units from among those on Coast Defence duty or from the 6th Division. In recommending the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, General Crerar wrote:
10. As you know, these units returned not long ago from duty in Newfoundland and Jamaica respectively. The duties which they there carried out were not in many respects unlike the task which awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The experience they have will therefore be of no small value to them in their new role. Both are units of proven efficiency.
11. In my opinion, the balance of argument favours the selection of these two battalions. I would be very reluctant to allot them indefinitely to a home defence role as the effect on their morale, following a period of "semi- overseas" responsibilities would be bound to be adverse. The selection represents both Eastern and Western Canada. In the case of the Royal Rifles, there is also the fact that this battalion, while nominally English-speaking, is actually drawn from a region overwhelmingly French-speaking in character and contains an important proportion of Canadians of French descent. 46-5
Ralston approved his Chief of General Staff's recommendation on 9 October.
On the face of it the process of selection of these two battalions exhibits at least one startling inconsistency. Their inclusion in Class C was presumably because the Director of Military Training considered (and with good reason) that they "required a period of refresher training". Nevertheless, Crerar proposed sending them back into what he considered (at least in his recommendation to the Minister) a situation that was to be largely identical to the one from which they had just emerged and which had produced this need for training. This renders farcical the Director of Staff Duties' recommendations that the most well-trained units be given priority, the Director of Military Training's arrangement of units by training level, and the Chief of General Staff's own statement that the units should be "well-trained".
There is some evidence, however, that other factors may have been involved in the selection of the Royal Rifles of Canada as one of the two battalions for Hong Kong. They were a Quebec City regiment, and the Honorable C.G. Power, Associate Minister of National Defence, represented a Quebec City riding and had a son in the Regiment. Major John H. Price, the Royal Rifles' Second-in-Command, was an old friend of Power as were many of the other officers. On 13 September 1941, Price wrote to Power telling him that the unit was most anxious to get into a larger formation and participate in "advanced and collective training..... I hope that, with the interest you have in our welfare, you will be willing and able to convince the military authorities that it is bad policy to keep a unit like ours just killing time…”
Power replied 22 September 1941 that he had "made inquiries" into the future of the unit as he knew the regiment would soon be fed up. "I have made certain representations and will continue to do so....I have some hope that events overseas may soon develop to the point where it will be possible for your lot to have the opportunity it deserves."
Price was somewhat mollified, and writing back on 1 October 1941, said he realized, as did the rest of the battalion, that "there is a lack of battlefields at the moment. Our main problem is that of training and it would be of tremendous assistance if we could be sent to some area where advanced training is possible..." 47-6
Did C.G. Power exert his influence when the battalions were being chosen? Mackenzie King, in his diary on 19 December 1941 when Hong Kong was under siege, wrote:
Those who have been so keen to send our forces overseas realise the kind of reaction likely to follow in the country where losses occur, and the danger draws nearer to our own shores. It was Power himself who was keenest on having the Quebec Regiment go, he mentioning at the time that his own son was a member of it. 47-7
It seems highly likely that soon after Power's reply to Price the Royal Rifles of Canada were earmarked for Hong Kong. In that event it would have been awkward to send a battalion from the 4th Division as the other half of the force. The Winnipeg Grenadiers, with similar experience in a garrison role, would most nearly match the Royal Rifles in its standard of training, and so was the battalion selected.