No Reason Why (Second Edition)

No Reason Why

—an analysis

The Canadian soldiers who fought at Hong Kong in December 1941 and either died in the hopeless struggle or else passed into a brutal and all too often fatal captivity, are the possessors of a unique distinction. They are the only Canadian soldiers and possibly the only Commonwealth soldiers of the Second World War who were deliberately sent into a position where there was absolutely no hope of victory, evacuation, or relief. In all other disasters to British arms such as Norway, France in 1940, Greece, Crete, Singapore, and Arnhem, one or another of these possibilities existed. For example, more or less successful evacuations were achieved in the first four, reinforcements were reaching Singapore until a few days before its capitulation, while Arnhem was a calculated gamble which, if successful, offered the prospect of an early victory. Even the greatest debacle in which Canadians played a major role, the bloodstained tragedy that was the Dieppe raid, was, while open to criticism of its conception, planning, and execution, nevertheless designed to permit the evacuation of the raiding forces.

But what of Hong Kong? Admitted by most informed opinion (including the men who requested that Canadian troops be sent) to be incapable of a prolonged and successful defence, was there any reason why nearly two thousand Canadians should have been caught up in the bloody shambles that marked its fall?

Of the British actors in the drama, Major General A.E. Grasett was the only one who appears to have honestly believed that an additional two battalions would markedly upgrade Hong Kong's ability to resist assault. His belief was unfortunately based on a contempt for Japanese military ability, a fixed determination to "put up a good show", and remarkably poor powers of military appreciation. Even Brooke-Popham, who was willing to reinforce the colony by taking two battalions from Malaya, was impelled primarily by political and diplomatic reasoning rather than military logic.

It is difficult to avoid a grudging admiration for the British Chiefs of Staff and the War Office in the Hong Kong situation. However, their judgement may be faulted in other respects, and whatever one may think of their actual motives for requesting Canadian reinforcements for the colony, they were one hundred percent correct in their opinion of the indefencibility of Hong Kong. They considered that there was no possibility of a successful defence until relief could be expected; they therefore had resolved to treat it as an outpost, they had held to this opinion for a number of years, and at no time changed their minds, even after the Canadians were on their way. Events were to prove them absolutely right.

There is abundant evidence to show that the despatch of the Canadians did not alter the policy of regarding Hong Kong as an outpost in the slightest. On 5 November, while the Canadians were still en route, the Chiefs of Staff became perturbed at indications that the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, considered that these reinforcements indicated a change in policy toward Hong Kong. They soon put him straight:

War Office
to
C in C Far East
6 November 1941

1. Our policy regarding defence of Hong Kong remains unaltered. It must be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible. 36-1

Herein lies the mystery. Precisely what happened at the War Office between 3 and 9 September 1941 during Grasett's visit? It is obvious from Kennedy's cancelled draft memo to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that they were all set to give his proposals as short shrift as they gave those made by his superior, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, eight months earlier. Grasett failed to convince them of Hong Kong's defencibility, and all reasons subsequently given for requesting the despatch of reinforcements had been considered earlier and deemed insufficient. What new elements could Grasett have introduced to have made the Chiefs of Staff reverse their stand? The only possible one is Grasett's suggestion that the two battalions might be obtained from a "hitherto unregarded source" 37-2-Canada.

The desirability of Canadian reinforcements was at first viewed a little sceptically (see earlier chapter "the British request"), especially as the War Office was well aware that any troops supplied by Canada would not be fully trained. It would appear that the political and morale advantages of the reinforcement, plus the fact that the United Kingdom did not have to supply the troops, won the day and prompted the cancellation of Kennedy's original memo.

Perhaps the most completely frank explanation is a War Office document dated 1 January 1942 which states:

It was probably the first two reasons given that most influenced Winston Churchill in the reversal of the position he had taken so strongly in January 1941. He was most anxious to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States in their confrontation with the Japanese, and this was one more way of showing Roosevelt that the Commonwealth was doing its part. Presumably Churchill, in his eagerness to do this, either forgot the risk to the garrison or considered it worth taking.

The telegram to Canada requesting the troops stated that the "approved policy had been that Hong Kong should be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible in the event of war in the Far East." It may be regarded as nit-picking, but it appears important to this writer that this was phrased in the past tense-the sentence gives the impression that the outpost policy is no longer the official one. One cannot but wonder if the alteration was made with deliberate intent. In any event, the Canadians never thought to ask the British whether Hong Kong was still an outpost or whether the policy regarding it had been changed.

The telegram went on to say that the position in the Far East was changing and Malayan defences were improved. Also, "there have been signs of a certain weakening in Japan's attitude towards us and the United States." This was not what Foreign Minister Anthony Eden thought, as a telegram received in Canada the next day (20 September) showed. The British Ambassador to Tokyo had written that Japan was moving away from the Axis and the moderates were gaining control. Eden replied that the Japanese loss of faith in the Tripartite Pact was merely the result of doubts of its being the best means to their established end-expansion. The "moderates" in Japan were those who questioned only the methods being used and not the final end in view. The United States and United Kingdom had to keep up a strong front, as it would be folly to give up anything in the expectation of a serious Japanese offer of a settlement of outstanding differences. Eden was very sceptical about any Japanese interest in making concessions in a search for peace. 38-4. In reality, then, there was no "weakening" in the Japanese attitude, and the United States and Japan were as far apart as ever in the Washington talks. The United Kingdom government was perfectly aware that the talks were going nowhere.

It was said that the two battalions would increase the strength of the garrison out of all proportion to the actual numbers involved. We have seen this phrase before. The reinforcement would "reassure Chiang Kai Shek as to the reality of our intention to hold the Island." A more accurate phrase might have been that used by the War Office in the memorandum of 1 January 1942 quoted earlier, "show Chiang Kai Shek", considering the long-standing desire of the Chinese to obtain possession of the Colony. Hong Kong had been something of a bone of contention between China and the United Kingdom since before the start of the Second World War. One of the main arguments against the earlier proposed demilitarization was that it would be hard for the United Kingdom to repossess the Colony after the war if it were given up without a fight. One may even go as far as to ask against whom the United Kingdom had the "intention of holding the Island", as all previous defence schemes made it plain that it was not expected that Hong Kong would be able to withstand a determined Japanese assault. It is probable that, as well as the immediate reasons for reinforcement, there was a very real determination on Britain's part to keep control of the Island on a long-term basis. If this is true, it is a pity that she used Commonwealth troops in her bid to accomplish this end.

Nevertheless, the politicians in Canada had the final word. They based their decision on two sources of information only-the statement of the United Kingdom that troops were required and it would be desirable that Canada supply them, and the advice of the Canadian Chief of the General Staff that it was militarily feasible to supply the battalions and that Canada should accept the commitment. These statements, and a strong and genuine desire that Canada play her part in the war, led to a practically unquestioning, positive response to the request.

The politicians had thus made their decision. What of the role of Major General Crerar, the Chief of the General Staff? His duties included "military policy and strategy" and "advice as to the conduct of operations of war and orders in regard to military operations,” 39-5 as well as intelligence. He had, in effect, "advised" the government when asked by Ralston and Power for his opinion. One may, however, question the adequacy of his attempt to consider all aspects of the decision. We have seen that he had had conversations with the ex-General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong a few months before, yet other than this Crerar made absolutely no attempt to inform himself on the situation at Hong Kong, preferring to rely, in toto, on the opinions of his old RMC comrade. The relevant material was available to the Canadian General Staff. Lieutenant Colonel William Murray, who was responsible for the collection and distribution of this type of information, was not asked for any summary of intelligence relating to Hong Kong. Brigadier Gibson, who as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence was Murray's immediate superior, also testified at the Royal Commission hearings that his Branch had not been asked for any information. 39-6 In other words, the military authorities displayed a noticeable indifference to the actual military situation in the colony.

Crerar did not concentrate on this aspect of the request in any event when he made his Royal Commission deposition. He felt that:

the decision for or against the despatch... [was] necessarily required to be taken on the highest policy level. The proposed action, whatever the military risks of the enterprise, needed to be examined from the broad view as to its contributory value to the eventual winning of the war. [He then quoted the example of the British despatch of troops to Greece in 1940.] In the case of the despatch of Canadian troops to Hong Kong... political and moral principles were involved, rather than military ones, and on such a basis, the matter required to be considered and decided by the War Committee of the Cabinet. 39-7

This evasion of responsibility would undoubtedly have caused Pontius Pilate to send out for a second washbasin. General Crerar was, of course, entitled to his own opinion, but he seems to have forgotten in this instance that his job was to give military, not political or moral advice. Once politicians know all the facts they make their decision, and often it is quite properly the moral and political factors which win out over the military, as was the case in the example of Greece. The difference lies in the fact that the British government was well aware of the dangers inherent in the Greek expedition but accepted the risk for political reasons. The Canadian government most definitely did not take into consideration the risks involved in sending troops to Hong Kong, because they neither asked nor were told about them. In effect, Crerar usurped their jobs by failing to make it plain to the politicians that the military risks were very real, even when Ralston specifically questioned him on this point. Despite Grasett's optimism, Crerar, with his wide experience, must have been well aware that Hong Kong, even if not in a hopeless position, could be expected to bear the brunt of a very heavy attack in the event of war, with no chance of relief for a considerable period. If he wished his memory refreshed, reasonably up-to-date information was available at National Defence Headquarters or from the British. Even Power and Ralston were vaguely aware that Hong Kong was in an exposed position, but in the absence of any definite information from the top military advisor to the government, they presumably assumed that the situation was not all that bad.

Crerar, moreover, in his written testimony sent to the Commission, went on to state that "the question posed in Telegram No. 162 [the request]... required from me a statement as to whether Canada could provide two battalions to assist in the defence of Hong Kong…” 40-8 This is a rather narrow contraction on Crerar's part of his responsibilities. In the light of the statement of his duties quoted earlier, the telegram required from him an effort to study the situation, work out the pros and cons, and outline these to the politicians so that they could make a decision based on all the relevant information. The Chief of the Canadian General Staff was surely expected to do more than just scout around for two extra battalions.

It is difficult, even in retrospect, to know what to make of Crerar's attitude. He had the reputation of being a man of integrity and a competent soldier. He was later to lead the First Canadian Army to victory in Northwest Europe. While there is little point in imputing motives from this distance in time, it is possible that even if he was suffering under the lash of his conscience for his negligence in the Hong Kong affair, he felt that as he was doing a good job in other respects, there was no point in crying mea culpa and he should be permitted to get on with the war without raking up the dead bones of past sins of omission.

Lieutenant General Stuart, Crerar's successor as Chief of the General Staff, also testified at the Royal Commission. His testimony made it abundantly clear that the General Staff did have access to Hong Kong defence plans. He mentioned some aspects of them in considerable detail. He did not say, however, what the gist of these plans was except to say that the garrison would be "in for a hard time" in the event of war. According to Stuart, to defend "as long as possible" was just a standard army phrase- "there is no futility about the thing". 41-9

General McNaughton, commanding the Canadian forces in England, was also informed about the sending of the troops to Hong Kong. Although he had no responsibility in the matter, he testified at the hearings. McNaughton "took for granted that the wording of the cable was something which could not be refused." He went on to explain later the situation in regard to such a proposal: "They [the War Office] were the only group, the only organization, able really to assess the situation, and, as we trusted their judgement, it was up to us either to reply in the affirmative, or to refuse.” 41-10

The final effect of the Canadian General Staff's attitude to the problem was therefore a failure to submit to the government for their consideration one of the primary pieces of information involved with the Hong Kong question-that "it has always been well-known in the Services that there would be considerable difficulties in defending Hong Kong, which presumably had obviously increased by the proximity of the Japanese forces before the war started." 41-11

Both the British and United States governments had plenty of information at their disposal in September 1941 to show that war in the Far East was virtually inevitable sooner or later. Despite occasional "weakening" on Japan's part, she never once, after 1931, made any real concessions in her dealings with other Powers. The oft-stated aim of every Japanese government, whether "moderate" or otherwise, was expansion in the Pacific area, and after the mid-thirties this expansion began to take an increasingly southward direction. This was natural and obvious, for despite Japan's hatred and fear of Russia, her real economic interest lay in the oil, rubber, and tin of the south.

In regard to the position of Hong Kong, it had been recognized as early as 1921 that the colony would be in grave danger in the event of war with Japan. This was during a period when England had no military worries about Germany, when Japan had a much smaller navy, and when England still ruled the waves. The deterioration of the British position vis-a-vis Japan over the next two decades could only serve to reinforce this conclusion. When Japanese troops and air forces reached a position within a few miles of the Island it became difficult to see how the defensive position could get much worse. This was common knowledge in military circles throughout the Commonwealth, and, to do the British Chiefs of Staff justice, they were well aware of this and were at no time prey to any false illusions.

While there was therefore never any change in the military policy regarding Hong Kong, Britain was determined by September 1941 to present a solid front with the United States against Japan, and also to demonstrate to the Chinese that Britain was still a force to be reckoned with in Asian affairs. There was undoubtedly as well a notion that the current Hong Kong garrison was inadequate to put up the kind of resistance called for by the plans. None of these factors by themselves or in combination was sufficient to persuade the British to reinforce the colony, but they were powerful enough when it was suggested that two battalions could be made available from a "hitherto unregarded source" that the British government abandoned a long-standing military policy based on a succession of intelligent appreciations of the situation, and two Canadian battalions became the most exposed pieces in a giant game of bluff.

In Canada, the situation was even simpler. Neither the politicians, lulled by the probably deliberate ambiguous wording of the request, nor Crerar, who appears to have accepted Grasett's beliefs wholeheartedly, thought to obtain either from the British government or from their own sources of information (which were perfectly adequate in this case) the answer to the question: "If war comes, as it likely will, what will be the fate of Hong Kong and of our soldiers?" The only honest answer to such a query would have been, "All our appreciations of the situation, including the current one, indicate that Hong Kong almost certainly will fall before it can be relieved and the garrison will either be killed fighting or be taken prisoner." While it is remotely conceivable that a Canadian government under the Liberals and led by Mackenzie King would be willing to cold-bloodedly immolate 2,000 Canadians on the altar of either Imperial solidarity or Far Eastern defence, it does severely strain one's concept of the possible.

Once having received the request, the Canadian government seems to have assumed that, provided the battalions were available, an affirmative answer was the only one possible. To these busy and sincere men, with neither the knowledge needed nor the inclination to read between the lines or wonder about motivations, the telegram made sense, and unless there were sound military reasons for questioning the request, a yes was automatic. There were sound military reasons for questioning it, but the Chief of the General Staff did not pass these reasons on to the government.

There was no reason why Canadian troops should have been despatched to the doomed outpost of Hong Kong-but through a combination of British cynicism and Canadian thoughtlessness, they were sent anyway.