A Hitherto Unregarded Source...
—the British request
Of all possible theatres of employment for Canadian troops, the last to cross anyone's mind before the summer of 1941 would probably have been Hong Kong. Anyone, that is, except for one man, Major General A.E. Grasett, former General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong. The twin circumstances of his Canadian birth and his responsibility for the defence of Hong Kong between November 1938 and July 1941 can be held largely responsible for the chain of events culminating in the despatch of Canadian troops to the colony.
The defence of Hong Kong was something of an ideé fixé with Grasett. This is neither strange nor particularly reprehensible--the domination of an officer's military thinking by a single tactical problem for nearly three years is bound to make a lasting impression. Unfortunately, this fixation was accompanied by an exaggerated belief both in the defensibility of Hong Kong and in the Japanese soldier's lack of fighting quality. Grasett's compulsion to see his theories vindicated was to have a dire effect on almost 2,000 Canadians.
On 19 July 1941, Grasett handed over command at Hong Kong to Major General C.M. Maltby and left for England. Whether the route home which took him across Canada was selected for him or was his own choice is difficult to ascertain. Whichever the case, in August of that year Grasett was in Ottawa where he stopped off to have "long discussions" with the Chief of the Canadian General Staff, Major General H.D.G. Crerar. The two men had been contemporaries at Canada's Royal Military College in Kingston, although Crerar, starting out with the Royal Canadian Artillery, had spent his military career with the Canadian forces while Grasett upon graduation had joined the Royal Corps of Engineers and had spent his career in the British Army.
General H.D.G. Crerar. (Public Archives of Canada (PAC PA 804282)
The exact nature and tone of these discussions is unknown, the only information being Crerar's recollections and his testimony at the 1942 Royal Commission investigating the despatch of Canadian troops to Hong Kong. It is certain, however, that one of the topics covered would have been the military situation in Hong Kong. Grasett believed that the defensive capability of the colony had been persistently underrated by his superiors and expressed the view, as Crerar remembered it, that the "addition of two or more battalions to the forces then at Hong Kong would render the garrison strong enough to withstand for an extensive period of siege an attack by such forces as the Japanese could bring to bear against it." 25-1
This recollection of Crerar's is undoubtedly accurate. What remains and will probably continue to remain an enigma is to what degree Crerar encouraged Grasett in his hopes for Canadian participation. In his testimony concerning these discussions Crerar never mentioned any suggestion being made that Canada supply the troops Grasett wanted. It is nevertheless logical that the availability and disposition of Canadian battalions would come up in the course of the conversations without reference to Hong Kong. It would have been strange for Grasett to suggest to his superiors the probable willingness of Canada to supply troops for Hong Kong without at least a tacit commitment from the Canadian Chief of General Staff. The virtual rubber-stamp endorsement given by Crerar to the subsequent British request gives some indication that it came as no surprise to him. On the other hand, Grasett appears to have possessed an incredibly sanguine disposition and it is within the bounds of probability that any reaction on Crerar's part short of leaping to his feet and bellowing, "Never, no never!" might be interpreted as an affirmative reaction. We may never know.
Grasett was back in London by 3 September, when he reported to the War Office where he was present at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff. In addition to briefing them on his view of the Hong Kong situation, he submitted his proposal that the garrison be increased by two battalions. For the first time, at least in writing, he made the suggestion that Canada might be willing to supply the troops.
Grasett does not appear to have gained unanimous acceptance of his point of view. What appears to be an extract from the content of the meeting states that:
- Canada could probably find the troops
- Any troops sent would be practically untrained
- The political effect might be undesirable in that it might result in greater attention being given to the Japanese menace to the Canadian Western Seaboard, with the consequent locking up of troops in the Vancouver area. 26-2
Major General J.N. Kennedy, Director of Military Operations and Plans, stated in a draft minute to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill,
I agree that in view of Mr. Mackenzie King's recent speech indicating the desire for Canadian troops to be placed in the front line of battle, and in view of the greater interest now being shown by the Canadian Government in the Pacific, it might now be possible to obtain small reinforcements from Canada for Hong Kong.
I suggest, however, that this factor should not be allowed to induce you to reverse your present policy of sending no reinforcements to Hong Kong. The Canadians might never be involved in a front line battle, and, if they are, it will merely mean more forces being locked up in a fortress which at the moment has very little chance of being relieved. 26-3
This minute was never sent to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but was instead marked "CANCELLED". What prompted Kennedy's change of mind is unknown, but what he actually sent, dated 7 September 1941, was: "If you think General Grasett has made out a good case, the Chiefs of Staff may wish to submit it to the Prime Minister." 26-4
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff must have decided that Grasett had made out a good case, for on that same day a note was drafted for submission to the Prime Minister by the Chiefs of Staff:
We have taken the opportunity of discussing the present situation in Hong Kong with Major General GRASETT, who was commanding the garrison in that colony until 19th July.
Major General Grasett brought up again the question of an infantry reinforcement of the garrison which he suggests the Canadian Government might be agreeable to provide. He considers that the garrison is insufficient to provide any reserve to meet eventualities. Three battalions man sectors on the island, while the fourth battalion has to be withdrawn from the mainland after effecting a programme of demolitions, and then becomes responsible for the defence of the southern beaches. To have reinforced a year ago would have been to throw good money after bad. The situation is now so changed that in 4½ months relief might be possible and such a reinforcement might well prolong resistance for a further considerable period.
The present policy is that Hong Kong is to be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible (C.O.B. (40) 592 para. 37). Though it has been decided not to send reinforcements, in the event of war, it was never intended that the forces available to the commander should not be adequate for the task. We agree that, at present, the available forces are insufficient to implement the defence plan, which is to deny to the enemy the dry dock and harbour for 130 days.
A small reinforcement of one or two battalions would increase the strength of the garrison out of all proportion to its numbers, and would provide a strong psychological stimulus to the garrison and to the colony. It would show Chiang Kai Shek that, in spite of our wide commitments, we really intend to fight it out at Hong Kong, and would also have a salutary effect on the Japanese.
You will remember this policy was last reviewed in January, 1941 (Your minute No. D 9/1 of 7th January, 1941 to Major-General Ismay refers), when it was decided not to send any more reinforcements to Hong Kong. Since then, however, the position in the Far East has changed radically and Japan has shown a certain weakness latterly in her attitude towards Great Britain and the United States.
Recently the United States has displayed a greater interest in the Far East and have despatched small reinforcements to the garrison of the Philippines. Reinforcement of Hong Kong from Canada would thus be accepting a wider commitment in Imperial defence, similar to that which has been assumed by Australia in Malaya.
For these reasons, the Chief of Staff consider that a reinforcement of up to two battalions infantry should now be made to the garrison of Hong Kong. If the Prime Minister approves, we suggest that Mr. Mackenzie King should be approached with a view to obtaining this reinforcement. 27-5
This draft note was discussed at the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 10 September. There is no record of the actual give-and-take of the meeting, but it is apparent that the statement "in 4 1/2 months relief might be possible", vague though it might be, was too much for the Chief of Naval Staff to swallow. He drew attention to it and stated that he "considered this misleading". 27-6 The note eventually sent to Churchill and dated 10 September read:
PRIME MINISTER
On the 3rd September, the Chiefs of Staff heard an interesting account on the present situation in Hong Kong from General Grasett who had been General Officer Commanding there until July. From this, one important point arose.
2. The present defence policy at Hong Kong is that the Island is to be regarded as an outpost and held as long as possible. In describing the tasks of the force in Hong Kong General Grasett said that of the army garrison of four battalions, one was to be deployed on the mainland and charged with the task of withdrawing to the Island after carrying out extensive demolitions. This battalion was also needed for the defence of the Island. It was essential therefore that it should be safely extricated from the mainland. He pointed out the great advantages to be obtained from the addition of one or two battalions and suggested that these might be supplied by Canada.
3. The Chiefs of Staff have previously advised against the despatch of more reinforcements to Hong Kong because they considered that it would only have been to throw good money after bad, but the position in the Far East has now changed. Our defences in Malaya have been improved and Japan has latterly shown a certain weakness in her attitude towards Great Britain and the United States.
4. A small reinforcement of one or two battalions would increase the strength of the garrison out of all proportion to the actual numbers involved, and it would provide a strong stimulus to the garrison and to the Colony. Further, it would have a great moral effect in the whole of the Far East and it would show Chiang Kai Shek that we really intend to fight it out at Hong Kong.
5. The United States have recently despatched a small reinforcement to the Philippines and a similar move by Canada would be in line with the United States Policy of greater interest in the Far East.
6. The Chiefs of Staff are in favour of the suggestion that Canada should be asked to send one or two battalions to Hong Kong, and submit this proposal for your approval. If you agree, the necessary approach would be made through the Dominions Office.7
It will be noted that the suggestion as to the possibility of relief after 4½ months has been completely eliminated from the minute, as has the reference to the possibility of the proposed reinforcements prolonging resistance.
Churchill was prepared to accept the recommendation of his Chiefs of Staff. On 15 September he noted: "It is a question of timing. There is no objection to the approach being made as proposed; but a further decision should be taken before the battalions actually sail."'8
No time was wasted once the Prime Minister's approval had been obtained. On 19 September 1941 the following telegram was sent by the Dominions Office to the Canadian government via the Department of External Affairs:
No. 162 MOST SECRET
In consultation with late General Officer Commanding who has recently arrived in this country we have been considering the defences of Hong Kong. Approved policy has been that Hong Kong should be regarded as an out-post and held as long as possible in the event of war in the Far East. Existing army garrison consists of four battalions of infantry and although this force represents the bare minimum required for the task assigned to it we have thought hitherto that it would not ultimately serve any useful purpose to increase the garrison.
Position in the Far East has now, however, changed. Our defences in Malaya have been improved and there have been signs of a certain weakening in Japan's attitude towards us and the United States.
In these circumstances it is thought that small re-inforcement of the garrison of Hong Kong, e.g. by one or two more battalions, would be very fully justified. It would increase the strength of the garrison out of all proportion to the actual numbers involved and it would provide a strong stimulus to the garrison and to the Colony, it would further have a very great moral effect in the whole of the Far East and would reassure Chiang Kai Shek as to the reality of our intention to hold the Island.
His Majesty's Government in Canada will be well aware of the difficulties we are at present experiencing in providing the forces which the situation in various parts of the world demands, despite the very great assistance which is being furnished by Dominions. We should therefore be most grateful if the Canadian Government would consider whether one or two Canadian battalions could be provided from Canada for this purpose. [underlined in original] It is thought that in view of their special purpose in the North Pacific the Canadian Government would in any case have wished to be informed of the need, as we see it, for the reinforcement of Hong Kong and the special value of such a measure, even though on a very limited scale, at the present time. It may also be mentioned that the United States have recently despatched a small re-inforcement to the Philippines. It would be of the greatest help if the Canadian Government would cooperate with us in the manner suggested and we much hope that they will feel able to do so.
If the Canadian Government agree in principle to send one or two battalions we should propose to communicate with you again as to the best time for their despatch having regard to the general political situation in the Far East. [underlined in original] 29-9
The foregoing documents have been quoted in full in order to observe the evolution of the content of the request to Canada. It can be seen that the actual military requirement is progressively played down while the diplomatic and political aspect is correspondingly emphasized.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the telegram of 19 September and the previous notes is the reference to Hong Kong being viewed as an outpost. The notes say that the present policy is that Hong Kong should be regarded as an outpost, whereas the telegram says that the policy has been. In any event, it was on this telegram alone that the Canadian government's decision was based.