One of the greatest sources of controversy concerning the Canadian involvement in the defence of Hong Kong is the state of training and equipment of the two battalions of C Force, and there can be no question that the degree to which they fell short of an acceptable standard in these categories, or if they fell short at all, is of major importance.
A Canadian infantry battalion up to its full war establishment consisted, in August 1941, of 799 all ranks, made up, in theory, of 32 officers, 45 warrant officers, staff sergeants, and sergeants, 72 corporals and lance sergeants, and 650 privates and lance corporals. Under wartime conditions, however, this rank structure was far from universally observed. In addition each battalion had a medical officer, a paymaster, six men from the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (armourer, shoemaker, and four motor vehicle fitters), and, usually, a chaplain and his driver.
The battalion was broken down into Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and four rifle companies, normally designated as A, B, C, and D Companies.
Battalion Headquarters' strength was 55 all ranks. These included the battalion's Commanding Officer (usually a lieutenant colonel), the Second-in-Command (usually a major), the Adjutant, the Regimental Sergeant Major, and intelligence, military police, and medical personnel.
All companies were commanded by a major or captain and possessed a Company Sergeant Major. The Headquarters Company consisted of a small Company Headquarters (6 all ranks) and six specialist platoons. They were the Signal Platoon (36 all ranks), the Anti-Aircraft Platoon with four twin Bren guns (18 all ranks), the Mortar Platoon with six 3-inch mortars in Universal Carriers (46 all ranks), the Carrier Platoon with 13 Universal Carriers (64 all ranks), the Pioneer Platoon (22 all ranks), and the Administration Platoon with transport, ordnance stores, and technical personnel.
The four rifle companies were the backbone of the battalion. Each of these companies had a strength of 123 all ranks, made up of a 12-man Company Headquarters which included the Company Commander and the Company Second-in-Command (usually a captain), and three 37-man platoons. Each platoon was normally commanded by a lieutenant or second lieutenant. This Platoon Commander was assisted by the Platoon Sergeant.
There were three 10-man sections within the platoon. For battle, each section was tactically organized into an eight-man rifle group under the Section Commander (a corporal) and a two-man Bren group with a single Bren light machine-gun. The section, with its two mutually supporting groups, was the smallest tactical unit in the battalion.
The full war establishment of a battalion called for 31 bicycles and 102 motor vehicles. These latter consisted of 27 motorcycles, 2 station wagons, 1 light car, 37 fifteen-hundredweight trucks, 13 three-ton trucks, and 21 tracked Universal Carriers. By far the greater part of these vehicles were with the Battalion Headquarters or with Headquarters Company-at the lowest level each platoon had one fifteen-hundredweight truck. Most of the vehicles were devoted to material rather than men. It was still an army of footsloggers-when on the move, unless extra transport was provided from outside the battalion, the official establishment laid down that 308 men rode vehicles or bicycles while the other 491 walked!
In the quality of its weaponry, the Canadian infantry battalion was, with few exceptions, well up to the standard of any of its allies or opponents. The main personal weapon was the Lee-Enfield No.1 Mk.3 bolt-action rifle, of .303 calibre, the same weapon that had served through the First World War. In using a rifle of this vintage the Commonwealth forces were in no way at a disadvantage. All the major combatants saw out the Second World War largely armed with one version or another of their 1914-1918 rifles, with the exception of the United States, whose army converted in 1942 to a semi-automatic rifle that offered a slight increase in firepower at the sacrifice of simplicity and freedom from mechanical problems. The Lee-Enfield was a rugged and accurate weapon that, in well-trained hands, could deliver a surprising volume of fire for a bolt-action rifle.
The Bren .303 light machine-gun used by Canada was one of the British Army's more inspired acquisitions and was, arguably, the finest weapon of its class on either side during the Second World War. Though incapable of delivering the incredible stream of fire of the German MG34 and MG42 belt-fed weapons, in accuracy, ruggedness, and ease of maintenance it transcended all its contemporaries. There were three Brens in each rifle platoon, one per section, plus 13 in the Carrier Platoon. The Bren was a simple weapon to use, but considerable practice was required for the instinctive operation necessary in battle.
Submachine-guns were just beginning to be standard equipment in the Commonwealth forces, and 42 were found in the 1941 version of the Canadian infantry battalion. Most were in the rifle platoons where the corporal commanding each section carried one. They were Thompson .45-calibre weapons, the notorious "Tommy guns". Not particularly accurate, they were capable of delivering a heavy volume of fire and were effective weapons at close quarters.
Another personal weapon was the hand grenade. While it did not occupy the prominent position during the Second World War that it did in the earlier conflict with its trench warfare, the grenade was still an extremely useful weapon and the only effective way of reaching an enemy behind cover at close range. Of course, a great deal of practice was necessary to hurl these 1 1/2-pound missiles with confidence and accuracy.
A weapon found at the platoon level was the 2-inch mortar. Each platoon had one and it served as the platoon commander's reserve of fire with which he could bring down explosive and smoke shells to support his attack or defence. This uncomplicated high-angle weapon was not difficult to operate, but much training and practice was required to achieve any degree of accuracy with it.
Two other types of weapon were scattered through the battalion. One was the Boys .55-calibre anti-tank rifle, a shoulder-held weapon with a horrendous kick. Useless against most modern armoured vehicles, it was effective against older light tanks and armoured cars, but played little part in the fighting in Hong Kong. The other was the .38 revolver carried by the officers, who frequently discarded it in battle at the earliest opportunity in favour of something more lethal, preferably a Thompson gun.
The 3-inch mortars of the mortar platoon were the battalion commanders' main source of firepower and these useful and accurate weapons could blanket a substantial area with explosives or smoke in a surprisingly short time. However, the same stricture applied as with the smaller 2-inch version-simple to operate, their crews still required practice and training to attain accuracy. Because of the weight of these weapons (125 pounds), to say nothing of the weight of their ammunition (each round weighed 10 pounds), they were carried into action on Universal Carriers, although they could, if necessary, be broken down into three components to facilitate man-handling. They could be fired from the carriers as well as from ground positions.
The carriers were lightly-armoured, tracked vehicles, used, in the case of the Carrier Platoon, for reconnaissance and to bring a rapid reinforcement of personnel or firepower to any point. At this period they were armed with a single Bren, hence the common terminology of "Bren Carrier".
There were no medium or heavy machine-guns with the unit as these were concentrated in special machine-gun battalions. The twin Brens in the anti-aircraft platoon were not particularly effective against aircraft as their rate of fire was rather slow for that purpose, but, should they be brought to bear on enemy infantry, they could be devastating.
To employ this rather complicated organization or any portion thereof in the field with any degree of success required an enormous amount of practice and training. Even at the lowest tactical level, that of the ten or fewer men in the rifle section, the successful interlocking employment of the rifles and Bren groups with mutual support and perfect co-ordination in so much as a simple "fire and movement" advance was far less simple than it might seem to the layman. It required a degree of instinctive reaction and confidence that could only be acquired through repetition under varied circumstances. When one realizes the additional complications inherent in employing the three sections of a platoon, then the four platoons of a company, and then the entire battalion with its internal supporting weapons and equipment, all in the face of enemy opposition, to say nothing of the necessity of co-ordination with friendly troops and with what artillery, armour, and air support are available, the full dimensions of training start-but only just start-to become apparent.