The Second Mission: Canadian Survival in Hong Kong Prisoner-of-War Camps, 1941-1945

by Matthew Schwarzkopf

Chapter 1

From Garrison Duty in North America to Prison Camps in Hong Kong

“As soldiers, we will see this thing through to the end, and we will live to have the last laugh.”1

- George MacDonell, Royal Rifles of Canada

This chapter, which provides the framework for the remaining thesis, begins with a brief history of Colonial Hong Kong and the British presence, followed by the deployment of Canadian troops which added to the Crown Colony’s defences. Next, the Battle of Hong Kong is detailed to establish how the Canadians became prisoners. The chapter then examines their Japanese incarcerators to learn why they treated their captives in the manner that they did. It concludes with an examination of the prison camps and reveals some of the many challenges that the prisoners faced, such as physical abuse by the guards, inadequate living facilities, the threat of disease, and Hong Kong’s notoriously rainy weather.

Britain first occupied Hong Kong Island in 1841 and China officially ceded it to them following the conclusion of the First Opium War in 1842. In 1860, the Crown Colony added the Kowloon peninsula to its territory, while in 1898 the New Territories joined on a ninety-nine-year lease, giving Hong Kong a considerable foothold in mainland China. The natural harbor between Kowloon and the north side of the island developed into one of the world’s great international ports and had become a key distribution route for British goods in southern China. The total area of the Crown Colony was 410 square miles, with Hong Kong Island occupying only twenty-nine square miles. The topography of the territory is very mountainous and rugged, particularly Hong Kong Island with its highest point being Victoria’s Peak at 1,800 feet. Also named after the former British Queen was the colony’s major city and de facto capital of Victoria, located in the northwest corner of Hong Kong Island. As Hong Kong’s climate is s ub-tropical, it receives heavy and often unpredictable rainfall to complement its winter and summer monsoons. The hottest temperatures are between the spring and the fall when the mercury commonly rises above thirty degrees Celsius. The winter months bring some relief and are generally cool and dry, although Hong Kong’s notorious humidity can be present all year long. The population of Hong Kong had grown dramatically since Japan’s invasion of China in 1937. As hundreds of thousands of Chinese refugees sought shelter in the Crown Colony, by December 1941, the number of civilians stood at between 1,500,000 and 1,750,000.2

A map of colonial Hong Kong. Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

Before war’s outbreak in Europe in 1939, Japan had seized much of northeastern China, many of its coastal cities, and the area bordering Hong Kong’s New Territories. Despite heavy fighting, massive Chinese casualties, and unspeakable civilian massacres, neither Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek nor the communist army of Mao Zedong would yield, and the fighting persisted.3 European powers with colonies in Asia expressed concern, but they were busy dealing with the threat of war closer to home and the Japanese were not considered a serious risk as they had been unable to subdue a stubborn China. Still, the British were alarmed as they held many possessions in South-East Asia, including Burma, Malaya, and Singapore. But in the fall of 1937 the British Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) decided against dispatching any forces to Asia, settling instead on maintaining forces large enough to act as a deterrent to Japanese expansionism. The COS believed that Japan had limited financial and natural resources, too many men tied up in China, had fallen afoul of American public opinion, and had to contend with an unpredictable neighbour in the Soviet Union as Japan’s conquests in Manchuria had given it a disputed border with the communist state. This combination of circumstances led the COS to believe that Japan would not consider an attack on Hong Kong for that action would mean war with the British Empire.4

War erupted in Europe with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. Less than a year later most of Western Europe had fallen to the Nazis leaving Great Britain alone, isolated, and expecting a major attack. Strengthening overseas territories was not a priority, yet there were some who argued that it was necessary, especially since Britain’s apparent weakness might invite Japanese aggression. Between November 1938 and July 1941, the General Officer Commanding in Hong Kong was Canadian Major-General Arthur Edward Grasett. Serving in the British Army, Grasett is the man who, in Canadian circles, is often held responsible for the decision to send Canadian troops to the British colony.5 Though Britain had its hands full in Europe, in October 1940 Grasett began raising the issue of reinforcing Hong Kong. His confidence in his own troops was high and his opinion of Japanese competency was equally low. Still, he pressed his superiors for the four existing battalions of British and Indian troops to be expanded to five, but the COS was not convinced that extra men could be provided.6 The following month British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham arrived in Singapore and, being of the same opinion as Grasett, also pressured London that Hong Kong be reinforced. His request for an additional two battalions7 was denied, but he raised the issue again in January 1941. This time British Prime Minister Winston Churchill weighed in, stating that “this is all wrong. If Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it…I wish we had fewer troops there, but to move any would be noticeable and dangerous.”8 For a third time the matter appeared closed.

In July 1941, Grasett retired from his command and was replaced by Major-General Christopher Maltby. In August Grasett to returned to England by way of Canada, allowing him to visit his friend and fellow Royal Military College of Canada graduate Major-General H.D.G Crerar, Canada’s Chief of the General Staff (CG). The two had previously studied the complexity of defending Hong Kong in 1934 at the Imperial Defence College in London. James Layton Ralston, Canada’s Minister of National of Defence, partook in the generals’ discussions and heard Grasett put forward the idea that two extra battalions would make Hong Kong strong enough to repel any Japanese attack, although Grasett did not specifically suggest Canadian units for this task.9 Grasett continued on to London where he again made his case for the two additional battalions, but at this time he suggested that Canada might be willing to offer assistance. The Americans had reinforced their colony of the Philippines in August 1941, soon after Australia committed soldiers to defend Malaya. If Canada could be convinced to reinforce Hong Kong, it would send a message to the Japanese that the Empire was taking their threat seriously and that Britain would fight for Hong Kong.10 Churchill reluctantly agreed, and on September 19 Britain’s Dominion Office formally requested two infantry battalions of Canada.

For Canada, there were important political considerations. Canadian troops had been in Britain for nearly two years but had yet to see any action. As the Conservative opposition used such inaction to argue that Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and his Liberals were reluctant to fight, turning down a request for men from Britain in a time of war might play poorly in the press and in the House of Commons.11 On September 27, Colonel Ralston expressed his approval but suggested that two fresh units should be provided from within Canada, and not from those stationed in Britain. The Canadian government had not gathered its own intelligence on the situation in the Far East, preferring instead to rely on British assessments. Still, Ralston believed that “anything which would either defer or deter Japan from coming in [to the war] would be highly desirable from our point of view.” On October 2, the Cabinet War Committee approved the decision and asked Ralston, in conjunction with the General Staff, to choose two units from a list prepared by the Director of Military Training. Preference was to be given to units that were the best trained and with experience in coastal defence, but it was considered unwise to pry battalions away from existing divisions, so two stand-alone units were selected.12

The Canadian detachment sent to Hong Kong was made up of two infantry battalions, the Winnipeg Grenadiers, the Royal Rifles of Canada, recruited mainly in Quebec’s Eastern Townships, and a Brigade Headquarters.13 No fewer than eight provinces were represented among the men and many were from the same areas, notably Winnipeg or Sherbrooke, and had much in common with each other socially, culturally, and linguistically. The group consisted of 1,975 personnel, including two medical officers, two Nursing Sisters, two officers of the Canadian Dental Corps, three chaplains, two civilian Auxiliary Service Officers, and a detachment of the Canadian Postal Corps. The Grenadiers and Royal Rifles had recently completed garrison duty, the former in Jamaica and the latter in Newfoundland. Neither unit was at full strength when selected and the men’s training in tactics, small arms, or large-scale exercises was far from complete. Relying solely on British intelligence, Crerar still believed war to be unlikely and he deemed the battalions suitable for the assignment, which he felt would be mere garrison duty. The man tasked with commanding “C” Force, as the Canadian detachment became known, was Brigadier J. K. Lawson, a Permanent Force officer who had been the Director of Military Training in Ottawa. On October 27, 1941, the Canadians departed from Vancouver aboard the troop transport HMT Awatea which was escorted by the Canadian armed merchant cruiser HMCS Prince Robert. The ships arrived in Hong Kong on November 16, but the freighter Don Jose, which carried “C” Force’s 212 vehicles, never arrived. When it reached Manila en route, war had broken out and the United States Army used the vehicles to defend the Philippines.14 The Canadians were stationed at the Sham Shui Po Barracks, a British Army facility constructed in the 1920s. After the war, Hong Kong veterans remembered Sham Shui Po not as a barracks but as a prison.

The General Officer Commanding in Hong Kong, Major-General Christopher Maltby, had a force of approximately 14,000 at his disposal although he considered the number of “fighting troops” to be closer to 11,000.15 Maltby’s command included the 1st Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, which had been stationed in Hong Kong since 1937, and the 2nd Battalion, Royal Scots which had been there since 1938. Two Indian battalions were part of the defence, the 5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment, in Hong Kong since 1937 and 1940, respectively. However, some units were understrength as 110 of the Royal Scots had contracted malaria; while the Rajputs had sent detachments for service elsewhere.16 Additional support was provided by the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC) which had its own infantry, artillery, and various other arms. The naval forces, already marginal, were further reduced when two of the three destroyers were ordered to Singapore on the eve of war. The air forces were tiny and obsolete, with only five outdated fighters based at Kai Tak Airport on the Kowloon Peninsula. The closest Royal Air Force (RAF) base was in Malaya nearly 1,400 miles away. The fixed-defences were more substantial, with eight 9.2-inch guns, fifteen 6-inch, two 4.7-inch, and four 4-inch. Mobile artillery included 32 guns ranging from 6-inch to 3.7-inch, plus 10 additional guns for beach defence. Anti-aircraft defences included only 14 heavy and two light guns. However, there was a shortage of mobile artillery and much other equipment.17

The defence plan called for the garrison to be split into a Mainland Brigade commanded by Brigadier Cedric Wallis, and an Island Brigade commanded by Canadian Brigadier John Lawson. The mainland group was comprised of the Royal Scots, the Punjabs, and the Rajputs. The island defence was made up of the Middlesex and the two Canadian battalions. The primary defensive fortification on the mainland was the so-called Gin Drinkers Line, an eleven-mile-long line of entrenchments augmented by concrete pillboxes at regular intervals. In his postwar dispatch, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham observed that the Gin Drinkers Line needed at least two divisions, some 30,000 men, to hold it properly.18 Maltby had just a quarter of that recommended strength. While the British were confident, that feeling was not shared by senior Canadian officers. A week after landing at Hong Kong, a Canadian officer challenged the defensive capabilities at a briefing.19 Noting that everything in the defence plan counted on the Japanese attacking by one certain route, what if, he asked, their attack on the island was concentrated across the narrowest point on the harbor side which was sparsely defended? The concern was considered, but Maltby remained satisfied with his defensive arrangements.20

By November 1941, the Japanese controlled all territory surrounding the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. They had occupied the adjacent province of Canton (now Guangdong), the island of Hainan, large swathes of French Indo-China, and had long held Formosa (Taiwan), thereby severing Hong Kong from other Allied possessions in the region. Speaking to Canadian officers shortly after their arrival, Maltby declared that the Japanese had 5,000 troops with little artillery support. Amongst his staff, the commonly held view was that their Japanese counterparts were not well-equipped, that they could not fight at night, and that their poor eyesight coupled with outmoded aircraft meant that dive-bombing would not be a concern. It was believed there was only one tank battalion and one medium brigade of artillery. In fact, the 23rd Army stationed in Canton included four infantry divisions equipped with tanks and artillery in much greater supply than originally anticipated.21 Some estimates have put the Japanese strength as high as 52,000 troops. But that estimate likely refers to the entire 23rd Army which numbered near 60,000 soldiers, while only 20,000 members of the 38th Division are thought to have landed on Hong Kong Island with fewer actively engaged in the fighting.22

The Japanese unit tasked with capturing Hong Kong was the 38th Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Tadayoshi Sano. It fielded three infantry regiments, with strong artillery support. Additionally, a substantial air force would ensure immediate air superiority.23 Historian George Beer Endacott remarked that the Japanese “proved to be disciplined, supremely fit, aggressive, resolute, well-led, sensibly armed and equipped, and prepared to use unorthodox tactics. They seized the initiative from the start and never lost it.”24 Fully cognizant of the Gin Drinkers Line, Japan’s battle plan included a major thrust to break through it. Once the Kowloon Peninsula had been secured, a second assault would commence against Hong Kong Island.

On December 8, 1941, at 8:00 am, and without any formal declaration of war against the British Empire, the Japanese attacked Hong Kong. The first air strike destroyed all five RAF fighters and eight civilian aircraft and damaged the Sham Shui Po barracks.25 An hour later Japanese troops began crossing the border. The first defenders they encountered were a company from the 2/14 Punjabs, but the latter quickly fell back to the Gin Drinkers Line. A key position along the Gin Drinkers Line was the Shing Mun Redoubt, a piece of high ground that served as a primary objective for the Japanese. On December 9 the redoubt was attacked close to midnight. Despite some ferocious fighting in the tunnels and above ground, the myth that the Japanese could not carry out night operations was shattered and they seized control of the position.26 It had taken the Japanese a mere 36 hours to break the mainland’s major line of defence.

Maltby ordered all troops to retreat to the island excepting the Rajputs who were instructed to hold the Devil’s Peak peninsula which overlooked Hong Kong harbor and the Lye Myn Passage, the shortest crossing distance between Kowloon and the island.27 But when the Japanese attacked the Rajputs late in the afternoon on the 12th, despite brave resistance, as Maltby recognized that resupplying that outlying position would be nearly impossible, he ordered the Rajputs to withdraw. By the next morning Maltby had all troops on the island where he reorganized them. The island was roughly split down the middle from north to south with the Wong Nei Chong Gap being the dividing line. The easiest and most direct route across the island, the gap was a crucial position which housed Lawson’s brigade headquarters. Lawson commanded West Brigade which contained the Royal Scots, the Grenadiers, and the Punjabs. East Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Wallis, consisted of the Royal Rifles and the Rajputs. The Middlesex battalion served under Fortress Headquarters.28 This new system became effective at midnight the 13-14 December, but it had one egregious drawback. The Canadian brigade had been split, while the urgency of the situation permitted no time for the Royal Rifles to become acquainted with their British commanders and staff officers.29

On December 13, the Japanese commander, Lieutenant-General Takashi Saki, issued an ultimatum to Governor Mark Young to surrender or suffer the consequences. When Young promptly refused, Sakai thereupon began a heavy artillery bombardment of Hong Kong Island. The shelling continued for several days and on the 17th the Japanese made a second surrender demand. When it was rejected too, Sakai issued the order to attack the island. His intention was to land his forces at positions between North Point and Lye Mun, precisely the location raised by the Canadian officer during the November defence briefing. 30 The first amphibious wave landed some 7,500 Japanese troops who smashed through the Rajputs and Royal Rifles and headed for the high ground positions and the area around the Wong Nei Chong Gap. On the morning of the 19th, a company of the Grenadiers was ordered to reclaim two of those positions, Jardine’s Lookout and Mount Butler. The latter was held for several hours, but a ferocious Japanese counterattack forced a retreat to the gap; the whole force was surrounded and took heavy casualties. In the eastern sector, the Royal Rifles and East Brigade were defending positions around Repulse Bay and the Stanley Peninsula in the southern part of the island. Brigadier Wallis attempted to push north, but his forces were driven back and the Rifles, holding some of the high ground, became separated. Wallis ordered his forces to return to their former positions.31

Meanwhile, the Japanese closed in on the West Brigade headquarters at the Wong Nei Chong Gap. Brigadier Lawson’s position was quickly overrun and he was killed in the fighting. Colonel H. B. Rose of the HKVDC succeeded Lawson. The same day, the Japanese reached Repulse Bay on the island’s south coast, permanently separating the east and west brigades. As they consolidated their advantage, the Japanese received a communique from Imperial Headquarters informing them that the 38th Division was to be redeployed in the South Pacific. The message was clear: finish the job in Hong Kong. On the 22nd, the Royal Rifles were ordered to the Stanley Peninsula at the southern tip of the island where it was believed the exhausted defenders would have a better chance of fighting since it was on level ground. Five days of continuous combat had taken its toll on all ranks. Climbing hills through treacherous trails, assembling defensive positions under fire, a lack of rest, and meager to non-existent rations had all contributed to the fatigue.32

On Christmas Eve, the Japanese tightened their stranglehold on Victoria City and relentless bombing had crippled the reserve water tanks at Stanley Fort.33 On Christmas morning, the Japanese sent a final request for surrender, but it was rebuffed. At noon on Christmas Day, Brigadier Wallis ordered a company of the Royal Rifles (some 100 men) to charge the Japanese in Stanley Village. This senseless daylight attack saw the company virtually annihilated as less than a dozen men returned unscathed.34 By then the garrison in the northern part of the island had capitulated and at 3:30 pm Maltby issued the official order for the remaining parts of the island to surrender by 8:00 pm. The battle for Hong Kong had ended, but it had taken a heavy toll on both sides. British casualties stood at approximately 4,440, which included 290 Canadians killed and 493 wounded. Japanese casualties were put at 2,754 though this is an estimation given that no complete casualty list is known to have survived the war. Civilian deaths numbered at least 4,000 with a further 3,000 badly wounded.35 The Crown Colony suffered extensive damage to its infrastructure, power supply, and water reservoirs. Hong Kong was the first land engagement for Canadian soldiers in the Second World War and it was the only battle during which they suffered 100 percent casualties as every man of “C” Force was either killed, captured, wounded, or went missing. No fewer than 1,684 Canadians fell into captivity. These survivors had failed in their first mission and were given a second chance to make it home alive, but it would not be easy.

While “C” Force soldiers knew little about their opponents before the battle, after becoming prisoners, they learned that many of the senior Japanese officers cared little for the rules which governed how POWs should be treated. This attitude often went down the chain of command. On July 27, 1929, in Geneva, Switzerland, fifty-three state parties and nine state signatories agreed to the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The state parties, including Germany, later ratified the convention, while the state signatories, including Japan, did not. The convention came about after the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) expressed concern at the way some prisoners had been abused and mistreated during the First World War. During that war the ICRC broadened its commitment to aid prisoners captured in battle, not just those wounded in combat as it had previously done. These efforts led to the 1929 Convention which sought to protect prisoner rights by enacting laws to ensure that they received food and medicine and that they were not subject to assault, humiliation, or forced labour.36 The Japanese signed a document detailing treatment for the ill and wounded in battle. The Japanese Diet did ratify the convention on soldiers wounded in the field but not the one concerning prisoners of war. In 1934, Japan’s army and navy decided against its ratification, explaining that it would work unfairly against Japan for as Japanese soldiers did not expect to become prisoners, the commitment to honour the convention would fall on Japan alone.37 The Imperial Army, therefore, was not legally obligated by international law to adhere to the convention’s articles. This became a serious concern after the string of Japanese victories in late 1941 and the capture of tens of thousands of Allied soldiers. To lessen Western fears, Japan released a statement through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 29, 1942 reiterating Japan’s legal position relative to the 1929 convention but also declaring that it would “apply mutatis mutandis the provisions of that Convention to…prisoners of war in its power.”38 The Japanese government insisted that it would honour the spirit of the convention, if not the actual wording. Many units of the Japanese Army did not follow through with that promise, including some of those stationed in Hong Kong.

The second article of the 1929 Geneva Convention affirms that prisoners of war must be humanely treated and protected against violence and reprisals. Other articles are more specific, including Article Eleven that stated that prisoners must receive equal rations as those soldiers holding them, while Article Thirteen obliged captors to provide their captives with healthy and sanitary conditions to prevent disease. Further articles covered labour (forbidding dangerous work), external relations (granting the right of correspondence), disciplinary punishment (preventing corporal punishment and cruelty), and judicial punishment (to guarantee a fair trial).39 Although Japan had not ratified the convention and while their aggressive actions in China had become well known, the Allies could never have imagined that nearly every main article would be so flagrantly violated, especially given Japanese re-assurances. Before the Second World War, Japan’s record of treating its prisoners had been honourable. The Japanese Army had taken thousands of Russians prisoner during the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, but their mortality rate was an astonishingly low 0.5 per cent. In the First World War, Japan captured and interned thousands of German and Austrian soldiers, but they were generally treated well and provided with adequate living conditions. Some even wished to remain in Japan once the war concluded. Again, the mortality rate was low at only 1.8 per cent, but would have been lower still if not for an influenza pandemic. By comparison, the mortality rate for Allied POWs in the Second World War was approximately 4 per cent in Europe and 28 per cent in Asia.40 Something in the Japanese mentality and practices had changed in the interwar period.

The word Bushido is synonymous with Japan’s aggressive wartime behaviour and its often-inhumane treatment of prisoners and civilians. Meaning “the way of the warriors”, Bushido was an umbrella term for the codes and ethics that governed the samurai way of life. First put into writing in the sixteenth century, it became the code of conduct for samurai under the Tokugawa shoguns and after the Meiji restoration of 1868 it became the foundation for “emperor worship.” By the turn of the twentieth century, the Japanese Army had begun touting the concept of death before dishonor. To die in battle or to commit suicide were preferable to being captured, which was viewed as cowardly and shameful and would earn a soldier the public’s scorn should he return home under such embarrassment.41 After the First World War, revived militarism and fervent nationalism fostered strong support in Japan for old ideals. By the 1930s, the military had advocated Bushido as the code of conduct to guide the Japanese in battle. That soldiers should kill themselves rather than be captured became an integral part of military training prior to the Second World War. Indeed, in his trial after the war, former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo stated that a Japanese soldier taken prisoner was considered a disgrace and that under criminal law “anyone who becomes a prisoner while still able to resist has committed a criminal offense, the maximum punishment for which is the death penalty.”42 Treating their POWs with the disdain and contempt that the Japanese felt they deserved was seen by the Japanese military as part of Bushido’s essence. But other factors also were at play.

Historian Kurosawa Fumitaka has noted that the Japanese vastly underestimated the number of POWs that would fall under their control, and they did not adequately account for the physical space that would be required to hold them. As Japan faced labour shortages at home, it formulated a policy that would put prisoners of all nationalities to work. Moreover, Japan’s world view was based on the notion of its racial superiority and that the Emperor represented the height of worthiness. Therefore, individuals and groups were measured by their closeness to the emperor, and Western POWs with corrupted and inferior Western values were near the bottom of that hierarchy. Western standards were no longer comparable with Japanese values and concepts of patriotism. Fumitaka wrote that it was a “misguided ideology disparaging capture by enemy forces combined with a sanctimonious nationalism against the backdrop of the tyranny of military priorities” that led to the attitudes which condoned and accepted the abuse of prisoners.43 And though the treatment of POWs often depended on the temperament of the camp commander, Japanese soldiers had been inculcated with the notion that there would be few, if any, repercussions if physical and mental abuse were meted out against enemy combatants who surrendered in disgrace.44 Even so, this does little to help explain some of the more cruel and heavy-handed measures the Japanese took towards their prisoners, including civilians. Many POWs in Hong Kong suffered physical abuse at the hands of the Japanese Army, and some of the more appalling incidents occurred even before the fighting there was officially over.

The Salesian Mission on north-east Hong Kong Island served as a training school for the clergymen of the Salesian Society of Hong Kong. Before the battle it was converted to house army medical supplies and was well stocked with medical equipment. On the morning of December 19, and despite the presence of Red Cross signage, Japanese troops burst through the mission doors and captured everyone in the building. The women were released, but the men were stripped of their possessions and forced to walk to a nearby clearing where the Japanese bayoneted their victims and attempted to behead some with their swords. No fighting had taken place near the mission, no resistance had occurred, and most of the staff were clearly marked as medical workers. Almost every member of the 40-person team was murdered.45

Even more shocking was what took place at St. Stephen’s College, located near the entrance to the Stanley Peninsula on the south shore of Hong Kong Island. The main building had been converted during the fighting for use as an emergency hospital. On Christmas morning, as the battle neared its end, approximately 100 patients were in the main hall and the nearby classrooms. The staff numbered around two dozen doctors, nurses, and orderlies. Again, the building was clearly marked as a medical facility and most personnel wore Red Cross insignia. This did not prevent about 200 Japanese soldiers from storming the makeshift hospital. The senior medical officer, Lieutenant-Colonel G.D.R. Black of the HKVDC, attempted to surrender but his pleas were answered with a gunshot to his head. The Japanese proceeded through St. Stephen’s attacking wounded soldiers lying in their hospital beds. More than 50 patients were bayoneted, while wounded soldiers housed in the classrooms were crowded together and arbitrarily shot. All the nurses, British and Chinese, were gangraped, eight of them were sadistically mutilated and murdered. Only four of them survived the slaughter.46 “C” Force Nursing Sister Kay Christie later remarked that “The rape business seems to be their reward when they overrun a city or an auxiliary hospital…they seem to feel that’s their right.”47 How else could such behaviour be explained? The massacre only ended because the battle had ceased. The survivors were forced to dispose of the bodies. One later recounted that the Japanese executed 14 of their own men for the hospital carnage, though this remains unverified. In any event, far more than that had participated.48 These stories spread amongst the Canadians who were getting an idea of the brutality of which their captors were capable. And during the initial stages of captivity, the behaviour of some of the Japanese did little to quell fears that the worst was yet to come.

Leslie Canivet of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps was lucky to survive the battle. Seriously wounded in the fighting at Stanley Peninsula, he managed to escape with three others, but they were captured by a Japanese patrol, shot execution style, and left for dead. Incredibly, Canivet survived and he made his way to Bowen Road Hospital in Kowloon. Once healed and integrated into camp with the rest of the prisoners he witnessed his share of abuse and brutality. He recalled how one form of torture employed by the Japanese was to gag a prisoner and put lit cigarettes up his nose. Canivet also mentioned that the POWs were initially made to learn Japanese. When he refused to do so he was punched and kicked by a guard. The prisoners learned not to lodge any complaints. “You complained about anything you got beat up…They had no feeling for a prisoner of war in any way, shape, or form.”49 Grenadier Ernie Hodkinson recalled a particularly brutal form of torture. Guards would come into a hut and randomly pick out a prisoner. The man would be beaten, made to stand out in the sun until he fainted, or even placed in a metal-roofed shed and left to cook.50 But typically, Chinese nationals suffered the worst of the abuse.

Less than two weeks into captivity, Royal Rifle Raymond Elliott wrote in his diary about the Japanese disdain for Chinese civilians. The guards had caught a Chinese man stealing money from Japanese soldiers. He was beaten and left tied up overnight. Still alive in the morning, he was subsequently shot dead. Elliott simply commented “It don’t pay to steal.” First World War veteran Kenneth Baird of the Grenadiers described how dangerous it was to pass goods through the fence that separated the prisoners and civilians. Two Chinese girls, perhaps as young as twelve, were shot by the Japanese for trying to sell items at the fence causing Baird to note that “Life is very much in the raw here and life is held very cheaply.”51 The violence towards the Chinese took other forms. Perhaps as many as 10,000 girls and women were raped by Japanese soldiers in the first month after their victory in Hong Kong.52 Civilians and prisoners alike had to tread carefully around their captors, never knowing when a random incident of violence might be carried out. The prisoners learned quickly to obey rules and not to antagonize their incarcerators. Despite such fears, there were some who decided to do something about their situation.

If the Japanese could not understand why a soldier would surrender, they might have been equally perplexed as to why one would attempt to escape given the consequences if recaptured. After members of the Royal Navy escaped early into their captivity, the remaining prisoners were warned by the Japanese that any further attempts would incur reprisals.53 Camp Commander Colonel Tokunaga ordered all men to sign an affidavit promising not to escape. Those who would not bend were summarily punished, including Royal Rifle Jack Porter who was beaten, tortured, and given meager rations. “I could not eat the rice or drink the tea on account of its maggoty and filthy condition,” he later recounted. Porter and the other holdouts eventually signed after their meals were stopped.54 Even if one were so inclined and determined, escaping from Hong Kong was challenging. The territory was ringed with water while Caucasians would surely stand out amongst the Chinese population. Potential escapees would be handicapped by their inability to speak Chinese and the fact that there was a considerable distance to be covered through Japanese-occupied areas before they could reach Chinese lines. Nonetheless, there were several escape attempts while Hong Kong was occupied. Some were successful, others went horribly awry.

In August 1942, some members of “C” Force took stock of their situation and came to what Royal Rifle George MacDonell called a “collective determination.” They were resolute that their war would continue and that failure to perform one’s duty was not an option. “We will never forget who we are and we will live up to our best traditions. As soldiers, we will see this thing through to the end, and we will live to have the last laugh.”55 Reasoning that it was a Canadian soldier’s obligation, four Grenadiers, led by Sergeant John Payne, attempted to escape. Resources were pooled to aid the breakout and the four men were provided with supplies. Payne and his three companions fled North Point Prison Camp on August 20, 1942. They had barely made it across Victoria Harbour before they were intercepted by a Japanese patrol boat. The four men were tortured, but never revealed their co-conspirators. They were later executed to send a clear message to the rest of the prisoners. Senior officers were implicated and jailed, but they were later released unharmed.56 Reprisal for the escape attempt was swift. That evening the prisoners, even the very ill and bedridden, were made to stand outside in the pouring rain. The men were released at 5:30am and returned to their huts; 90 minutes later they were back outside.57

The Japanese may have felt that escape attempts deserved a collective punishment, but there were occasions when it appeared as if abuse and punishment were administered to satisfy the sadistic guards on duty. One of the Japanese soldiers, Kanao Inouye, became notorious among Canadian POWs. Better known to prisoners as the Kamloops Kid or Slap Happy, Inouye was born in British Columbia to Japanese parents. In 1936, he went to Japan for university, but when war broke out he was drafted into the Japanese Army. Given his fluency in English, Inouye was stationed at Hong Kong in a duel role as guard and interpreter.58 Growing up in Canada, Inouye had been teased and bullied because of his Asian heritage. Not forgetting these slights, Inouye took advantage of his position in Hong Kong to exact revenge on those whom he perceived had wronged him, namely Caucasian Canadians.

Royal Rifle Ken Gaudin recalled that Inouye made them stand at attention in the rain at night, while Grenadier Claude Corbett remembered how the interpreter once punished a one-armed man by making him carry 70-pound blocks across camp.59 George MacDonell wrote in his memoir that he had to stand by helplessly as Inouye subjected his men to several different forms of torture. Leslie Canivet called Inouye “One of the meanest Japs anybody would ever want to meet, just hated Canadians…We had a rough time with him, he’d beat you up for anything, slightest provocation.” Harry White recorded in his diary that during one inspection Captain John Norris was late bringing his men out to the parade square. A furious Inouye knocked Norris to the ground. Challenged to get up and take it like a man, Inouye continually knocked the captain back down and beat him until he was nearly unconscious.60 Inouye’s vicious behaviour continued unabated for the remainder of the prisoners’ captivity and he was thought to be directly responsible for at least three Canadian deaths. After the war, Inouye was set to be tried by a war crimes tribunal, but when it was discovered that he was a Canadian citizen, his case was moved to a civilian court in Hong Kong. Subsequently, he was convicted of treason and hanged on August 27, 1947, at Stanley Prison.61

While physical abuse was one challenge the Hong Kong POWs had to face, another was the dreadful camp conditions for prisoners. Once the fighting ended, surviving members of “C” Force and other Allied soldiers were moved to their former quarters at Sham Shui Po Barracks for temporary internment. Under strict supervision, the Japanese allowed foraging parties to return to the city to retrieve usable materials. As a result, some canned food supplies and amenities such as books and band instruments were brought into the camp. Sham Shui Po had two identical barracks and two more recently built married quarters buildings.62 It barely resembled the place that they had left three weeks earlier. On re-entering the site, Harry White vividly described the scene in his diary. The camp had been “stripped by the Chinese; the wiring, light fixtures, doors and windows were gone. In fact, everything moveable, and if they’d had another two weeks, they’d have taken the huts too.” No cooking facilities existed, dishes and cutlery were scarce. The camp was squalid, causing immediate concern among the medical officers that diseases were already present or soon would be. The bucket-type latrines were not plentiful enough for the number of men and diarrhea caused many to relieve themselves where they stood. The washing facilities were in poor condition, the pipes and taps had been removed, and only a minimal amount of cold water flowed from them.63 The Senior Medical Officer for “C” Force, Major John Crawford, claimed that while they had left Sham Shui Po a clean, habitable barracks capable of housing 2,000 men, they returned to a looted mess with no furniture, no shelter, and no food that was expected to accommodate more than 7,000 prisoners. He recalled that it was cold and that they had no heat so they “huddled together for warmth. Under such circumstances it was not surprising that disease soon menaced us. Many of the troops, due to the failure of the water supply, had developed dysentery during the battle, and this spread quickly through camp.” Raymond Elliott saw “quite a few dead bodies lying around,” writing that on December 31, he had spent the entire day cleaning up. 64 The start of captivity was fraught with adversity, but the nightmare was just beginning.

It was in this early stage of their POW experience that the men of “C” Force began displaying the type of discipline, solidarity, and determination to survive that would mark the length of their imprisonment. Leo Berard noted the initial challenges, but also that their own officers had been ordered by the Japanese to keep their men under control. Accordingly, “daily routine was much the same and that was good but we were quickly learning how to be prisoners.” As many were already sick with dysentery and diarrhea, the doctors were overwhelmed. Thus, Berard and the stronger men began to aid the sick and wounded “fast learning to become nursemaids…changing and cleaning bedding and helping those who could not help themselves.”65 Then just as a routine and basic facilities were being established, the Japanese chose to separate the prisoners largely based on their nationalities. The British and Volunteer troops remained at Sham Shui Po while the Indian units were sent to Ma Tau Chung Camp, originally built to house mainland Chinese refugees fleeing the war with Japan. Another refugee camp, Argyle Street, was used for most commissioned officers, while civilians were sent to the former grounds of St. Stephen’s College in the Stanley Peninsula. On January 23, 1942, the Canadians were sent to North Point Camp on Hong Kong Island where they joined others who had been held there since the battle’s end. “C” Force stayed there for the next nine months.66

North Point Camp was the third camp originally built for refugees, but it had the misfortune of being near the Japanese landing on Hong Kong Island and had been badly damaged in the fighting. The area was used by the British and their opponents as a garbage dump and the latter had also used it to stable their horses. Animal and human excrement were everywhere. John Crawford described the nearby beach as being “covered with dead and rotting bodies.” Leslie Canivet called North Point, “one of the filthiest rat holes I have ever seen…there was mud, pure mud, and a bunch of little huts.”67 Kenneth Baird noted that those huts were 20 feet wide by 120 feet long and expected to hold as many as 75 men and their few belongings. The space was constantly menaced by millions of flies that fought the soldiers for food at every meal. Baird wrote that they killed “thousands every day, but the supply seems inexhaustible.” Arthur Squires wrote in his diary that he would sleep better now that a rat in the rafters had moved on, but he was still bothered by crickets who chewed on him and everything else. But he stayed positive, a characteristic so crucial in captivity, and noted that “fortunately [the crickets] carry little disease.” He also recorded how the bedbugs forced the men to sleep outside to gain relief, but for him the rats and spiders were a bigger nuisance.68 The greater danger were likely mosquitoes as they carried diseases such as malaria and dengue fever.

Once again, the soldiers had to organize a habitable prison camp with few supplies and no help from the Japanese. As beds in North Point went to the sick and wounded first, men like Baird devised what they could with what they had on hand. In March 1942 his sleeping arrangement was a blanket on a wood bed with rice sacks serving as the mattress. It was “anything but a Beauty Rest” he wrote, but he was grateful to have at least that. 69 Baird made it a personal project to improve his “Beauty Rest” during his incarceration, and his diary and letters demonstrate that he never lost his sense of humour and was always trying to better himself and help those around him. Crawford also never stopped helping others even though his role as a medical officer was nearly impossible to perform effectively under such conditions. Now limited to only his own staff, Crawford had more orderlies trained while they turned a “small warehouse with a very leaky, shell-scarred roof” into their new hospital. North Point had one advantage over Sham Shui Po in that it was on the same side of the harbour as Bowen Road Hospital, the main medical facility in Hong Kong which was internally controlled by Allied medical officers but governed by Japanese regulations. This allowed Crawford to get the most critically ill to Bowen nearly every day. If lucky, he would return with supplies.70 But so many men crammed together made it difficult to contain diseases such as dysentery. Major Gordon Gray of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps recalls the difficulty of watching men with abdominal pain and severe diarrhea suffer while it was known that the medical stores in Hong Kong had had plenty of sulpha drugs for treating bacterial infection before the Japanese had pilfered them for their own use.71 This denial of medical aid was repeated throughout the imprisonment. The officers, soldiers, and medical staff carried on as best they could and worked to improve what was within their control,72 but there were some things they could do very little about.

The unsanitary housing conditions were worsened by Hong Kong’s erratic tropical weather. Avoiding close quarters was difficult when a day of rain would force everybody inside. The climate often came in extremes and was difficult to predict. Most of the year Hong Kong was hot and humid, but winters could be deceptively cold. Many Hong Kong prisoner diaries make mention of the impact that the weather had on their daily lives. By the middle of March 1942 Royal Rifle Delbert Welsh was already recording that it was “very very hot,” in May, his comrade Lance Ross wrote that it was 43 degrees Celsius in the shade. James MacMillan noted that the autumn did not bring much relief, writing on September 30 that the “heat seems to sap all the strength right out of you.”73 The short winters were cold, even for Canadians, as there was no heating except for those times a small fire was overlooked by the guards. The temperature plummeted to 5 degrees Celsius in February 1942 according to Harry White. Georges Verreault wrote the next day that he never thought it could be so cold in China causing him to wear every piece of clothing that he possessed. Even during the winter of 1944/45, their last in Hong Kong, Arthur Squires was still surprised by this “country of contradictions” writing that 10 degrees Celsius with a “cold damp raw atmosphere” was enough to send a chill through the men.74

At any time of the year, they could expect heavy rain. Squires commented the first August of his imprisonment that he had “seen more rain since I have arrived here than in all my life.” Two non stop weeks of rain brought Verreault to one of his lowest points. But when the sun finally came out he said it boosted the men’s spirits and helped them forget their hunger.75 At times the weather would cooperate and have a positive effect on Canadian morale. In January 1943, after a long stretch of miserable weather, Royal Rifle Frank Ebdon was delighted to see the sun as he started his day. In May 1943, Harry White recorded that something truly special had happened. On one of his regular evening walks he and a friend were blessed with “a most beautiful moonlight night, stars in the millions, when suddenly we saw what must have been some kind of Meteor, seemed quite large and the most brilliant colours streaking out behind it…a wonderful sight.”76 Perhaps this reminded White and his companion that beauty still existed, even in a world at war.

The abusive treatment by the Japanese and the conditions the POWs were made to live in were early warnings of how difficult their captivity would be. But several members of “C” Force recognized these challenges and swiftly worked out ways to overcome them showing character traits that would aid in their survival. They were duty bound to help their fellow soldiers and with luck and ingenuity they created the best possible living conditions within their means. Moreover, they worked hard to maintain a positive attitude, high morale, and a sense of humour. Prisoner diaries from Hong Kong are not just filled with the worst that incarceration brings, but also moments of hope, camaraderie, and determination. However, character can only benefit survival to a point. Other factors can be more important. A prisoner of war cannot survive without proper sustenance and this was always their primary concern. Unsurprisingly, there is nothing Hong Kong POWs mention more often than the struggle for food and health, the subject of the next chapter.