Perhaps the greatest single amount of testimony given at the Royal Commission hearing dealt with the actual state of training of the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers in October 1941. The evidence taken was varied, and conflicting opinions were expressed. It is hardly surprising that the Commissioner could have found considerable justification for his conclusion that both units were reasonably well trained. Much of the evidence, however, pointed to the contrary, and evidence available since the war has tended to confirm the latter view.
One of the difficulties associated with this topic is the lack of hard information. When a training report says that "Bren gun instruction was carried out", this may often apply only to one company, one platoon, or even one section. Perhaps the only solid evidence would be the percentage of men in each battalion that had carried out standard tests on the different weapons. This evidence is difficult to locate, and when it is available, it normally refers to TOET's-Tests of Elementary Training. This data is useful, but in a negative way, as these are the simplest tests of all and are carried out before a man so much as fires one shot with a particular weapon. If we find, as we do, that not all of the men in the battalions had even done TOET's on the rifle, let alone the Bren or mortars, it gives some idea as to the actual state of training. An even more serious handicap in the actual battle was the lack of training in the support weapons-mortars, anti-tank rifles, Brens, et cetera, as well as the lack of experience in tactical manoeuvres. This last deficiency was to cost them many lives when the fighting began.
With regard to the actual selection of the battalions, it should be noted that the two chosen were in Class C. Those listed in Class A were certainly not regarded as perfectly trained either, but only as "sufficiently advanced to enable them to be despatched abroad and continue their training independently". The Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadiers were two classes behind this category.
The Winnipeg Grenadiers were the earlier mobilized of the two units. They had had a reasonable amount of training before going to Jamaica, especially in the Vickers machine-gun. This was ironic, as when they were redesignated a rifle battalion and ceased to be a machine-gun unit, all Vickers guns were handed in and never re-issued. Unfortunately, their stay at Jamaica was under such conditions as to seriously hamper training. A War Diary entry for October 1940 notes: "Due to duties and sickness only 100 men were available to train - 50 at Up Park Camp, 50 at Newcastle." Almost all of this was individual training on weapons with no firing involved. One company was detached to Newcastle Camp in the hills for one month at a time to train, but it does not appear that many section, platoon, or company exercises were carried out. When sickness became widespread, men had to be brought down from Newcastle to fill guard duty commitments around the harbour and town of Kingston.
In March 1941, each company began, in turn, a two-week course in tactical training at a specially constructed camp at Montpelier. The first week of the training, however, still concentrated on individual subjects. Section and platoon training took place in the second week. Two company exercises were carried out.
In July 1941, two mock general alerts were staged. The first was not particularly successful, the second went a bit better. If enthusiasm was lacking, it was quite possible because the troops were never turned out with ammunition.
The Battalion's only experience of air attack was just before it left Jamaica. Two old and slow RAF aircraft carried out a mock attack on the column as it marched to the ship. The men stayed in bunches, all on one side of the road - "Casualties estimated as high". The men also had trouble following the aircraft with their weapons. 58-1
Lieutenant Colonel Sutcliffe submitted a detailed report on the state of training of his battalion when he returned to Winnipeg in September. Individual training in the main infantry weapons had reached the TOET level. Some tactical training, but no range work, was done with the Bren gun and the Boys anti-tank rifle. Bayonet work was taught but without an assault course. As far as the handling of Thompson guns, 2-inch mortars, and 3-inch mortars, as well as grenades, was concerned, almost nothing had been done due to the scarcity or total absence of these weapons. The Anti-Aircraft Platoon had been trained up to but not including firing, the Mortar Platoon had hardly been trained at all, and the Carrier Platoon had done neither tactical nor drill training. The Signal Platoon was reported as trained, but no personnel from the rifle companies had been taught. The Pioneer Platoon was trained and trade tested. Cooking, dispatch riding, and Mechanical Transport training schools had all been held. Sutcliffe also noted that the 75 recruits sent to him in June appeared to be extremely raw. They were put in a special class and had reached the sixth week of their course by the time of embarkation.
In summary, Sutcliffe said that while garrison duties were onerous, "the many and varied duties did however furnish both the officers and OR's with a far more extensive general training than this report would indicate.... Morale, discipline, and esprit de corps has been maintained at a very high level." 59-2 General Stuart, in his testimony before the Commission, also claimed that the Winnipeg Grenadiers, because of their service in Jamaica, had learned to be self-reliant. They were the only troops there, and had done their job very effectively for over a year. They had, in addition, become acclimatized to the subtropics. 59-3
Interpreting the Winnipeg Grenadiers' training report, Lieutenant Colonel Graham, the Officer Commanding an Advanced Training Centre at Winnipeg, stated at the Commission, that the Winnipeg Grenadiers rifle training appeared to have reached, but did not include, actual field firing with machine-gun support. He also said that judging from the report the men sent to the Winnipeg Grenadiers in October 1941, and the Grenadiers themselves would not have been capable of using mortars in combat. 59-4
A corporal, W.J. Middleton, who had been with the Winnipeg Grenadiers since demobilization also testified. He had left the troop train without permission at Sicamous, British Columbia, on the way to Vancouver where the unit was to embark for Hong Kong. He had already been told by a medical board and the Battalion Medical Officer that he should be in the hospital for stomach ulcers. In spite of this, the Regimental Sergeant Major had put him on the train, and Middleton had therefore taken matters into his own hands. He suffered no punishment for his action except that his pay was withheld for the time he was absent without leave. He was discharged from the army in February 1942 on medical grounds.
In his testimony, Middleton conveyed a rather poor impression of the training the Winnipeg Grenadiers had received in Jamaica. The two weeks at Montpelier was their only period of real training, as the camp at Newcastle was really too small to be of any use. At Montpelier, the company incorporated Lewis guns into the tactical schemes but not Bren guns, and never so much as saw a 2-inch mortar. Middleton saw a 3-inch mortar once, but was not allowed to examine the sight as he was told that it was too delicate. This prohibition applied to the men of the Mortar Platoon as well. There was no grenade training whatsoever, to say nothing of the fact that there was no fieldwork, little camouflage training, and no carriers. The Government and Commission counsels tried to demolish his credibility because of his "desertion", but to no avail. Middleton thought that the Medical Officer in Jamaica had rather unwisely ignored his pains, but he had nothing at all against the other officers. Middleton also recalled that at Banff, Lieutenant Colonel Sutcliffe had read out a letter from Brigadier Lawson, saying that they were going "where there was a war, not yet our war, but it might be our war at any time." 60-5
The Grenadiers, after being warned overseas, had the St. Charles Ranges at Winnipeg set aside for their use for a week. During this period, many of the men fired off an average of 35 rounds apiece in practice. About 10 men of the Carrier Platoon were also given a week's course at an Advanced Training Centre. No further training was done before embarkation.
Additional officers joined the battalion prior to sailing. These were described as excellent and fully-trained. The first statement may well be true- the reinforcement officers did very well in the actual battle. But the officers themselves, the weekend before leaving, confided to T.C. Douglas (later to be the Premier of Saskatchewan and leader of the federal NDP), who had earlier participated in a training course with them, said that they felt "that they were not in a position, nor had they had sufficient experience of operational manoeuvres, to take men into a fighting zone.” 60-6 They were very happy to go nevertheless. If these officers, who proved to be quite useful, regarded themselves as under-trained, we may wonder what the position of the original Winnipeg Grenadiers' officers was, particularly with regard to that one aspect - operational manoeuvres or tactics, in which the Canadians were most at a disadvantage at Hong Kong.
When we turn to the Royal Rifles, we find a battalion that had mobilized 10 months later than the Winnipeg Grenadiers but seems to have had more opportunity to train. The Rifles had also had their share of garrison duty, though not the Grenadiers' 16 months, and their duties in Newfoundland were not as demanding as those undertaken by the Grenadiers. They had also been much more in touch with National Defence Headquarters than the Grenadiers, and were part of the large organization of a Canadian Command. They therefore had more feedback, assistance, criticism, and inspections, all of which undoubtedly helped them. This is not to say, however, that they were fully trained by any means.
The unit was officially mobilized 28 June, 1940 at Quebec and for the first two months recruits were drilled as they came in. There were no weapons. When the battalion moved to Valcartier Camp in September 1940, training began in earnest. Unlike the Winnipeg Grenadiers, the battalion was built up almost from scratch as far as other ranks were concerned. It was often necessary to select a "likely looking lad" who was a raw recruit and make him an NCO. Before he could teach the other recruits, the officers had to take the newly promoted NCOs, "who was to take a squad in some subject the following day", and "give instruction to him the night before". Nevertheless, some progress was made before the unit moved to Sussex Camp in October, 1940. The camp at Sussex was considered inconvenient because, among other reasons, the parade ground was much too small for a battalion. The ranges themselves were on a riverbank, and on wet days in autumn the firing points were underwater. Tactical schemes were held for the first time at Sussex, and many route marches also. The unit picked up fieldcraft quite easily - the diary noted that "most men have hunted before and do this well." Night schemes were also carried out.
In November 1940, the Royal Rifles went to Newfoundland and were split up. Half the battalion and the Headquarters were at Gander, and the other half under the Second-in-Command at the seaplane base in Botwood. At the latter, before the harbour froze over, guard duties continually required the service of 50% of the men. After the harbour froze and air activity consequently ceased, the Botwood detachment had a good deal of time to train. They fired Lewis guns at stationary and moving balloon targets, trained in taking up defensive positions, and continued rifle practice on the 30-yard range. Junior officers and NCO’s were given considerable latitude in forming their own area defence schemes.
At Gander Airport the defensive duties were rather more onerous,but, as they mainly consisted of providing guards and sentries, could hardly be considered training in any sense. On relief days, however, the different platoons trained intensively. In February 1941, the companies at Botwood and Gander changed places. Bren and Lewis gun firing continued to be carried out, including night firing, and when TOET's were taken in rifle and Bren, most men passed.
Winter camping was undertaken as well as training on skis, and some companies were able to find an opportunity for tactical training. In May 1941, the battalion moved to St. John's and was reunited.
During the Royal Rifles' stay in St. John's, blackout practice and alarms were a feature. The latter consisted of a full defence scheme requiring the whole battalion to turn out and take up positions in the area. Range firing was recommenced and more men were put through their TOET's. Reconnaissance work and map reading started to appear in the training syllabus. The seven carriers which arrived were incorporated into the defence scheme. Nevertheless, the unit's War Diary records that "in Canada almost anywhere, training is less handicapped than here."
During this period more Brens arrived, allowing platoons to get their own complement. Thompson submachine-guns were issued, though only a very few, and one 2-inch mortar was loaned to the battalion for a week. A four-day course in the latter was held for Warrant Officers and NCOs.
In August 1941, the Royal Rifles were moved back to Valcartier and then almost immediately to Saint John, New Brunswick. 62-7
One thing that emerges with abundant clarity is that blame for any deficiencies in the training of the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, cannot be laid at the door of the officers, NCOs, or men of these units. They trained hard and enthusiastically to the limits of the time, opportunity, and facilities available, and paid it far more than mere lip service. Whether the training that they were actually able to undertake had brought them to a level of being even remotely ready for battle is an entirely different question.
At the Commission hearing, many officers gave testimony as to their impression of the battalion's training, particularly that of the Royal Rifles Brigadier Philip Earnshaw, the Officer in Command in Newfoundland, called the Rifles a "good average unit". He recalled that Lieutenant Colonel Home had spent most of his service in the Army connected with training in one way or another. The Second-in-Command, Major Price, was a natural leader as well, he claimed. Earnshaw said that junior officers and NCOs were given actual operational responsibility during the duty at Newfoundland. The battalion had a reasonable amount of training up to the company level, but little or none as a battalion. Grenade training was carried out, but only with dummies. Earnshaw admitted that live grenades were a far better way to build confidence. 63-8
A report submitted in September 1941, summarized the Royal Rifles' training to August 1941. It was filed as Exhibit 122 and bears the following information:
| TOET's | Rifle | 79% of strength |
| LMG | 63% of strength | |
| Gas | 49% of strength | |
| Judging distance | 57% of strength | |
| Grenade (dummy) | 41% of strength |
This perhaps gives a better idea of the actual state of training. The Royal Rifles seem to have been the opposite of the Grenadiers, having received more tactical training than weapon training. One must also remember what the Tests of Elementary Training meant: they did not mean that the soldier had necessarily even fired a weapon, indeed he had to pass the test before he could be allowed to fire it, but only that he knew how to load, aim, and clean it to a minimum degree. What these percentages indicate if looked at negatively is that, of the two main weapons, the rifle and Bren, 21% and 37% of the men had not yet demonstrated that they were sufficiently trained to fire their first shot! As the battalion was almost constantly on the move from September until it arrived in Hong Kong in late November, little more training could be done. Again, as with all the battalions in Canada, there was virtually no chance to train at all with mortars, grenades, anti-aircraft weapons (twin Brens), submachine-guns, and signal sets, because these weapons only became available in Canada to any extent at the end of 1941.
Confirming Sutcliffe's observation in regard to the Grenadiers, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lamb, who was with the Royal Rifles until October 1941, testified that the battalion's stay in Newfoundland was useful training in a general way. Newfoundland was a potential theatre of war - it was not just a place to do sentry duty. The many alarms and scares which occurred during their stay kept the men of the Battalion on their toes and gave them experience in a defensive role. Lamb also claimed that the men were very fit, a statement which does not agree with the battalion's experience during the actual fighting in Hong Kong. This discrepancy can be blamed on the fact that there was, unfortunately, little opportunity to maintain fitness in the months immediately before the battle. 64-9
Major Duncan Laurie gave testimony concerning reinforcements and the recruits who joined the battalion before October (when it was further reinforced). Laurie was in command of the Rifles' Regimental wing in Quebec in late 1941, and despatched 62 men to the battalion from there. No weapons at all were available and the recruits were only trained in squad, platoon, and company drill. 64-10 In any calculation of the percentage of men with less than 16 weeks training, these men should therefore be included, even if their date of enlistment goes back further. As was brought out many times at the inquiry, training is a matter of fact, not time, and these would have received their first rifle training in June 1941 at the earliest.
From evidence of fact, the Commission often descended to evidence of a most subjective nature. The Government called many witnesses from among the senior ranks of the Army, who all testified in glowing terms to the quality of both the Rifles and the Grenadiers. One piece of evidence to this effect pre-dated the despatch of ‘C’ Force and therefore seemed to have greater validity. Colonel Gerald Berteau, who was acting District Officer Commanding of Military District No.5 (Quebec) in September 1941, sent in a report to NDHQ 15 September, 1941, stating that the Royal Rifles was "one of the most efficient ever mobilized in this District ''. He also recommended that it be included in an overseas formation, where it "would prove of great value". It transpired, however, that Berteau wrote the letter because Lieutenant Colonel Home was anxious that he should. Home's men were getting very restless, and he was afraid he would lose some of his best officers and NCOs through transfers if he failed to get his unit into a divisional formation in the near future. It has already been noted that the Second-in-Command was also engaged in an exchange of correspondence to this end with C.G. Power at this time. Berteau's letter was probably written in all sincerity- he seems to have had a good deal of respect for Home- but he hardly had a chance to know anything about the Royal Rifles' training, beyond seeing them on parade for the Governor General in September 1941, and observing their mobilization in the summer of 1940. 64-11
General Stuart appears to have uttered more nonsense during the Commission than any other witness. In his second appearance he proceeded from the particular to the general, and went off on an abstract discourse regarding military training. Like a French Marechal before the First World War, he told the Commission that morale, character, and esprit de corps were the things that mattered most. The General was hurt because he felt that "the evidence I have heard so far has been trying to bring out just the condition of the battalions... in respect to their individual and sub-unit training... that is only part of the training of a unit ... that is superficial." Stuart explained carefully to Duff that the moral and mental training of a unit was what really mattered. If this was at a high peak, "these alleged shortcomings that we have heard about, which are all very simple and do not take very long to adjust, can be adjusted." The two battalions could easily have made up these deficiencies by 8 December;
...it is not as though these units had no training whatever... they had a considerable amount of weapon training. It is true in the case of the Winnipeg Grenadiers they lacked the actual firing of these various weapons, but they had done a certain amount of preliminary training with respect to weapons. Some of them missed, it is true . . .
And so on. 65-12 Duff accepted this line and even quoted some of it in his official report, despite the fact that any officer who genuinely believed that sort of stuff in 1941, should have been drummed out of the Army. It is difficult to credit that Stuart did believe it, but he certainly managed to convince the Commissioner. The examination of the whole question in 1948 (see Appendix C) gives a clear analysis of this matter based on wartime experience. Training is almost everything in the production of an efficient unit. Esprit de corps grows out of efficiency, not vice versa. As the Minister, J.L. Ralston, who had commanded a battalion in action during the First World War and knew whereof he spoke, said in a speech on 7 November 1941, "The man who has to stop to think how to adjust his respirator or remedy a stoppage in an automatic weapon will probably have no need of either before he has arrived at the answer." Also, "not until every section of a platoon is efficient as a section can a platoon carry out useful training as such. . ." No section could be considered efficient without extensive practice with the 2-inch mortar, no battalion without well-trained mortar, carrier, anti-aircraft, signal, and pioneer platoons, et cetera. 65-13 It is depressing, in summary, to read such things being said by the Chief of the General Staff.
And what of Major General H.D.G. Crerar, who had been Chief of the General Staff and who recommended that the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers be the units to go to Hong Kong? To do him justice he did not beat around the bush in his written testimony. He said that the two battalions "in my opinion were generally adequately trained to undertake defensive responsibilities such as those in prospect in Hong Kong." He then became even more specific and positive. "I would say that Force ‘C was certainly fit to meet an attacking force, even in superior numbers, and to give a fine account of itself by December 8, 1941." 66-14
Despite the suggestion that the two battalions had been "half-way to the war already" (Crerar) and were therefore well trained, Brigadier Macklin admitted that the units of the 4th Division were "more ready for immediate battle than those two battalions". In mitigation, the General Staff were convinced that time for the necessary refresher training would be available at Hong Kong. Possibly it was not coincidental that the Commander of the force was the Director of Military Training, either. For his part, Lawson was very pleased with the appointment and showed no anxiety about the quality of the troops. He was, by all accounts, not a "yes" man, and would have said something if he thought it necessary. The most probable judgement on Lawson's attitude is that he knew the state of the battalions, honestly felt that there would be time to train before war broke out, and welcomed the opportunity to whip a brigade into shape and bring it up to his standards.
In the final analysis, however, the whole controversy must be viewed and judged in the light of the two Battalions' experience in battle. As one British officer, who escaped from Hong Kong on the night of 25 December, 1941 said, "Both Canadian battalions sent to Hong Kong consisted of magnificent material, both officers and men. On arrival we were appalled at their lack of training. "There is little doubt that in many cases the Canadians' lack of training cost them unnecessary lives, and this was a subject the Duff Commission was charged specifically to investigate. In view of this it is unfortunate that the Commissioner tended to accept, as expert testimony, the evidence of men whose professional reputations would have been injured if their choice of these battalions had not been upheld.