No Reason Why (Second Edition)

The Canadian Army Should Take This On...

—the Canadian response

When the telegram carrying the British request arrived, the Minister of National Defence, the Honorable J.L. Ralston, was absent in the United States, and the Minister of National Defence for Air, the Honorable C.G. Power, was acting in his place. That morning, Power met the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services on the street and they "discussed the matter at some length". 31-1 By the next meeting of the War Committee of the Cabinet, they had decided to take on the commitment.

Before describing the actual authorization of Canadian participation in the defence of Hong Kong, it might be useful to examine what Canada's leaders thought her role should be in the Second World War. There is no doubt that these leaders, along with most Canadians, felt that the Dominion should do everything possible to help the United Kingdom win the war. This did not mean that Canada should be required to commit her troops and her armaments blindly. Unlike the case in the First World War, the defence of Canada was a factor which had to be considered. Prime Minister Mackenzie King wrote a memo on 5 September, 1939, on the "Question of Canadian Overseas Forces", outlining his beliefs on the broad policy to be followed.

The Government should have much clearer information than is yet available of the war operations planned or intended by the British and Allied governments. It is not enough to simply get suggestions from the British as to what Canadian action would be the most effective, without at the same time having the information in question, so that the Canadian government can form their own judgement,whether the Canadian action suggested would in reality be the most effective. 31-2

Later that year Brigadier H.D.G. Crerar, the man who was to become Canada's top military officer and the man who was Chief of the General Staff at the time of the British request, wrote down his ideas of general policy:

In view of the war effort they are making, Canada and the other Dominions have a right to be consulted on policy, and to be kept advised of the strategic position. Spasmodic issues of information will not be enough…

When the Dominions are asked to furnish troops or air forces, they ought to be told how it is proposed to employ them, and this cannot be done once and for all, but must be a continuous process throughout the war. If we are to cooperate to the full, we must have full knowledge.

... Some machinery, therefore, should be set up, preferably within the framework of the Committee of Imperial Defence, so that the Dominions, through their representatives on the staff of the High Commissioners, may obtain full information on the current military situation, and the strategy designed to meet it. 32-3

When the time came to put these policies into practice however, the leaders of Canada proved to be remarkably uninquisitive. This is all the more surprising considering that the Canadian government did have enough information at their disposal to form their own opinions on the matter. Hong Kong defence schemes, intelligence reports, Japanese diplomatic intelligence, and similar relevant material, were all in Canadian hands, and a brief glance at the first two in particular would have (or should have) given them pause.

C.G. Power, the Associate Minister of National Defence, stated at the hearings of the Royal Commission investigating the despatch of Canadian troops to Hong Kong: "I do not think there was ever any question really, or any discussion as between General Crerar and myself, as to any reason why we should not take it on." Power recognized that Hong Kong was in a rather poor position, but "took it for granted that the military authorities had assessed all that." Power considered the Dominions Office argument sufficiently strong. The battalions could be spared, therefore the United Kingdom should have them.

Power had always felt that "if it were possible and we could spare the men, [we] should send men to other theatres of war..." On 24 September, Power and Crerar had a long talk and concluded that two battalions could be taken away from home defence forces. Power did not ask, however, for any sort of military appreciation of the defensibility of Hong Kong. 33-4

Judging by the minutes, the discussion of the subject at the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 23 September was very short. The telegram was read and agreement in principle was reached. Mackenzie King insisted on first gaining the assent of Ralston, the Minister of National Defence, and obtaining the advice of General McNaughton in England. 33-5

Ralston was located at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, and an officer at the Canadian Legation in Washington was sent out to contact him. The officer, who brought with him a copy of the 19 September telegram, was instructed to tell Ralston that the "War Committee is prepared to accept... CGS sees no military risk in despatching Canadian Battalions for this purpose.” 33-6 When the copy of the telegram reached the Minister, he went over it very carefully.The message implied that time was of the essence, so by that night he had made his decision. His reasons for accepting the proposal were largely contained in the telegram itself. Two battalions would do more than such a force normally could. Japan was to be given a show of strength which might cause them to hesitate, and China would be reassured. All these elements "seemed to me to make  a decision in the affirmative almost inevitable unless there was some overriding factor that made that impossible or undesirable." Other circumstances also had their effect. Ralston was acutely conscious that the United States was not yet ready for war, and anything that prevented her and Japan from clashing was all to the good. Another, perhaps major influence was that Ralston felt "it was Canada's turn to help.... Australia had been doing a great deal in Libya and elsewhere; the New Zealanders had been in Crete; and the South Africans in Abyssinia."

The only doubt that Ralston had was on the matter of military feasibility. Ralston wanted to reassure himself on this point, as he could "remember Hong Kong being an outpost to be held as long as possible. I think that was generally understood." 33-7 He therefore telephoned Crerar that night to obtain confirmation. Crerar later testified that "I told him that I had definitely recommended that the Canadian Army should take this on.” 33-8 Probably the last real chance the government had of going into the request in depth disappeared with these words. Ralston arranged for an answer approving in principle to be sent to Ottawa via Washington.

The Honorable Angus L. Macdonald, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, was to tell a similar story at the Commission. The reasons given in the cable seemed to make sense to him, and he knew that the naval strength in the Far East was in the process of being reinforced, (the Prince of Wales and the Repulse). Beyond this was a simple desire to help. Macdonald stated emphatically, "I do not think it was thinkable for this country to offer a negative answer to the request of the United Kingdom." 34-9

At a further meeting of the War Committee on 20 October 1941, at which Ralston was present, the final decision was made to notify the British that Canadian troops would be made available to reinforce Hong Kong. Mackenzie King participated very little in the discussion, except to make it plain that "agreement in that particular did not later afford an argument for conscription." 34-10